CHARLES I’s determination not to release control of the militia, ‘not for an hour’, brought to a head the conflict with his opponents and eventually led to war. At the Restoration the crown’s inalienable right to exercise this control was one of the first powers to be quickly and firmly re-established. Thus there seems to be a prima facie argument that the militia was a vital institution, and yet it has often been derided. The attempts of country bumpkins to learn the arts of war and to create an armed force capable of withstanding foreign invasion has provided a target for the criticism and ridicule of contemporaries, and some later historians. In addition, after the Restoration when internal divisions, plots and rebellions, as well as foreign attacks seriously threatened king and country, the local militia has often appeared to have had a shadowy existence. This article attempts to show, by reference to one county, the militia’s continued survival, and to suggest some reasons by an examination of its real importance in a wider context, and through a discussion of contemporary attitudes towards it.

I

The three regiments and horse troops comprising the Lancashire county militia were organised, administered and controlled by the lord lieutenant with the indispensable support of his deputies and militia officers. During our period the Lancashire lieutenancy was held by Charles Stanley, eighth earl of Derby, by Lord Bridgewater during the minority of William the ninth earl of Derby who took office in 1676, and briefly at the end of James II’s reign by the catholic Lord Molyneux. The group of deputies, drawn from the greater gentry, varied in number from between six and ten in the early years of the Restoration to about twenty from the 1670s.
Their main administrative duties were ordering the musters and the militia’s training, calling the troops out on duty at times of local and national emergency, ensuring the forces were up to strength by assessing the contributions of the community and dealing with those who defaulted, and levying taxes to pay the officers’ wages, powder and match, and such military paraphernalia as drums and regimental colours. To carry out these tasks the deputies, joined from time to time by the lord lieutenant, met together either as one body or in their regional groups. The administrative arrangements for dealing with the militia were more loosely structured than other aspects of local government, resembling rather the ad hoc arrangements with which the justices of peace dealt with out-of-sessions business than the regular and formal quarter sessions. This tendency appears to have developed after the Restoration, for whereas the early seventeenth-century practice of holding general meetings of all the deputies at Preston was continued, increasingly after 1660 they met in smaller groups of two or three in their own divisions of the county, often in their homes or some nearby inn. Gradually as the emphasis of the militia’s work changed, the latter divisional meetings became more frequent than the former.

The administrative divisions corresponded with the local regions on which the three regiments were based. Thus the deputy lieutenants of Lonsdale and Amounderness, the northern division, usually held their meetings at Lancaster, whilst those for Leyland and Derby were often held at Ormskirk or Wigan. This looser structure was, of course, much more suited to dealing with the sudden emergencies with which the lieutenancy had to contend. Orders and information from the government to the lord lieutenant were transmitted from one deputy to the next until the 1670s when the divisional system was more developed. The lord lieutenant’s instructions were then sent to the principal deputy of each division, for example Robert Holt for the Salford and Blackburn hundreds, and communicated by him to his particular colleagues.

Although the militia acts enjoined the regular mustering of the trained bands, without the close attention of the central government or the lord lieutenant’s diligence in calling them, the lieutenancy operated at a more irregular pace than in the 1630s. The pattern which emerges in Lancashire closely resembles at first sight the general picture which Western has drawn: the first decade of Charles II’s reign, and the period 1661 to 1663 in particular, saw the greatest administrative activity amongst the deputies. During this period seven
meetings on average were held each year, whilst in the second
decade to 1679 the frequency had declined to an average of
there. Finally, for four of the last years of our period no
recorded meetings took place, and only an average of 2.6 were
held during the remaining time. The deputies seem to have
kept individual records of their meetings, written up by their
own clerks, and thus the evidence of their activity is more
subject to the individual situations and circumstances than for
example that of the Norfolk deputies who employed a militia
clerk.\(^5\) His detailed records suggest there was continuous
militia activity in that county throughout this period, whereas
by contrast in Lancashire the records have been kept more
haphazardly. In this instance the lack of detailed records does
not prove that the deputies were inactive, and other evidence
discussed later suggests a contrary picture. The apparent
decline in militia activity, suggested by a comparison of
average numbers of meetings, is more an indication of the
changed emphasis of the militia’s work and the decentralised
system of administration which had grown up in the county,
than of an absolute decline.

The first administrative task in 1660 was to settle the
militia, and the deputies relied heavily upon the former
system in such matters as the number of foot soldiers to be
supplied by each of the hundreds. Prior to 1642 the county
militia had consisted of 600 foot soldiers in the trained bands,
each hundred supplying 100 men, and a troop of 100 horse-
men. As a result of conciliar pressure in the 1630s the horse
had been increased to 109 by 1636 in the official returns,
though the county could raise at least 159 horse. In addition
there had been a reserve force of 7000, of whom 1800 had been
armed with musket or pike, and this smaller force had begun
to receive training in the 1630s as a result of the privy
council’s attempt to create an ‘exact militia’. It had become a
superior reserve force, manned by the freeholders or their
substitutes, and known as the freehold bands instead of the
‘untrained forces’, its former name.\(^6\) The events of 1642 had
overturned this peace-time provision, but it was to this earlier
system that the deputies turned in late 1660. In addition, since
1624 there had been an agreed rating system for the county to
provide men or money for the militia, and this table of rates
with details of the Soldiers’ Ley, as well as other taxes, was
widely available. It contained not only the proportions paid
by the six hundreds but also information for each township.\(^7\)
The hundreds contributed at the following proportionate
rates: Lonsdale 16 per cent, Amounderness 19 per cent,
Blackburn 18 per cent, Salford 14 per cent, Leyland 9 per cent, Derby 24 per cent. The years after 1642 witnessed a further development in that the organisation of the militia hardened into three geographical divisions, on each of which a regiment was based. In November 1660 the deputies decided that the foot should consist of 667 men raised in each of the three divisions, of whom 100 from each were to be the trained band. The total of foot was to be 2001 men.\(^9\) The horse was divided into three troops, one associated with each foot regiment, and each was to be approximately 50 strong; the county complement of horse troop officers was twelve.\(^9\) Each regiment was known either by its colonel’s name or the colour of the uniform worn by the foot. The Red regiment was based on the northern division of Lonsdale and Amounderness, the Blue, which was the lord lieutenant’s regiment, on the southwest division of Leyland and Derby, and the third one, Colonel Nowell’s, was based on Blackburn and Salford hundreds.\(^9\) The absence of regular general musters of the whole county force enhanced the regional rather than county characteristics of this force.

The second militia act, passed in May 1662, required some revision of the November 1660 settlement in Lancashire, and of the rating system which had financed that settlement. It also gave the deputies an opportunity to remedy some of the criticisms of the old, traditional system. Following the valuation of real and personal estate which they had ordered the constables to complete, they agreed on a force of 1802 foot soldiers for the county which was to be proportioned amongst the hundreds according to a new rate — the Middle Ley. This was their attempt to meet complaints about the inequalities of the Soldiers’ Ley, and was based at a mid-point between the two county rates, the Soldiers’ and the Ox Ley (the latter being the purveyance tax raised for the crown before the civil war).\(^1\) The new levy increased the assessment on certain townships, and the inhabitants of Dalton-in-Furness, for example, put up a prolonged resistance into the 1680s to the new charges. After the 1662 settlement it seems correct to regard the old divisions between trained and freehold bands as having disappeared and to think of the militia as a single body of foot and horse troops. In the neighbouring county a paper of 1666, containing details of the Macclesfield hundred’s foot soldiers, states these are the troops charged by the militia acts, ‘the gentlemen’s freehold band being laid aside by the Act of Militia 1662’\(^1\)

The militia was not yet finally settled. The 1662 act had set
down the criteria under which contributions to either the foot or the horse were to be made: for example, those with incomes of £500 a year or an estate of £6000 were to supply a horse trooper, those with incomes of £50 or an estate valued at £600 were to contribute a foot soldier. Not every member of the Commons had agreed that these rates were satisfactory, and during the debates on the second militia bill Sir John Holland, a deputy lieutenant from Norfolk, had voiced his opposition because he declared the rates were too high and predicted a decline in the size of the militia.¹³ Though his claim of a 50 per cent reduction was exaggerated, the 1662 act seems to have caused a decrease in the Lancashire militia: the new force of foot was reduced in November that year from 2001, agreed in 1660, to 1802. The lower limit of £50 had exempted 200 people from contributing towards the foot. The third militia act of July 1663 therefore attempted to remedy this defect and other weaknesses of the previous legislation. The new act empowered the deputies to raise contributions from people with incomes of less than £50, and did not specify a limit below which contributions were not to be levied. Often parliamentary legislation gave legal force to what was already customary practice, and this seems to have happened in respect of the contributions from the less wealthy, in one county at least. In February 1663 the Lancashire deputies had already ordered people who were without their own land, and not charged towards the horse, to become contributors to those charged at the £50 rate.¹⁴ This decision had not been designed to increase the number of foot soldiers, which remained at 1802, but seems to have been intended to spread the burden of their upkeep rather more widely than would otherwise have been the case. The 1663 act may not have caused any increase in the size of the militia but had the important effect of spreading the burden of its support more widely over the community. Despite the objections of a few, the requirements to contribute to the militia foot cannot have been intolerable.

Unlike the foot, the three horse troops were not based strictly on their respective hundreds. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the wealthy gentry were not evenly distributed throughout the county and it was therefore necessary for the captains of the horse to be able to draw upon contributions from other hundreds. The northern troop, for example, was in fact drawn from gentlemen in four of the six hundreds, and similarly the lord lieutenant’s troop was not confined to gentry from Leyland and Derby. It is possible that alternative explanations account for the practice, particularly
in the latter case, as service in the elite troop may have been eagerly sought after. The horse constituted about six per cent of the whole militia, each troop being between 40 and 50 strong, and the task of assessing contributions towards it had been made easier after the Restoration because the deputies no longer had to impose their own assessment system. The set rates for contributions to the militia meant they were to be concerned only with obtaining an evaluation of wealth, though this was not necessarily a straightforward task.

In order to involve as many of the propertied classes in the country’s defence, as well as to draw upon their wealth to provide a force adequate for this task, the 1662 militia act had empowered the lieutenants to assess persons with incomes of between £100 and £500 towards the horse troops. Persons worth £500 per annum were to supply a horse, rider, arms and ammunition, and pay, but in addition the same provision could be made by a ‘principal’ and his ‘contributors’ whose combined income amounted to £500. After the reassessments in late 1662, following the second militia act, two-fifths of Sir Roger Bradshaigh’s troop were provided by a single contributor, whilst of the remainder, 16 troopers were provided jointly by a principal and two contributors, and 15 by a principal and one contributor usually on a half share basis. During the reassessments 15 gentlemen who had formerly contributed singly had their contributions reduced, either, as in one or two cases, from two horses to one, or by being joined with other partners. Although the evidence does not lend itself to exact interpretation, it seems as though the militia act had succeeded in involving many more of the gentry in the militia’s upkeep. Although the total number of horse troops may not have increased significantly this was perhaps not regarded as a disadvantage by the government because the maintenance of the militia had been distributed more evenly, and especially as more of the propertied classes had become directly involved with the preservation of church and state.

Evidence of changes in the number of horse in the northern troop indicate that the deputies carried out a regular updating of the charge of arms. As circumstances affecting families altered there was a constant need for reassessments to be made. Appointment as an officer in the militia carried with it a discharge from paying contributions, and when Barnaby Hesketh was made a captain in 1672 his partner William Blundell begged the deputies to find another contributor. Until they had done so his own contributions were suspended. Other alterations came as the result of comp-
laints about assessment, and readjusting contributions was a frequent aspect of the deputies’ work. During the early period whilst the militia was being settled there was a burst of this activity, and the greatest number of recorded reassessments was made in November and December 1662. There is evidence of the deputies’ reassessing contributions throughout the period, indicating they continued to manage the militia on a regular basis.

We can now summarise the strength of the Lancashire militia: after 1662, and for most of our period, the militia foot numbered about 1800 men. The horse comprised 160, although numbers in each troop fluctuated. This was somewhat larger than the militia of several other counties: Cheshire, for example, mustered 114 horse and 1140 foot, Northamptonshire had a total of 1047, and the North Riding 1298 men. On the other hand, Lancashire’s militia was small compared with the vast force of 5289 mustered in Norfolk.

The changes in the numbers of militia soldiers which were effected in the 1660s were paralleled by recognition of a fundamental change in the concept of personal services which had characterised the traditional militia. The appearance of paid soldiers and professional armies in the civil war was reflected in the Restoration militia acts. After 1662 it was no longer obligatory for men of wealth to be personally involved in defending their homeland, provided they sent suitable substitutes. Shortly after the second militia act had been passed the government introduced the scheme whereby the wealthier classes could contribute a yearly payment of £10 towards the militia in lieu of supplying a horse and rider, despite the fact the Commons had specifically rejected the proposal. It suggests that in the early 1660s the government had been intent upon establishing a militia which would become a thoroughly professional and useful armed force. A further indication of the change in the concept of the militia arises from the idea that the distinction between the ‘freehold’ and ‘trained bands’ was no longer made, and that the term itself fell into disuse. Once, the former companies had been the preserve of the freeholders who seem to have been personally involved, and the idea that the militia would be manned by ‘hirelings’ and substitutes was unwelcome to some of the gentry in the early 1660s. Sir Roger Bradshaigh, for example, was worried by the idea of substitutes amongst the militia because it was ‘very disgustive [sic] to some of the better and abler sort to serve equally in rank with such mean hirelings’. The snobbery is evident, but it was not the real
reason for his anxiety, which arose rather from his concern that the militia would become manned by men who posed a real threat to the restored social order. ‘Persons as having nothing to lose or forfeit’ he wrote, ‘should not again have the spear put in their hands, the said consequences thereof being too well known already’. However, the social order was not overturned and by the 1670s the deputies in Lancashire could look upon the idea of ‘hirelings’ in their militia with less suspicion. Their attitude may have been partly shaped by knowledge of what function the militia had come to perform. It had become less of a main defence against an invasionary force, when personal service was expected, and more an agency for ‘animating the well-disposed and aweing the disaffected mobile’. A force such as this could be more efficiently serviced by means of a locally raised rate, administered through the parish constables, than by the personal participation of the propertied classes.

The gentlemen who sustained the horse troops were not obliged to turn out for the musters or go on duty themselves, and the troopers they sent were often their servants or tenants. Sir Roger Bradshaigh, who clearly took great pride in the troop he captained, undertook to enlist suitable riders for several gentlemen from the Furness area who contributed to his troop. He also made arrangements to supply weapons and equipment for them. Such direct concern would undoubtedly have produced a well-equipped and competent trooper. There is no certainty, however, that all riders were able. Indeed one criticism of the militia’s potential was that the troopers were often servants whose service with a gentleman was not necessarily for life, thus preventing any real development of their military skill. Some of the ‘inferior’ officers such as corporals seem to have served in the militia for long periods, though the lack of evidence has made it impossible to establish whether there were frequent changes amongst the troopers. If their military expertise was not of prime concern, then this lack of continuity was less serious than a critic suggested in 1666. ‘Able’ was a term to be interpreted less by criteria of physical fitness or military expertise than by those of loyalty to the crown and religious conformity. The deputies were directed in the 1662 act to remove soldiers who refused the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and though the details of how many were removed are not known, in 1663 and 1673 they took these steps and warned their countrymen to send well-affected replacements. In a county with a high proportion of catholic gentry the task may have been a sizeable one,
and the deputies' actions may have achieved a militia whose reliability in controlling the civilian population could have been counted upon.

The importance of the militia's reliability was of immediate and lasting concern to those who supported the restored Stuarts. It was necessary to establish a competent and trustworthy force in every county to maintain internal security. To this end the Lancashire deputies, encouraged by their lord lieutenant, had worked effectively to settle the militia. Sir Roger Bradshaigh wrote with satisfaction in December 1663, 'the militia is so well settled there is time for recreation.' They had also acted responsibly in trying to distribute the burden of its upkeep as fairly as possible upon the local community although there were numerous complaints about assessments.

Such complaints were largely predictable, and usually on the grounds that the assessment was inequitable, rather than iniquitous. Failure to appear at musters, or to send correctly-equipped troops were other symptoms of the same reluctance to support the militia, and the complaints were always loudest when the militia was more active, as in the early 1660s. But there is little evidence the militia presented more than a minor grievance to grumble about. There were occasions when people defaulted, and made incredible apologies about the state of their health or availability of their horses: William Walmesley's horse had died and he had 'parted with the man that rode him'; Lord Morley could not send his two horses as they were needed to convey Dr. Richmond from Liverpool to attend to his lordship's dislocated arm, a comment suggesting they were his coach horses. Other less frivolous reasons were put forward, particularly by the inhabitants of townships which felt their assessment was based on inaccurate valuation. The government had warned the lieutenants that the surest way of encouraging good support for the militia was by distributing the burden of it equally, and in December 1663 Lord Derby had instructed his deputies to meet regularly at certain towns, for example, at Roger Tootal's house in Bury every third Tuesday, to hear and redress complaints about the foot. Though it is not possible to say how frequently such sessions were held, or for how long, it is clear the deputies undertook to listen to complaints and to alter assessments, although it was often after a lengthy interval. For example, the inhabitants of Toxteth Park complained in July 1666 about the charge of foot; their assessment was not finally reduced from 5 to 4 soldiers until 1675. The complaint of the
townsfolk of Dalton-in-Furness took even longer to settle. In 1674 they claimed they bore a disproportionate burden of the foot charged on their part of the Lonsdale hundred; their case was still unresolved in 1685.30

The militia’s upkeep involved the whole community, and such representative examples of complaint are not evidence of a major sense of grievance against contributing. The fact that assessments were not made arbitrarily by the deputies, but after valuations had been made by other assessors, and against a known and and legal scale of contributions, as well as through a locally known and traditional rating system, probably accounts for the general acceptance of the militia’s upkeep.31 Restoration deputy lieutenants did not provide the target of criticism they had done in the early years of Charles I’s reign. What was significant was their willingness to listen to complaints and to undertake reassessments. The fact that they made them, and evidence occurs throughout the period, suggests too that the maintenance of the militia was a continuous concern.

The soldiers were paid according to the rates laid down, namely 2s. 6d. for a trooper and 1s. 0d. for a foot soldier for each day they were absent from their home and work, the pay being provided by those charged to contribute towards the militia. Additionally, the deputies were empowered to levy money for ammunition and other ‘necessaries’ such as trumpets and ‘trophies’. The amount which the deputies could raise from their county was determined by the £70,000 levy which Charles II had been granted for three years after 1662. Lancashire’s contribution amounted to £933 6s. 8d. and this was used as the basis for calculating what was to be levied. From 1665 the amount became fixed at one quarter of this levy, namely £233 6s. 8d. which was then divided amongst the hundreds and townships according to the rating of the Middle Ley. Yearly from 1665 to 1677 the deputies levied this sum except in 1668 and 1671, and during the period 1670 to 1679 they expended £1,175 on the militia at an average rate of £117 per annum, retaining healthy balances in hand of £301 (1673) £410 (1675) and £323 (1680).32 The largest proportion of the money was paid to the officers, though up to the mid-1670s regular sums were also spent on powder, match and ball. During the last years of the period there are few references to the militia tax being levied except in 1685 and late in 1688, though the officers continued to receive their pay at least until 1685.33

The money raised for the militia was very modest and was
used quite sparingly by the deputies who clearly felt accountable to the community. The amount in hand in 1680 would have covered the ordinary costs for about three years and it is probable that no further money was levied until 1685 when there was ‘very little money or none in the treasurer’s hands.’ Thus the maintenance of the militia after 1660 did not arouse the protests it had done during Charles I’s reign because it was no longer regarded as an unwarranted financial burden, and moreover it was seen as serving a useful purpose by those who contributed most towards its upkeep. Absence of information about the militia tax after 1677, together with our earlier conclusion that assessing contributions was not a particular problem, could be interpreted as evidence that the militia was largely inactive during the last years of Charles II’s reign. Despite Western’s original view that the militia decayed, there is a case to be made that it remained active until James II’s reign.

The Lancashire deputy lieutenants held their administrative meetings for the county, or their own divisions, regularly from 1660 to 1677, except during 1668 and 1671. They also seem to have met in 1680, 1683, 1685, and in late 1688 after Lord Derby had been restored to his commission. The incidence of only four administrative sessions in eleven years would lead credence to Western’s interpretation, but it seems probable that lack of evidence rather than lack of activity is the explanation of this picture. Evidence for the levying of the militia tax on the county corroborates the pattern of the deputies’ activity: the weekly tax was raised regularly from at least 1655 to 1677, except in 1668 and 1671, but thereafter only in 1685. However, if we turn to the treasurer’s accounts of payments made to the officers for duty performed it seems there had been much greater activity amongst the troops and companies than the other sources suggest. Payments were made to the officers of foot and/or horse for 19 years during our period. The evidence emphasises the continuity of militia activity from at least 1663 to 1679, with a break in 1668 and 1676, and again from 1683 to 1686. A similar impression is created by the chance reference to the training or meetings of regiments and individual companies in a variety of other sources, and although there is no evidence that the three regiments met regularly each year, it seems that musters, training, or some form of militia activity took place during the greater part of this period.

The quarter sessions records, carefully kept by the clerk of the peace, include copies of the militia accounts submitted to
the deputies in the 1670s which show there had been musters as late as 1679. In addition the notebook kept by Thomas Barcroft, when high constable of Blackburn hundred, reveals he issued orders for militia training in his hundred in 1681, a year when lack of other evidence would have suggested there had been none. Finally, there are scraps of information amongst the papers of two Lancashire families, whose ancestors had been militia officers, which show the foot companies from Lonsdale and Leyland had been mustered during 1684. On the negative side, however, there is no evidence of any militia activity during the five years, 1668, 1676, 1680, 1682 and 1687, though the deputies themselves had met in 1676 and 1680. It would seem therefore that militia activity was a routine part of the county's annual rhythm until James II discouraged it in 1687.

Evidence of the militia tax and of payments to the officers, together with information about the deputy lieutenants' meetings, suggest the foregoing conclusion about the Lancashire lieutenancy. There is, however, little detailed evidence which records whether the troops were adequately trained. We do not know, for example, whether the muster master did more than make lists of absent soldiers or note the extent of defects in weapons and equipment. Nor do we know what constituted the 'duty done' for which the officers had so regularly been paid. It is true that the militia accounts disclose the purchase of powder, match, and ball, but the question is whether firing practice consisted of more than letting-of volleys to impress the neighbourhood, rather than of target practice. Dryden's oft-quoted verdict on the militia,

'Mouths without hands; maintained at vast expense,
In peace a charge, in war a weak defence,
Stout once a month they march, a blustering band,
And ever, but in times of need, at hand.'

has created one impression, but other less audience-conscious comments may perhaps provide a more accurate picture of these amateur troops. On 19th March 1669 Roger Lowe recorded that whilst attending a funeral 'as we came into Winwick churchyard, Capt. Risley's soldiers were training and when we were at prayers in the church... the soldiers discharged their muskets three times.' Edward Rawstorne, a local gentleman, noted in passing in a letter, that he had recently received a powder wound in his eye whilst exercising with his troops. The reference provides some proof that in 1670 the deputies' orders to train had been implemented at least in one part of the county. Neither the year 1669 nor
1670 was marked by major emergencies, which might have accounted for the militia's activities, and the comments seem to reveal it at routine practice. In June 1672, after their first day of training at Rochdale, the local company was ordered to its quarters for the night. It was 'usual to keep guard at night in order that the soldiers be afforded the experience of all points of duty', and whilst on duty the guard had challenged four drunken rowdies and shot one who failed to answer his challenge. Such references from non-emergency years suggest that the militia met regularly, though in the eyes of a professional soldier their training might not have been very impressive.

**TABLE 1  Militia administration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deputies' Meetings</th>
<th>Musters/Training</th>
<th>Militia Tax levied</th>
<th>Payments to Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tendency to compare the militia with a professional force is natural and not confined to historians. Capt. James Bellingham, a regular officer, observed the regiment of the Blackburn and Salford hundreds being trained and summarily dismissed what he had seen; ‘the militia companies and troop drew out. I saw them exercise very ill.’ The professional was not alone in his criticism of the militia’s activities, and Timothy Cragg, a yeoman from Wyresdale who had been a militiaman, wrote in later life,

‘when I was 22 years of age I was put on for a trained band soldier or one of the militia which certainly led to more jollity, talking and drinking and such like idleness, and we met to be trained yearly for some years, and an abundance of idleness there was to be seen and heard, though through mercy I was preserved from swearing though I heard abundance of it.’

Cragg later became a quaker, and his stictures on the morality he witnessed are less significant than his reference to the regular training of the Lonsdale and Amounderness foot bands. Circumstantial evidence that there was militia activity in the last years of Charles II’s reign is supported by a comment from William Stout of Lancaster who noted that during these years ‘the militia was raised a week or ten days every summer.’

References to swearing, drinking, and even to murder, can, however, reinforce an impression of the militia as a rabble-some rout, ill-disciplined, poorly trained, inadequately equipped, in short, a force quite incapable of protecting the country from a foreign invasion. The surviving evidence does little to dispel this view, and the militia can perhaps never quite escape from Dryden’s witty comments. On the other hand it had been active in Lancashire where it had been called upon to muster or train or perform some duty throughout Charles II’s reign and in the early years of his brother’s. What was true of Lancashire, a coastal county close to Ireland, populated by catholics and agitated by the strength of non-conformity, may not have been typical of the whole country. Its deputies may have been responding to particular local needs and circumstances. The county, however, was not unique in the degree of its militia activity. In 1681 the Oxfordshire militia were mustered and were ‘so well provided and in good order’ that Humphrey Prideaux considered it to be the best in the country. Evidence from Norfolk supports the view that the militia was active throughout this period until 1688. In the West Riding the militia was mustered regularly between 1678 and 1686, but afterwards although no general musters were held, particular musters of single troops and
companies continued. The militia thus seems to have remained an active and integral part of the life of the county community throughout a substantial part of this period. Why this was so arises essentially from the role it had to play.

II

The militia was the creature of the lieutenancy. As the emphasis of the lieutenancy’s involvement in local government changed between its inception in the sixteenth century and the civil war, so did the role of the militia. Thus under Elizabeth I the military functions of lieutenancy were of paramount importance, whilst during James I’s reign it came to encompass many different aspects of county government. Then, during the period of conciliar government in the 1630s, lieutenancy was expressly concerned with trying to create a perfect militia, thus once again emphasising its military aspect. At the Restoration, its immediate task was to protect the crown and the restored social order, and the militia came to be used both directly to constrain the wayward elements of society, and indirectly to encourage its conforming elements. Ceremonial appearances of the troops did much to remind the populace both of the crown’s authority, and who exercised that power in the locality. Sir Daniel Fleming, for example, had proclaimed the King’s declaration against the French accompanied by his foot soldiers who fired off a salvo and ‘gave a hearty shout to second the same.’ In Westmorland the militia escorted the assize judges into the county, in Hereford the local gentry and several militia companies welcomed the lord president of Wales as he passed through, whilst at Chester Lord Ormonde was escorted to and from the city by the trained bands who ‘gave him several volleys and shouts for a farewell.’ The efforts of Monmouth’s supporters in 1682 to bribe the local populace to give ‘his Grace some volleys’ shows what value continued to be placed upon such demonstrations.

Alongside such ceremonial functions the militia had a military role as a front-line defence against foreign invasions, but gradually during our period less emphasis was placed upon these functions and more upon the militia’s work in over-awing the civilian population. Charles II and James II could countenance a decline in the efficiency of the militia as an armed force of combatants because of the development of the crown’s regular forces. What was needed, however, were bodies of armed men clearly under the control of gentlemen
loyal to the crown, who would uphold the laws of the land and protect the crown’s interests. Thus gradually the militia developed first and foremost into a civil guard, with less emphasis being placed upon its military functions. There was no need for it to become an efficient army, and this change of emphasis helps to explain why the militia appeared to become very inactive, particularly during the 1670s.

At first sight the lack of substantial evidence of militia activity in the later part of Charles II’s reign does suggest a state of decline. But this was probably not so, for there is reason to believe, and as has been shown, some evidence to substantiate the view, that the militia was not in decay. The crown itself had no wish to weaken a force which served as an effective instrument of control over its political and religious enemies. In addition, evidence of support for the county forces during the Commons’ debates on the militia, particularly in 1678 and 1685, from country gentlemen, especially those critical of the court, attests the high regard in which it was widely held. Many members of the Parliament were themselves deputy lieutenants and/or militia officers: in the 1670s, for example, there were 241 deputies and 96 militia officers amongst the members. It is not possible to establish whether its supporters had genuine confidence in the militia’s strength, but it nevertheless provided them with a forceful counter-argument against a standing army. It is conceivable, too, that the shift in emphasis upon the militia’s work led to a decline in record keeping which was a result of a change in local organisational arrangements. If the militia was no longer seen as a front line defence against foreign invasion or major rebellions then the requirements to train it up as a large scale fighting force no longer seriously applied. The general musters of the whole militia accompanied by full military training were not really necessary. The harrying of dissenters, the arrest of political suspects, or the seizure of weapons were all activities which could be effectively carried out by small bodies of men, often horse troopers, who did not need lengthy training and disciplining in the arts of warfare. The complex manoeuvres, which had to be instilled into pikemen, if they were to be successful in battle, were inappropriate in the context of the policing functions which the militia had taken on. It had become the practice in Lancashire, for example, to leave arrangements for ‘particular’ as distinct from ‘general’ musters to the individual captains, under the direction of the deputies, and thus the militia may have continued to function at a divisional or regional level, despite the fact that the whole
county force was infrequently mustered together. In 1683 the complaint of a tory squire, Leftwich Oldfield, that there had been no general muster in Cheshire for five years, although suggesting the militia’s neglect, does not prove it had been totally inactive. Here a whig presence amongst the militia, suggested by the crown’s removals in the 1680s, nevertheless intimates that the local militia may not have been very busy in pursuit of whigs or dissenters. In contrast, however, in tory Lancashire, where the crown removed none of the militia officers, the hostility of many deputies and officers towards dissidents suggests a continuing use of their troops. This is, of course, not to argue they received large scale or elaborate training, nevertheless it could be the case that rather than declining in importance during the last years of Charles II’s reign, the militia became even more significant as the major instrument of internal security.

Lieutenancy’s main purpose was to contain those elements of society identified as scapegoats by the government, and the lord lieutenant remained the key agent through whom this control would be implemented. In Lancashire, the privy council showed extreme concern to instruct Lord Derby in 1680 to pursue several catholics, who had flouted authority and given great offence by riotously rescuing some of their fellow co-religionists from the sheriff’s custody, and to exact retribution. Later, in 1682, the militia soldiers were brought in to deal with a riot, again involving some catholics. The local justice of peace had first tried the normal measures by raising the hue and cry, but in a predominantly catholic area the result was dangerously disappointing; then some of the local militia troops were called upon to hunt down and arrest the rioters. The militia was thus seen as an important instrument for the maintenance of internal security, and one which could be summoned at times of need. It is clear from the comments of members of Parliament like Sir Hugh Cholmondeley and others in 1685 that they did not look upon the militia as useless. The voices raised in its defence in 1679 and 1685 arguing that it should be made more useful were pressing the point, not that it was in a worthless condition, but that it should be made more effective as an armed force to enable it to carry out the work of national defence, which the standing forces, supported by the crown, were threatening to assume. A revitalised militia would render any other armed force redundant.

Contemporary views such as this reflect the changes which had taken place in the militia’s role. In the 1660s it was seen
largely by the gentry as an amateur army intended substantially to defend crown and country, and as such, criticisms were levelled, by those who wanted a more effective force, at its military inadequacies. Subsequently with the growth of a standing army, which was capable of taking over these military functions, its virtues were extolled. Such contemporary attitudes both reflect its changing role and add further insight into its importance.

'The fear of standing armies had been born during the Commonwealth and remained alive after 1660 because the crown had gradually promoted the development of 'a good force of well-disciplined troops in constant pay.' Reaction against Cromwellian soldiers, major generals, and army rule had swung the political nation firmly behind the restored monarchy, and had made it so eager to restore the traditional, familiar and easily controllable militia into its hands. The militia acts of 1661–3 not only emphasised that the power of the sword belonged to the crown; but declared no-one else might aspire to claim it. Actual control of the militia, however, passed directly into the hands of the ruling classes by virtue of the restoration of commissions of lieutenancy, and indeed the King and his advisers seemed eager for this to happen, for as early as June 1660 the King began to settle the militia under the newly appointed lords lieutenant. The crown established a key safeguard for its own authority by retaining not only the right to appoint the lords lieutenant, but their deputies and the militia officers too. With the militia commanded and controlled by loyal men who held their prestigious office by virtue of the King's good will, the crown remained secure, and such regular troops as were retained were seen initially by the
government as a useful additional safeguard for the King’s person, and no more. However, a standing army did develop, and as its growth is not unconnected with changes in attitudes to the militia it is necessary to offer some comment.

Its development was stimulated partly by the crown’s foreign policies, which in provoking wars necessitated the establishment of armed forces, and partly by domestic policies which emphasised the militia’s police rather than military functions. But in addition, England had been affected by the development of ideas which has been termed the military revolution, for there is no prima facie reason to suppose that this phenomenon, which had led to the growth of vast and efficient armies in the major European states, had not affected the British Isles too. In Europe one effect had been the re-establishment of the distinction between soldier and civilian and the consequential decline of the militia system. A citizen army was both inefficient and increasingly anachronistic. In Spain for example, very few of the huge militia force were armed, whilst in France it received little regular training, being basically a reserve list. Such developments had occurred because a professional force existed to protect the state from its foreign and internal enemies. The changes taking place in the English militia from the mid-1670s taken together with the growth of a standing army suggest that similar developments were in train here as indicated first by the crown’s idea of creating a ‘select militia’ in the late 1660s and secondly by James II’s subsequent rejection of this citizen army. The first of these developments was stimulated by what Western has called the ‘court’ view of the militia, which was to find support amongst those who had no anxieties about the growth of the powers of central government.

The militia’s traditional purpose had been twofold: defence of the realm against foreign attack, and the maintenance of internal peace and security. When put to the test for the first time after the Restoration its performance in defending the country during the second Dutch war had not appeared especially impressive. In 1660 most gentry had warmly welcomed the return of their local militia, commanded as it was by men of good family and ancient lineage, of proven loyalty to the crown, and above all true sons of the church of England. Some of the officers also had expertise as soldiers, but they were essentially civilians, and the militia an amateur force. There was nothing unsatisfactory in such a situation until the country was threatened by war, and when this occurred the militia was viewed in a different light. Many Englishmen in
the 1660s had known war, experienced battles and sieges, seen armies on the march, and thus some were quick to point out the inadequacies of the militia forces. The government, faced by a foreign invasion, was itself eager to have an effective defence force and promoted the idea of the ‘select militia.’ This concept followed closely the Cromwellian model: namely a force which, although smaller, would be better trained and equipped and therefore more proficient. The idea gained ground amongst the crown’s supporters. At the end of June 1666, for instance, the government received an anonymous letter arguing that the militia should be ‘put down’ and the money used for a standing force. At the same moment (2 July) the crown issued an order for raising three horse regiments out of the county militia. Clearly the letter had been planted.58

There were those, however, who had worked out rather more careful reasons why the existing militia should be remodelled, and their support for the concept of a ‘select militia’ is made clear in a series of papers prepared by a Cheshire gentleman, Sir Thomas Mainwaring. They provide an important contemporary explanation of why the trained bands were regarded in some quarters unfavourably, and significantly his arguments go beyond a simple dissatisfaction with the militia’s military capabilities.59 His first attack upon the militia was that it was unserviceable:

‘neither officer, nor soldier is chose for their conduct, courage, or being anyway (fitly) qualified for the employment: as if it were no more to lead an army than to go a hunting; and to be a soldier than to hold a plough.’

Even the horses were unsuitable ‘consisting (for the most part) of gentlemen’s saddle or coach horses,’ and their riders, often gentlemen’s servants, gained little continuity of experience. The militia, to its critics, consisted

‘either of new, and unexperienced men, or such as will be impatient of the wants and fatigues of the war having plentiful houses and warm beds to retreat to . . . .’

and was both costly to maintain and inconvenient to train. Equally significant were the criticisms made against it on non-professional grounds. Control of the militia placed great power in the hands of a few who wielded it for their own ends by making ‘briges and parties, to the hazard of the public peace; and to tamper in parliament elections.’ Significantly, too, the critique argued that the existence of an armed force encouraged the rank and file to exert a dangerous influence on the community: the possession of weapons by those who might as soon support as oppose rebellion was a grave danger, as
was the existence of county magazine, and the custom of storing arms in private houses. The arguments reflect not only hostility to the militia as an ineffective military force but present the prejudices of an anxious gentry fearful of social turmoil. James II’s subsequent attack upon the militia was to be based on attitudes very similar to these.

The author of this critique proposed ‘another sort of militia’ both cheaper and more proficient. It was to be a select militia: suitable troops were to be nominated by the local justices and deputy lieutenants from the trained bands, and subsequently selected by the officers, who were themselves to be chosen by the King from ‘persons of good family.’ Not only would such a militia be more fitted for its role, but significantly it would enable the King to exert a more influential control over the local community ‘so that by the militia (well chose and managed) he may very much strengthen his government.’ This was the very centralised control which the existence of the old militia, in the hands of the local gentry, could inhibit.

Although there is not much evidence of support for the crown’s promotion of a select militia it would appear from these comments that it had found favour with some. On the other hand, gentlemen with an interest in maintaining their country-based forces were encouraged to defend them. Perhaps significantly it was during 1666 that some of the Lancashire deputy lieutenants, led by Colonel Kirkby, had made detailed recommendations about improving their own militia. However, there appeared to be more hostility against the militia than support for it, with criticisms voiced in the Commons against lieutenants and militia officers for interfering in the subjects’ liberty. For a brief moment, the crown and many of its subjects seemed in agreement about the militia, but the opportunity for establishing a select force was jeopardized by the crown’s diversion of the money needed for its maintenance, to other purposes. Secondly, the crown gave encouragement to the growth of the standing forces, so that by the mid 1670s with the Dutch War supporting arguments for the maintenance of an army, there was a significant reawakening of enthusiasm for the local militia.

The militia’s civil-guard functions had been developed during the first decade of Charles II’s reign, and though at the outbreak of the third Dutch war the government repeated the traditional call to the lieutenants in the coastal counties to raise the militia for the country’s defence, it seems to have given greater weight to their duties of raising men for the navy than upon their defensive activities. Understandably, Eng-
land’s security seemed safer in the hands of its navy, and regular forces, than in those of the local troops whose real value was as a mobilised police force. Charles II had no intention of weakening or removing the militia, as James II seems later to have intended, and the liteutenancy still had a vital role to play in maintaining its hold upon the county community. Thus, with the growth of a regular force, which could become the main defence of the realm, the militia, and those who administered and commanded it, became the principal agencies through which the crown could control its subjects both directly by force, but equally importantly, by influencing public opinion. The crown was not running down the militia at a time when it was promoting the regular forces, but its critics in seeking to find a counter-weight against the apparently sinister encouragement of a standing army rallied to its support. In the mid-1670s they began to laud it as the only defence of liberty against arbitrary government. Significantly, the Lancashire deputies in 1674 had again recommended measures to improve the efficiency of their militia. Colonel Kirkby in fact headed the Commons’ committee set up to investigate the militia’s defects, but the new concern felt for it evaporated as quickly as it appeared, and it was not until the autumn of 1678 that a major debate took place. By now anxieties about popery were coupled with those about standing armies and mistrust of Danby; the militia once more became the bulwark of liberty and security. The bill to make the militia more effective by placing at least one third of it upon guard was vetoed by Charles, to the serious concern of many in the House of Commons. But once again, their anxiety seems to have dissipated with a strange suddenness. Coventry’s explanation of the King’s rejection on the grounds

‘he will not have the militia half an hour out of his hand, he thinks that by this bill 60,000 men are to be in arms, and are not in his power to make them lay down their arms if he pleases’

may have worried some members that they were treading too closely upon the royal prerogative, whilst others may have worried about the cost, and the practical problems which would have ensued in their constituencies. The debate on the King’s veto was brought to an end by members taking the Test, and although it was revived in March 1679 the members were easily deflected from their discussion, despite warnings from Sir John Lowther that the motion should not be ‘stifled.’ Confidence in, and support for, the militia waxed
and waned according to the degree of anxiety about the standing army which was felt by the country party. Ironically the crown was soon to call upon the militia to harry the whigs and their followers once it had purged the lieutenancies of them and their supporters. Under loyal tory gentlemen, it became an effective weapon for intimidating the crown’s political opponents. Confiscation of weapons and the arrest of suspects after the Rye House plot became the order of the day, thus once again emphasising the militia’s powers of surveillance.

The final burst of enthusiastic support for the militia was stimulated by James II’s criticisms, following upon the 1685 rebellion. In the Commons the King’s supporters were challenged by several gentlemen who, whilst defending its recent performance, acknowledged the need to increase its numbers and put it into better shape. They found sufficient support for the House to agree that a bill should be brought in to this end. However, the move to counter the crown’s plans for the standing army were frustrated by the dissolution which followed a few days later. Such support is indicative of a belief in the importance of the militia and suggests that its decline from the mid-1670s was not as total as Western suggested.

Its importance both to the crown as an agency through which to preserve order and security, and to the class which controlled it as a bulwark against social revolution, which political and religious non-conformity might encourage, were reasons why it ought not to have decayed. This discussion, although substantially confined to the militia of one county, has provided some evidence that it did not suffer such a decline.

NOTES

2 M.C.L., Farrer MSS L1/40/1/1, L1/48/6/1, cited hereafter as Farrer MS. with appropriate call number; L.R.O., Bankes MS. DDBa 1263, cited hereafter similarly. The above manuscripts and the following material are the main sources used to identify the deputies. G.F. Duckett, Penal Laws and the Test Act (2 vols, 1882–3); All Soul’s College, Oxford, MS. 223; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28 Nov. 1680, ff.64–6. The deputies are listed in the appendix (below, p. 180).
3 The main venue for the third division remains unknown, but may have been Manchester or Bury.
7 L.R.O., Tatton of Cuerden MS. DDTa/214, 1636 Rate book; L.R.O., Towneley of Towneley MS. 1628 Rate book for Blackburn hundred; L.R.O., DDX 114/1 Rate book for Lancashire, 1675; Chetham’s Library, Manchester, William Crabtree’s Book of Rates for Lancashire 1610–1644.
8 Farrer MS. L1/40/1/1, p. 11.
9 Farrer MSS L1/40/1/1, L1/48/1/1 passim.
10 Although no reference to its regimental colour has been found for this period, in 1745 two of the regiments were blue and red, and the third one white. The evidence suggests these were their traditional colours. I am indebted to Mr. J.J. Bagley for this information.
11 Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, p. 15.
12 Farrer MS. L1/45/11/1.
13 L.G. Schwoerer, No Standing Armies (Baltimore, 1974), p. 84.
14 Bankes MS. DDBa 1263, p. 18; Farrer MS. L1/40/1/1, p. 47.
15 14 Car. II c.3 SS. 2, 3.
17 Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, p. 353; Bankes MS. DDBa 1263, p. 101; L.R.O., Blundell MS. DDB1 24/37.
19 B.L., Additional MSS. 34,222 (Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Book), 36, 922, f.35 (Aston-Norris papers, Cheshire militia) and 41/254 (Lord Fauconberg’s Lieutenancy Book 1666–84); Cozens–Hardy, Norfolk Lieutenancy Journal, 1676–1701, p. 2.
20 P.R.O., State Papers Domestic, Entry Books, SP 44/4, p. 62; Western, Militia, p. 18.
21 Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, p. 203.
22 P.R.O., SP 29/44/132.
24 See below p. 175.
26 C.S.P.D. 1663–4, p. 367.
28 Farrer MS. L1/40/1/1, p. 58.
29 Bankes MS. DDBa 1263, pp. 35–7, 92, 112; Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, pp. 460–1.
32 Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, pp. 48–9, 108, 369–72, 464; L1/40/1/1, p. 122; L.R.O., QSP 416/39, 40; 512/13; Bankes MS. DDBa 1263, pp. 35–7, 68, 96, 100, 106, loose sheet, no date; L.R.O., Kenyon MS. DDKe 2/18/10, militia accounts 1679.
33 Farrer MS. L1/40/1/1, pp. 122, 125, 135; J.R.U.L., Crawford MS, 45/1/59, 4 April 1683; L.R.O., Cavendish MS. DDCa 17/213 June 1684; L.R.O., Kenyon MS. DDKe 4/6, Dec. 1688.
34 L.R.O., QSP 416/39, 40; 512/13 militia accounts; L.R.O., Kenyon MS. DDKe 2/18/10, militia expenses 1673; Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, p. 464; J.R.U.L., Crawford MS. 45/1/60, militia tax 1683.
35 L.R.O., QSP 512/13, militia accounts, 1675–9.
37 L.R.O., Farington MS. DDF 2438/135; L.R.O., Cavendish MS. DDCa 17/213.
39 L.R.O., Kenyon MS. DDKe 9/41/9; Farrer MS. L1/48/6/1, p. 79.
40 P.R.O., SP29/303/217.
41 The Diary of Thomas Bellingham, an Officer under William III, ed. A. Hewitson and A.R. Maddison, (Preston, 1908), p. 36.
42 Lancaster Public Library, Diary of Timothy Craggs, N.D. No pagination. MS copy made in late 18th century of the diary written in the late 18th century. The date when Cragg became a militia soldier was about 1680.
45 H.M.C., Le Fleming MSS, pp. 34.
48 Schoewer, No Standing Armies, p. 98.
49 P.R.O., SP 29/424/132 (i).
50 C.S.P.D. 1680–1, pp. 452, 610; P.R.O., SP 44/68, pp. 64, 104; C.S.P.D. 1682, p. 252.
52 L.R.O., (Quarter) S(essions) Recognizances QSB 1/57; L.R.O., Kenyon MS. DDKe 9/54/38, 44, 48, 50; P.R.O., PC 2/69/469.
53 ‘An Argument showing that a Standing Army is inconsistent with a Free Government,’ in State Tracts 1693–99, p. 4.
58 C.S.P.D. 1665–6, pp. xxxv, xxxvii, xxviii, 489. The letter is endorsed in Williamson’s hand ‘pretended discovery’.
59 J.R.U.L., Mainwaring and Jodrell MS. 5/131, ‘Objections against the trained bands as they are now established.’ The series 5/130–41 contain various drafts and other arguments for a different type of militia. One paper only is dated (Jan. 1665/6). Nowhere is the term ‘select militia’ used.
60 J.R.U.L., Mainwaring and Jodrell MSS 5/130, 132, 134.
61 Western, *Militia*, pp. 45, 47.
63 Carter, M. Litt. thesis, Chapter V.
69 Western, *Militia*, *passim*. Miller believes Western may have modified his earlier view as it was not repeated in *Monarchy and Revolution*. J. Miller, ‘The militia and the army in the reign of James II,’ *Historical Journal*, XVI (1973), p. 661, n. 9.

**APPENDIX**

1. **LORDS LIEUTENANT, 1660–88**, with period in office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Stanley, eighth earl of Derby</td>
<td>1660–72 (death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Egerton, second earl of Bridgewater</td>
<td>1672–76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Stanley, ninth earl of Derby,</td>
<td>1676–87 (removed),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caryl Molyneux, third Viscount Maryborough,</td>
<td>1687–88 (removed).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **DEPUTY LIEUTENANTS, 1660–88**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Career as a Deputy**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANDERTON, Charles of Lostock, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1657–91</td>
<td>1687:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSHETON, Edmund of Whalley, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1620–92</td>
<td>1688–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSHETON, Ralph of Middleton, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1652–1716</td>
<td>1680–7: 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATHERTON, Richard of Atherton, Kt.</td>
<td>1656–86</td>
<td>1680–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANKES, William (1) of Winstanley</td>
<td>1631–76</td>
<td>1660–1: 67–76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANKES, William (2) of Winstanley</td>
<td>1658–90</td>
<td>1688–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANNISTER, Henry of Bank</td>
<td>?1636–65</td>
<td>1661–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANNISTER, Christopher of Bank</td>
<td>? –87</td>
<td>1674–81: 87:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINDLOS, Robert of Borwick, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1625–88</td>
<td>1660–87: 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD, Peter of Bold</td>
<td>1656–91</td>
<td>1688</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRADDYLL, Thomas of Portfield</td>
<td>1631–1706</td>
<td>1673–87: 88–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRADSHAIGH, Roger (1) of Haigh, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1628–84</td>
<td>1662–84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRADSHAIGH, Roger (2) of Haigh, Kt. &amp; Bt.</td>
<td>1649–86</td>
<td>1685–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANDON, Hon. Charles of Gawsworth C</td>
<td>1656–1701</td>
<td>1687:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROOKE, Peter of Mere &amp; Astley, Kt. C</td>
<td>?1613–85</td>
<td>1676–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROOKE, Richard of Astley</td>
<td>? –1718</td>
<td>1688–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CLIFTON, Thomas of Lytham, Kt. & Bt. 1628-94 1687:
DALTON, Robert of Thurnham 1639-1700 1687:
DODGING, Miles of Conishead 1642-83 1673-83
FLEETWOOD, Edward of Penwortham 1634-1704 1662-87: 88-9
FLEMING, Daniel of Rydal, Kt. W 1633-1701 1674-87: 88-9
GERARD, William of Ince, Kt. & Bt. 1638- ? 1687:
GIRLINGTON, John of Thurland 1637-1706 1687:
GREENHALGH, Thomas of Brandlestone 1633-93 1673-87: 88-9
HOUGHTON, Richard of Hoghton Tower, Kt. & Bt. 1616-78 1660-1:
HOUGHTON, Charles of Hoghton Tower, Kt. & Bt. 1643-1710 1680-2: 89
HOLT, Robert of Castleton 1602-76 1660-76
HOLT, James of Castleton 1647-1713 1685-7: 88-9
IRELAND, Gilbert of Hutt, Kt. 1624-75 1660-1: 73-5
KIRKBY, Richard of Kirkby Ireleth 1625-81 1662-81
LEGH, Richard of Lyme 1634-87 1673-80: 85-6
LEGH, Peter of Lyme 1669-1744 1688-9
MIDDLETON, George of Leighton, Kt. & Bt. 1599-1673 1660-73
NORRIS, Thomas of Speke 1653-1700 1673-87: 88-9
NOWELL, Roger of Read 1606-95 1662-87: 88-9
PRESTON, Thomas (1) of Holker 1600-78 1660-79
PRESTON, Thomas (2) of Holker 1647-97 1685: 88-9
RAWLISON, Curwen of Cark 1641-89 1673-82: 88-9
RAWSTORNE, Laurence of New Hall 1619-1700 1673-87: 88-9
RIGBY, Alexander of Layton 1633-98 1673-87: 88-9
SPENCER, Hon. William (1) of Ashton 1630-88 1660-82
SPENCER, William (2) of Ashton 1655-1700 1687: 89
STANDISH, Richard of Duxbury, Kt. & Bt. 1650-93 1688-9
STANDISH, William of Standish 1638-1705 1687:
STANLEY, Edward of Bickerstaff, Kt. & Bt. 1644-71 1667-71
STANLEY, Hon. William of Cross Hall 1640-70 1660-70
TOWNELEY, Nicholas of Royle 1650-99 1687: 89
TOWNELEY, Richard of Townley 1629-1707 1687:
TYLDESLEY, Thomas of Myerscough 1657-1715 1688:
WARREN, John of Poynton C 1630-1706 1687:

NOTES
* Unless otherwise indicated, all deputies were of the status of esquire; Kt. Knight; Bt. Baronet. All normally lived in Lancashire, but those marked C or W normally lived in Cheshire and Westmorland, respectively.
** Career: first date given is date of appointment. Continuous appointment is indicated thus 1660-67, and removal by: . For example, Christopher Bannister was first appointed in 1674 and served to 1681 when he was put out; he was re-appointed in 1687 but put out again that year.