Liverpool under parliament: the anatomy of a civil war garrison, May 1643 to June 1644

Malcolm Gratton

Studies of civil war garrisons are few and far between. Coverage is generally restricted to sub-sections of larger works, the prime concern of which is to examine the experience of a town or explore a particular theme, such as military finance.¹ The paucity of garrison investigations reflects the scarcity of appropriate source material. Churchwardens’ and constables’ accounts can be helpful but their survival is uneven. Material specific to an individual community such as an assembly book or borough records can be helpful, but these are not plentiful.²

In the case of Liverpool, however, a fortuitous conjunction of sources has made possible a more detailed examination of the workings of the town’s garrison. The period under review runs from May 1643, the time parliament took control of Liverpool, to June 1644, when the town fell to Prince Rupert. The lynch pin of this study is the West Derby hundred sequestration papers, which cover the period July 1643 to May 1644.³ In addition, the deeds and papers relating to the influential

³ National Archives, SP 28/299/1063-1365, SP 28/300/211/1163, commonwealth exchequer papers, papers of West Derby hundred sequestrators. For a summary of their contents, see J. M. Gratton, ‘The
Liverpool family the Moores of Bank Hall provide valuable supporting material. Finally, the Liverpool town books are of value for this period.

The questions to be addressed are as follows. What function did Liverpool garrison perform and what was its strategic value? How was the garrison organised, financed and supplied? How did the garrison relate to the townsfolk? In what respects was Liverpool garrison typical of other strong points in the first civil war? Finally, did the presence of a parliamentary garrison play any role in Liverpool’s future expansion?

Liverpool in the early 1640s

In many respects Liverpool, a small port on the south-west coast of Lancashire, was no different in 1640 from how it had been in the sixteenth century. Plague still threatened its inhabitants, the medieval street pattern lay virtually undisturbed and the town’s economic fortunes were as much bound up with Ireland as its rural hinterland. Still in the shadow of the administrative and commercial dominance of Chester, Liverpool lay firmly under the political influence of two major landowning families, the Stanleys, earls of Derby, and the Molyneux of Sefton. The first viscount Molyneux was especially anxious to maintain his position as lord of the manor.

But by the beginning of the 1640s, changes in Liverpool’s fortunes were underway. Increased economic activity was apparent in wider occupational diversification. Commercial interaction with surrounding agricultural areas was expanding and above all links with Ireland had grown to such an extent that the 40 years up to 1641 represented something of a boom in Liverpool’s Irish trade. This and Liverpool’s participation in the increasingly important salt industry, as well as its export of coal, cheese, other foodstuffs and textiles, marked a small but significant advance in its commercial standing. Chester still

---

4 Liverpool Record Office, Moore of Bankhall deeds papers; Historical Manuscripts Commission, 10th report, Stewart manuscripts (London, 1885), pp. 64-99.
5 G. Chandler and E. Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I (Liverpool, 1965).
maintained its overall superiority, but its problems with communications, largely due to higher haulage charges on account of the silting problems in the Dee estuary, could only be to Liverpool's advantage.

Growing self-confidence in the economic sphere was matched by developments in the political and religious arena. The 1626 charter granted by Charles I gave the Liverpool burgesses enhanced powers of legislation, especially in commercial issues, and led to disputes in the 1630s between the town and the claimed jurisdiction of the Molyneux family. Parliamentary and mayoral elections remained subject to crown influence up to 1642, yet the town was able to display a measure of autonomy owing to the development of puritanism. By financing a resident preacher, the town was asserting its own identity as distinct from the surrounding areas of West Derby hundred, which had a large concentration of Roman Catholic gentry. The inroads made by Liverpool puritans were to play an important part in the port's stance once hostilities broke out in 1642.

The onset of the 1641 Irish rebellion had a profound effect on Liverpool. Its population of around 1,000 was swollen by refugees from across the Irish Sea. The resultant 'Catholic fear' added to the confused and tense political atmosphere prevalent in the country as a whole, which was to erupt into civil war in the second half of 1642.6

Royalist and parliamentarian Liverpool, autumn 1642 to spring 1644

Removed from the first large-scale fighting in Lancashire, the siege of Manchester in late September 1642, Liverpool played little part in the early months of the war. Once lord Strange, later the seventh earl of Derby, had seized the town magazine on or about Monday 20 June, and John Moore, the town's MP, left Liverpool to join his fellow deputy lieutenants, the port lay open to royalist influence and subsequent occupation. A royalist governor, captain David Lloyd, was in place in late November 1642. Subsequent

---

6 For the context of the period down to 1642, see Gratton, 'The parliamentarian and royalist war effort', chapter 1. For a recent evaluation of early seventeenth-century Liverpool, see Gratton in J. Belchem, ed., Liverpool 800: culture, character and history (Liverpool, 2006), chapter 1, pp. 97-111.
admissions as freemen of the town include up to ten royalist officers between 2 March and 21 April 1643. To establish the size of the Liverpool garrison at this time is problematic; however, as some of those officers, four of whom were Welsh, were either in transit to serve in other parts of Lancashire — Warrington, for example — or were admitted as individuals distinct from any soldiers, they may or may not have held command in Liverpool. A cautious estimate would give the garrison size as about 200.7

The circumstances of parliament’s subsequent takeover of Liverpool are shadowy. Given the rapid disintegration of the royalist cause in Lancashire following Derby’s defeat at Whalley on 20 April 1643, it seems that the occupation took place at the end of April. Taking advantage of royalist distractions in south Lancashire as the king’s supporters fought to hang on to Wigan and Warrington, parliament’s occupation of Liverpool appears to have been unopposed.8

The main beneficiary of the new parliamentarian garrison was Sir William Brereton, the Cheshire commander-in-chief. He was particularly anxious to utilise Liverpool’s port facilities against royalist reinforcements from Ireland and for ‘piratical’ attacks. Measures were introduced to defend the town and the town books reveal a sizeable influx of freemen admissions of parliamentarian ship captains and military officers in June and July 1643.9

The defence of the town was formalised in August 1643 when John Moore, who had been in London and brought soldiers northwards, was appointed governor of Liverpool. The town’s security was far from certain. In late November, the landing in North Wales of 3,000 royalist troops released from service in Ireland threatened to endanger parliament’s position in Cheshire and Lancashire. In addition, the arrival from Oxford of John, lord

7 E. Broxap, The great civil war in Lancashire, 1642-51 (Manchester, 1910); G. Ormerod, ed., Tracts relating to military proceedings in Lancashire during the great civil war, Chetham Society, 2 (1844), pp. 9-51; Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 313-14.
9 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 314-17.
Byron, with 1,000 men alarmed Brereton. Byron had an ambitious brief. He was to clear Lancashire of enemy forces, coordinate moves with the earl of Newcastle in Yorkshire and thereby oppose any march southwards of Scots forces that were threatening to cross the border in order to aid parliament.  

Alarm bells rang in Liverpool over these developments. Fearing that the town was a specific target of Byron, it was decided that suspect strangers be removed from Liverpool. On 21 December, 'divers Papists and other ill affected persons or Malignants' were expelled. These measures were enacted over seven months after the parliamentarian takeover. Despite the expulsions, it seems that a residue of royalist sympathisers remained. When Rupert attacked the town, it was reported that several townsmen who were royalist supporters were killed. The moves to expel royalists were not unusual, but the timing is suggestive. In Exeter, action against royalists took place within two months of the parliamentarian takeover. It was a far more politically polarised town than Liverpool.

In early 1644, further steps were taken to strengthen the town's defences under the direction of the German professional, John Rosworm. Three hundred men were sent from Warrington to bolster Moore's garrison when Rupert's army entered Lancashire. The test of the effectiveness of these precautions came when Rupert's forces began to camp outside Liverpool in the first week of June 1644.

---

13 Stoyle, From deliverance to destruction, pp. 73-75.
Strategic considerations

The events of 1643 and the first half of 1644 proved that Liverpool had assumed an importance to both sides, out of all proportion to its pre-war status. Why was this?

For the king, Liverpool possessed several advantages. It worked in tandem with Chester to continue the domination of the Irish Sea that royalist ships had enjoyed since the start of the war. Royalist possession of both ports ensured control of the Wirral peninsula, a fertile source of agricultural produce and site of several useful landing places for troops. Royalist control of Liverpool could also release the resources of the surrounding rural areas which were overwhelmingly royalist in sympathy. But above all, Liverpool’s value to Charles lay in its relationship to Ireland. As Orlando Bridgeman, the royalist organiser in the North West, wrote to the king’s Irish commander, Ormonde, in November 1643, ‘this town of Liverpool is of great consequence, in respect of the mutual intercourse of these 2 Kingdoms’. A royalist Liverpool opened up the prospect of unlimited amounts of men and resources from Ireland to underpin the king’s war effort.

Parliament had an even greater need of Liverpool. On land, its garrison could hold a royalist area in check, maintain communications via the Mersey valley with Warrington, Manchester and Cheshire, and participate in the siege of Lathom House, the seat of the earl of Derby. Regarding the sea, parliament’s control of Liverpool was even more crucial. It could challenge the power of royalist Chester, Bristol and the Isle of Man in the Irish Sea and harass the royalist recruiting grounds in North Wales. Using Liverpool as a base, parliamentarian ships would also be in a position to disrupt the flow of goods and men from Ireland. In addition, Liverpool could develop a vital naval link with London and open up lines of communication with Cheshire and the West Midlands, where Sir William Brereton and Sir Thomas Myddleton were in some need of reliable channels of food and armaments.

15 For the background, see Dore, ‘The sea approaches’, pp. 2-9.
16 J. R. Powell and E. K. Timmings, Documents relating to the civil war, Navy Record Society, 103 (1953), pp. 105-06
Fortification and defence

Parliament’s first priority on taking control of Liverpool in 1643 was the improvement of the town’s security. This involved a two-pronged policy of improving the land defences and realising the port’s naval potential.

It would seem that the Lancashire parliamentarian authorities were initially confident of the land defences that they had inherited, as they did not commence work on the fortifications until autumn 1643, when Moore assumed the governorship. Early work was small-scale and involved a local man, Richard Tarleton, and unspecified labourers. He was paid only £1 16s during October and November 1643. Tarleton had been bailiff in 1625 and proved to be a committed parliamentarian—he was presented in June 1643 for fighting with the vociferous anti-puritan John Mainwaring and was mayor in 1646. This tentative start to strengthening Liverpool's defences was not lost on the royalists. In late November 1643, Bridgeman wrote that Liverpool was ‘a place without any works or defence of the land side’. This evaluation was not tested during the Nantwich campaign of December 1643 to January 1644, but parliament was sufficiently alarmed to instigate a programme of defence improvements. In addition, Sir Thomas Fairfax, the Yorkshire parliamentarian general, was nervous about Liverpool’s security. In February 1644, he suggested the establishment of a garrison on Wirral’s Mersey coast to support the town. In the event, nothing was done until the following September.

Work on the fortifications continued to be directed by Rosworm. He was assisted by two outsiders, John Elliott and James Stott. Work seems to have begun from the first week of March with some concentration on building sluices, wooden dams with adjustable gates to divert the flows of water in the Pool so as to improve the town’s defences. This work was not especially inconvenient to the townspeople but another aspect of the work

---

17 National Archives, SP 28/211/122, SP 28/299/1105; Chandler and Wilson, *Liverpool under Charles I*, pp. 44, 60, 301, 364.
18 Powell and Timmings, *Documents*, pp. 105-06.
19 Liverpool Record Office, MD 320.
was. In common with many other towns, Gloucester in 1643 and Leicester in 1645 being two examples, considerable damage was done by the engineers who pulled down houses, gardens and orchards in their zeal to improve the fortifications.\(^{21}\)

When Rupert approached Liverpool in June 1644, it was defended by a ‘strong and high mud wall and a ditch of twelve yards wide and near three yards deep’. This enclosed the town and ran from the river to the Pool. The streets were blocked off at the river end and protected by bars and gates with cannon on the land-side. Liverpool castle, which was situated on the south side of the town, was ringed by batteries. In all, 14 pieces of ordnance were available to defend the town. An extra facet of the defence was the placing of bags of wool on the mud walls to nullify enemy fire. The presence of warships in the harbour was a further boost to the garrison.\(^{22}\)

Formidable as the works might have seemed, Liverpool suffered from a major disadvantage. Its land defences were overlooked by high ground, namely Everton hill, where the Prince had his headquarters, and present day Lime Street and London Road, where the besiegers dug trenches and from where they could bombard the town to effect. As John Seacome noted, ‘the country near it is high land which renders it unfit to sustain a long siege’.\(^{23}\)

**The parliamentarian garrison**

Prior to Moore’s appointment as governor on 18 August 1643 and his return from London, Liverpool was garrisoned by forces drawn from south Lancashire. Admissions of military men as freemen are detailed in Liverpool town books. Gilbert Ireland of Hutt, Hale, was the first, admitted on 6 June 1643. Ireland was a

---


\(^{22}\) Ormerod, *Tracts*, pp. 199, 199-201; P. Young, *Marston Moor* (Kineton, 1970), p. 211. There was no fort with eight guns guarding the sea lake and Pool entrance, as ‘Mersey Fort’ was situated on Mersey Island off the coast of Essex south of Colchester. T. Heywood, ed., *The Moore rental*, Chetham Society, 12 (1847), p. xxv and note. For further details of some of the ships in Liverpool harbour, see Watts, ‘The Moore family’, p. 137 n. 3.

troop commander in Liverpool in early 1644. A day later, captain George Cranage of Salford was admitted. He was a noted defender at the siege of Manchester in September 1642. Other outsiders feature in the freemen lists of late June and July. At least one officer, lieutenant John Chandler, hailed from London. He may have been sent ahead to prepare for Moore's arrival as governor. Four of the remaining officers hailed from the foot regiment of colonel Sir Thomas Stanley. Of Bickerstaffe and a kinsman of the seventh earl, Stanley commanded a unit that formed the core of the garrison until Moore's arrival in October. Thereafter, he joined in Brereton's November campaign in North Wales. Liverpool's garrison was supplemented by a town company of 100 men. Its sergeant was Edward Lyon, a Liverpool cordwainer. He was supplied with 217 bushels of oats from Altcar to feed his men sometime before Rupert's attack.

Stanley's regiment was complemented by the townsmen and probably Ireland's horse troop. In total, the garrison at this time numbered about 550. Stanley's unit was eventually replaced by Moore's men. This regiment of foot, with a horse troop attached, formed the heart of Liverpool's garrison up to June 1644. Examination of the West Derby hundred sequestration papers reveals the names of ten officers who belonged to Moore's regiment between October 1643 and June 1644. Five were in the unit when it first deployed, while the others were added in 1644. Civil war companies rarely achieved the ideal maximum strength of 100, so reports that Moore's regiment was 600-strong just before Rupert's attack were probably close to the mark.

Like most garrisons, the number of Liverpool's defenders varied considerably. The main influence was the seriousness of the royalist threat. For example, extra companies were billeted in

---

24 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, p. 314; National Archives, SP 28/300/235; The Palatine note-book...the history of and literature of the counties of Lancaster, Chester etc (4 vols, Manchester, 1881-85), IV, 103, 109.
25 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, p. 315; Gratton, 'The parliamentarian and royalist war effort', p. 561.
26 National Archives, SP 28/211/24, 141.
27 National Archives, SP 28/211/134, 140, SP 28/12/9, SP 28/299/1103, 1104, 1138, 1159, 1162, SP 28/300/217, 265, 274, 356, 951, 953, 1130.
Liverpool a week before the battle of Nantwich and a few days after the battle. At this time, soldiers in town must have numbered at least 700. In late May 1644, when Rupert commenced his Lancashire campaign, Liverpool garrison, with Moore’s regiment, the town company and 300 men sent from Warrington, probably numbered around 1,000. But earlier in the year, in March, royalist claims put the garrison at only 50 strong. This estimate was the product of the earl of Derby’s meeting with Rupert at Chester. Derby was persuading the Prince to invade Lancashire and relieve the countess of Derby who was under siege at Lathom House, and therefore the figure of 50 may well have been set deliberately low. On the other hand, Moore was missing from Liverpool in April and his regiment, or at least part of it, was at the siege of Lathom. The garrison’s main function being to defend Liverpool, this was the only occasion on which some of its number took part in other operations.

If we put the size of Liverpool garrison at its maximum of 1,000, just before Rupert’s attack, how does that compare with other strongpoints? Within Lancashire, Manchester’s garrison numbered about 1,000 at the time of the siege of September 1642 and was never less than this subsequently. At the time of Rupert’s incursion, 5,000 soldiers were in the town. Preston garrison was about 800-strong in February 1643, while royalist Liverpool sustained a similar sized garrison when it surrendered in November 1644.

In national terms, Liverpool’s garrison was small, reflecting the inconsiderable size of the town and its comparative indefensibility. It is worth remembering that with a garrison of about 1,000, Liverpool’s population was effectively doubled. Around 800 men comprised Chester’s city regiment in 1642; at the beginning of 1643, 1,000 had been added and at the end of 1643, the garrison numbered between 2,500 and 3,000. The garrison size again increased as the threat increased. Bristol had a garrison of 1,500 on its fall in September 1645, while Leicester, subject of a

---

28 National Archives, SP 28/12/6, 7, 14.
29 F. R. Raines, ed., The Stanley papers, part 3, number 1, Chetham Society, 66 (1867), p. xcix; Liverpool Record Office, MD 323.
30 Gratton, ‘Parliamentarian and royalist war effort’, table 6.2; Calendar of state papers domestic, 1644, pp. 206-07.
fierce royalist onslaught in May 1645, had a garrison of just over 2,000.31

Liverpool’s governor did not have an assistant. Only ‘supergarrisons’, for example Oxford, merited a deputy governor. Liverpool had a commissary in charge of the distribution of food and supplies and on occasion there seem to have been two men who performed this function.

Concerning the running of the town during the royalist and parliamentarian occupations, the everyday business was conducted by the mayor, aldermen and council, without military interference. Only from early 1644, when the war was intensifying and the royalist threat growing, did the governor begin to play a significant role in town business. On 28 January 1644, three days after the battle of Nantwich, colonel Moore attended a meeting that oversaw the appointment of two ministers and reiterated the policy of strict observance of Sundays and feast days. Moore’s presence, so soon after the expulsion of royalist suspects, seemed to indicate the start of a new military-influenced discipline in the running of the town. A further indication of this was the convening of a council of war on 12 April 1644. Moore being away at Ormskirk, involved in the siege of Lathom, letters addressed to him were opened by the council of war. This body was headed by the mayor, James Williamson, and a senior alderman, John Walker, but the rest were sea captains, four in number, including, significantly, William Rigby.32 The involvement of the civil authorities is evidence of the military’s awareness of the town’s sensibilities. The importance of naval power in maintaining Liverpool garrison’s viability was now also apparent. Whether this collaboration continued is unclear, as no further evidence is forthcoming.

Of the ordinary members of the garrison, we know little. Adam Martindale, the Presbyterian minister who served as chief clerk to Moore’s foot regiment at Liverpool, gives us an insight into some of the regiment’s officers. He wrote that he ‘enjoyed

---

32 Chandler and Wilson, *Liverpool under Charles I*, p. 322; Liverpool Record Office, MD 323.
sweet communion with religious officers of the company which he used to meet every night at one another's quarters, by turns, to read scriptures, to confer of good things and to pray together'.

Regarding common soldiers, as parliament usually emerged victorious, identification of its soldiers through lists of deaths is rare. Robert Rimmer of North Meols was killed during Rupert's siege; he left a widow and six small children. Edward Tatlock of Liverpool was also killed and his four children were left in the care of his mother. However, there is no evidence that either of these men served as a soldier.

**Finance**

If our knowledge of those who participated in the siege is scanty, more is known of how the Liverpool garrison was maintained and financed. Various sources of finance existed to pay for the parliamentarian military operations. The 'Propositions', either a voluntary or a compulsory loan, began to be collected, usually by soldiers, from the beginning of 1643. More enduring was the weekly assessment set in train by an ordinance of 24 February 1643. This made a slow start in Lancashire. Collections only began in February 1644 and moreover the assessment was opposed from within parliamentarian ranks on the grounds that it was excessive and arbitrary. There is no evidence that the Liverpool garrison received money from these two sources during the period under review. Far more effective was sequestration, the levying of financial penalties on royalist activists and sympathisers or 'delinquents'. The main methods were fines and sales or renting out of royalist lands and possessions. Given the rapid collapse in royalist fortunes which took place in the spring and early summer of 1643, south-west Lancashire, a hotbed of royalist support, afforded splendid prospects for this important means of finance. Introduced by an ordinance of 27 March 1643, the success of the sequestration process was not uniform across Lancashire. By their own admission, the Lancashire parliamentarians' administration of sequestration was ineffective before October 1645. Only in parts

---

33 Parkinson, *Martindale*, p. 36.
34 Liverpool Record Office, MD 1371, 1274; Chandler and Wilson, *Liverpool under Charles I*, pp. 141, 214, 308.
of Salford, Blackburn and West Derby hundreds was sequestration executed satisfactorily. The machinery was not subject to judicial procedure and the definition of delinquency was problematic.³⁵

For the more efficient management of sequestration, West Derby hundred was split into two divisions – Liverpool and Warrington. A similar procedure was set in train in Leicestershire. Here the country was divided in two to cope with the demands of the two major royalist garrisons at Belvoir Castle and Ashby de la Zouch. Two major sets of papers relating to the Liverpool division have survived. Many refer to Liverpool garrison and itemise the sequestrators' receipts and warrants. They cover the period from October 1643 to May 1644.³⁶ From 25 August 1643 to 1 June 1644, the West Derby sequestrators received £2,922. How this was split between Liverpool and Warrington divisions is not known. Over the same period, the Liverpool division sequestrators spent £3,475 3s 4d. The discrepancy is accounted for by cash in hand derived from other sources before October 1643. An analysis of the expenditure from October 1643 to May 1644 reveals that 40% of the total was spent on Liverpool garrison's soldiers' pay and provisions. The supply, organisation and maintenance of the garrison accounted for 14.5%. Another 10% was expended on other garrisons, notably Warrington, and 6% on shipping. Around 11% of the expenditure was on unspecified items. Small amounts were spent on rents, clergy and costs of administering sequestration.³⁷

Other garrisons did not have such a ready source of finance as sequestration. The cost of upgrading Bath's defences fell on the corporation and neighbouring parishes. The garrison's need for food was met by requisitioning local inhabitants. Nor did

³⁵ Gratton, 'Parliamentarian and royalist war effort', pp. 171-79. There is a reference to proposition money, but when this relates to is uncertain, Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, p. 358.
³⁶ National Archives, SP 28/299/1063-1365, SP 28/300/211-1163; Bennett, 'My plundered townes', p. 40.
³⁷ Gratton, 'Parliamentarian and royalist war effort', tables 3.5, 3.6.
Liverpool have to endure a ‘garrison rate’ levied as an extra burden on its citizens, as in Exeter.\textsuperscript{38}

Many garrisons resorted to plundering, for example those in disputed areas such as the Welsh Marches. Liverpool garrison, which was financed by West Derby hundred, had no need of plunder, yet it requisitioned foodstuffs in the south-west Lancashire parishes. Liverpool inhabitants suffered as well. In 1649, a petition claimed that colonel Moore had seized corn, cattle, beer and other provisions for the garrison at a considerable cost to the townsmen. Bath’s residents were affected in the same way.\textsuperscript{39}

Local populations could be alienated by arbitrary food requisitioning and therefore garrisons aimed at self-sufficiency. The cereal growing areas of West Derby hundred were heavily targeted in providing food for the parliamentarian war effort. The main recipients of the cereals were Liverpool garrison and the parliamentarian forces besieging Lathom House. Ten parishes were involved. Scarisbrick, Sefton and Halsall sent supplies to both Liverpool and Lathom, while Aughton, North Meols, Walton, Huyton, Childwall and Altcar catered exclusively for Liverpool’s needs. Fish was sold to Liverpool garrison by Thomas Marsh of Formby and oxen worth £16 were sold to colonel Moore on his arrival in October 1643.\textsuperscript{40}

The sequestration accounts throw light on the expenditure on non-food items. An active middleman, Henry Wild, made a great deal of money supplying arms to both garrisons at Liverpool and Manchester. Liverpool merchants, such as John Lurting, Richard Blevin and Richard Turner, provided munitions and coal. Indeed, supplying a garrison could be of considerable benefit to local merchants and contractors. Larger garrisons’ insatiable demands for regular supplies of arms and goods – Bristol, Oxford and Reading are good examples – gave local traders opportunities they were keen to exploit. Richard

\textsuperscript{38} Wroughton, Community at war, p. 143; Stoyle, From deliverance to destruction, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{39} Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 422-23; Wroughton, Community at war, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{40} National Archives, SP 28/211/130-41, SP 28/333/360.
Tarleton’s work on Liverpool’s fortifications in autumn 1643 was no doubt a contributory factor in his becoming mayor in 1646.\textsuperscript{41}

The providers of specialist services to the garrison tended to be outsiders. Allen Cotton, a surgeon who was paid £40 from November 1643 to May 1644, was not born in Liverpool, and neither were Thomas Prenton and Isaac Wallington, who were master-gunners. On the other hand, Edward Chambers, the commissary-general responsible for the storage and distribution of food to the garrison, was a well-established Liverpool merchant. He was a member of the common council as early as 1627, an office-holder during the 1630s and a prominent jury member in the 1640s.\textsuperscript{42}

The sequestration accounts show certain trends that relate to the expenditure connected with Liverpool garrison. In the first month under scrutiny, October 1643, the largest amount, £100 (42% of expenditure), was paid to two clergy, John Broxapp, an approved preacher since 1629, and William Bell. Slightly lower was the £96 spent on shipping, £80 of which was paid to captain Robert Clarke. Soldiers’ pay at only 17% of the total did not include Moore’s regiment, which in October was only just establishing itself in Liverpool.\textsuperscript{43} From December 1643, however, soldiers’ pay, including Moore’s regiment, was by far the biggest destination of the sequestration money. Its lowest proportion of monthly expenditure (40%) came in March 1644, when Moore was almost certainly at the Lathom siege. In December 1643, at the height of the ‘Byron scare’, and again in May 1644, prior to Rupert’s entry into Lancashire, soldiers’ pay accounted for 60% of the total expenditure.\textsuperscript{44}

Later expenditure on shipping never approached the level of October 1643, though 11% of money spent in February 1644 was earmarked for the supply of the ships commanded by Robert Philpott and William Williamson.\textsuperscript{45} The second prime destination

\textsuperscript{41} National Archives, SP 28/211/122, SP 28/299/1102.
\textsuperscript{42} National Archives, SP 28/299/999, 1000, 1127, 1142, SP 28/300/885, 1149, 1151, SP 28/300/979; Chandler and Wilson, \textit{Liverpool under Charles I}, pp. 53, 60, 63, 131, 308.
\textsuperscript{43} National Archives, SP 28/299/1004, 1065, 1109, 1150.
\textsuperscript{44} Gratton, ‘Parliamentarian and royalist war effort’, pp. 229-32.
\textsuperscript{45} National Archives, SP 28/300/264, 281, 289.
for sequestration cash over the period in question was Warrington garrison, which usually accounted for between 22% and 27% of total expenditure, though in December 1643 and in May 1644 payments were low and in March 1644 non-existent. During these months, Liverpool’s needs were the greater, as were those of the besieging forces at Lathom. Liverpool probably contributed to its sister garrison’s upkeep as part of a general policy to maintain Warrington’s important strategic position on the Mersey.46

In the case of all other payments, the only category that consistently received sizeable amounts was that of payments to contractors in the danger months of December 1643, January 1644 and March to May 1644. Then, between five to nine per cent was spent on fortifications. Substantial sums were spent on ‘unspecified items’, many paid to individuals with no discernible purpose. These were especially high in November 1643 (39%) and March 1644 (32%). Colonel John Moore received £80 in the first of these, while in March 1644 the recipients were Elizabeth Fazackerley (£88) and Elizabeth Warner (£40).47

On occasion, the amount of money derived from the West Derby sequestrators was insufficient. In mid November 1643, ammunition was sent to Liverpool from Manchester and the Committee of Both Kingdoms in London, which had overall responsibility for the direction of the war effort, sanctioned the dispatch of ammunition and firelocks to the port. The capital, taking advantage of Liverpool’s maritime presence, was a frequent donor of military necessities. When Rupert reached Lancashire in May 1644, George Hawley, a commissary, was sent to Manchester for gunpowder. He returned to Liverpool with twelve barrels of bullets but had to borrow money himself to pay for the transaction.48

47 National Archives, SP 28/299/1120, 1122, SP 28/300/1117.
48 Historical Manuscripts Commission, 10th report, Stewart manuscripts, p. 68; Liverpool Record Office, MD 840; National Archives, SP 24/1/136, committee of indemnity papers. Hawley had not received compensation when he petitioned on the matter on 24 Jan. 1648, SP 24/52.
With Liverpool surrounded by large numbers of cowed royalist sympathisers, the garrison was better placed than most to exploit the economic potential of their opponents’ sequestration. The town itself, however, was an important source of additional provisions, especially when the security situation at the end of 1643 and in late May 1644 was uncertain. Then, additional materials were needed from other parts of the county and country to aid the garrison’s defence.

**Sea**

An integral part of parliamentarian Liverpool was the support derived from sea power. Soon after the royalists deserted the town in spring 1643, Sir William Brereton began unloading guns and ammunition in Liverpool water. The recapture of John Moore’s own ship *William and Thomas* on 13 June was a further step on the road to exploit Liverpool’s maritime potential. \(^{49}\)

Over the next six months, Liverpool’s ships became increasingly bold in the Irish Sea and off North Wales. Complaints that ‘piratical ships of Liverpool’ were threatening royalist interests in Chester, North Wales and Anglesey were commonplace in August 1643 and fears were voiced of potential disruption to royalist communication channels between Dublin and the west coast of England. In October, the parliamentarian captain Dansk seized royalist supplies of victuals and coal from Dublin and offloaded them in Liverpool. The Liverpool ships were also vigilant regarding the threat from Derby’s stronghold, the Isle of Man. \(^{50}\)

These activities clearly emphasised the growing importance of parliamentarian Liverpool in the crucial Irish Sea theatre. But Brereton was warned that the Liverpool squadron was too small to challenge the royalist Bristol fleet, let alone to prevent a major invasion by Ormonde’s Anglo-Irish army in the last months of 1643. On 21 November 1643, Brereton voiced his

\(^{49}\) Liverpool Record Office, MD 317, 318; *Journal of the House of Commons*, III, 137.

fear regarding the weakness of the Liverpool ships, that at that
time totalled just six men-of-war. The numbers of ships operating
to and from Liverpool are difficult to evaluate at any given time,
but reports issued just after Rupert's successful assault of June
1644 suggest that nine large ships escaped from Liverpool and at
least one other vessel was lost.51

The maritime forces riding at anchor in Liverpool
harbour performed useful service for parliament. The disruption
they caused to local royalist ships was considerable and they also
competed for control of the Irish Sea. However, in the general
context of the entire west coast, Liverpool ships were unable to
better their opponents and despite vital work in supplying the
Liverpool garrison and protecting trading vessels from London,
they were unable to assist in mounting a successful challenge to
Rupert's onslaught in June 1644. However, once Liverpool was
again under parliament's control and the falls of Chester and
Bristol all but eradicated the royalist presence off the western
coasts, Liverpool's expanding maritime power was instrumental in
its development as an important military and commercial facility
in the late 1640s, the 1650s and beyond.

The garrison and the town
The smooth working of the garrison rested to a large extent on a
good relationship between the citizens and the military. Unlike
their royalist counterparts, the parliamentarian garrison did not
have a governor before John Moore. Prior to his arrival from
London, authority seemed to be vested in the common council. It
is difficult to establish whether the parliamentarian takeover led to
changes in the council's composition. At the meeting of 19 June
1643, 'the moste parte of the rest of the Common Councell' attended. It would be dangerous to assume that those who did not
were royalist sympathisers. In essence, the council adopted a
flexible stance in the face of changing circumstances, while
attempting to keep the interests of the town to the fore. Hence
the expulsion of papists and malignants at the end of 1643 can be

51 Historical Manuscripts Commission, 13th report, appendix I, Portland
manuscripts, 1 (London, 1891), pp. 153, 157; Powell and Timings,
viewed as a response to a deteriorating security situation rather than as a conscious attempt to pursue a divisive policy that favoured a particular political standpoint.52

We do not know if voluntary work was undertaken by inhabitants to help the governor, as took place in Worcester in June 1643. All that is known is that on 25 March 1644 non-cooperation by some townspeople had reached such a pitch that ignoring arms practice or watch duty was to be punished by a 12d fine or imprisonment in the town hall until payment had been made. Concerns regarding the destruction of property to aid the town’s defence have already been alluded to.53

Evidence is scanty regarding town-garrison relations. It is probably safe to say that Liverpool’s support for parliament, commented on so extensively during the late 1640s, surfaced after the shock of Rupert’s attack, the subsequent intensification of the conflict and Liverpool’s role in it. It was only after November 1644 and the collapse of the second royalist garrison that a closer identification with parliament was seen to be in Liverpool’s best interests. Nevertheless, concerns were lodged in early 1645 about the cost to the town of the continuing presence of a garrison. In addition, steps begun in 1646, after the end of the first civil war, aimed to bring about demilitarisation and normalisation.54

A significant factor affecting town-military relations was whether the governor was a local man. Colonel John Moore’s local credentials were impeccable and he does not seem to have incurred the town’s displeasure up to Rupert’s attack. His family, however, did not meet with the approval of the Presbyterian cleric Adam Martindale. He found them extremely unpalatable, calling them ‘a packe of arrant thieves’ and ‘bitter scoffers at pietie’. After parliament regained control of Liverpool, Moore’s conduct as a commander was open to question both from within the town and from prominent Lancashire parliamentarians. He was no longer governor from 18 May 1645. Moore’s status as MP, JP, committeeman, deputy lieutenant and vice admiral of Lancashire,

52 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 316-17, 323-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 353, 376; Liverpool Record Office, MD 327.
allied to his governorship, was no proof against the misgivings voiced by Liverpool residents and parliamentarian colleagues.55

Towns under occupation during the civil wars yearned for stability. Communities that were less likely to be badly affected contained a moderate/neutralist bloc adaptable to differing circumstances. Liverpool common council certainly aimed for that. The members of the council were largely the same all through the 1640s. The mayors of this decade tended to be chosen with an eye on the prevailing military occupier. Expulsions of aldermen and other senior members of the council were rare. William Ireland, mayor in 1640-41, a merchant who had commercial dealings with colonel Robert Byron, the royalist governor between June and September 1644, was the main casualty. He was expelled from the council in early 1645. After the end of the first civil war, the town council aimed for a return to normality, but the growing importance of the port and its involvement in the continuing war in Ireland made this ambition impossible to achieve.56

The end of the first civil war in 1646 did not mean an end to the unpopular practice of billeting soldiers in the houses of ordinary residents. Householders rarely received money for their pains and instead tickets were issued to be redeemed at a later date — in theory. The sequestration accounts refer to two women, Isobel Moore and Margaret Higginson, both widows and alehouse-keepers, who housed soldiers. Two men, William Darrine and Joseph Wilcocks, also opened their houses to the troops. Unlicensed alehouses, that is houses where drink was provided without the permission of the authorities, were the usual places where soldiers were billeted. In 1645, there were 64 unlicensed alehouses in Liverpool, evidence of a thriving sideline whereby townspeople, a substantial proportion of them widows, aimed to supplement their income.57


56 Chandler and Wilson, *Liverpool under Charles I*, pp. 269, 328; Howell, ‘Neutralism, conservatism and political alignment’, p. 84.

57 National Archives, SP 28/12/6, 7; Chandler and Wilson, *Liverpool under Charles I*, pp. 345, 347-48, 386, 387, 407.
The fall of the garrison

By all accounts, Liverpool put up fierce resistance to the royalist assault of June 1644, though not as long as Seacome’s ‘for the space of a month or neare it’ or Broxap’s fortnight. Following the capture of Bolton on 28 May, Rupert’s army paused to collect additional forces and then moved through Wigan on 5 June before his cavalry arrived at Liverpool the next day. The siege began on 7 June and lasted over four days. The garrison aided by sailors put up a stubborn fight. The royalist account states that ‘the matter was disputed very hotly until the tenth day of June with muskets and great shott without measure out of the towne and from the shippes’. On the 10th a ferocious royalist attack on the walls was repelled, but the following night ‘they shipped themselves the cheife of theyr menn and goods and left 12 colours on the workes [and] hoysted sayles’. The town eventually fell to a night attack in the early hours of 11 June.

It had been absolutely crucial for the royalists that Rupert take Liverpool, but it was at some cost. Arthur Trevor, the royalist commentator, admitted that the siege had expended 100 barrels of powder, ‘which makes Prince Rupert’s march [to York] ill provided’. The taking of Liverpool also cost the royalists many lives, though surely not the 1,500 claimed in the parliamentarian news-sheet Mercurius Britannicus, which is the only numerical estimate of royalist losses available.

The loss of Liverpool can be attributed to many factors. It may be ascribed to nothing more than the size of Rupert’s army that numbered about 13,000. The royalist account states that ‘we pitched before Liverpool with our whole army’, a force that outnumbered the defenders by as much as 12:1. This was high compared to European practice. The 22 sieges conducted by French armies between the years 1637 and 1658, during the Thirty Years War and the Franco-Spanish War, gave an average ratio of 9:1.

---

58 Ormerod, Tracts, p. 201; Broxap, Great civil war, p. 128.
59 Young, Marston Moor, p. 211.
60 Carte, Life of Ormonde, III, 309; Ormerod, Tracts, p. 199.
What proportion of the army was used at any one time is not known. The defences were as strong as they could have been, so Rupert’s artillery blasted the mud walls protecting the town rather than attempt a direct assault. Once the walls began to crumble and the earth filled the ditches, a sustained defence was unlikely. Also significant was the suggestion of treachery. On 1 July 1644, Robert Philpott, a naval captain who had been stationed at Liverpool and lost a ship in the siege, informed against William Rigby and Rigby was then detained at Portsmouth. Rigby, another naval captain and on the council of war at Liverpool in April 1644, was charged with carrying out ‘perfidious correspondence’ with the enemy in Lancashire. Clearly, Philpott held Rigby responsible for the fall of the port.62

The morale of the defenders and townsmen was another consideration. It was evident that several inhabitants wished to ship out their goods to safety when royalist attacks began, but the mayor and other town leaders stopped this on the grounds that it would discourage the soldiers.63

But most of the speculation regarding the fall of Liverpool garrison centres on the governor. Moore fled the town by sea in the early hours of 11 June and escaped, along with at least four other ships, ‘richly laden’, to safety off the coasts of Northern Ireland and Scotland.64 The royalist version opines that the town’s commanders, fearful of a repetition of the 10 June attack, decided to leave the town. The consequence of this was the relatively easy final night assault. A parliamentarian news-sheet calls Moore’s retreat ‘prudent’. Seacome ascribes the governor’s behaviour to a desire to preserve his house as Bank Hall. But the most telling testimony is from Liverpool common council on 5 March 1645. On that day, the council ordered the mayor and the recorder to go to London to plead for compensation for widows and fatherless children, as well as for permission to strengthen the town’s defences and to enclose the commons and wastes within the town. More pointedly, the mayor was to press for an enquiry into the circumstances of the town’s fall to Rupert,

---

62 Calendar of state papers domestic, 1644, p. 298.
63 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 422-23.
to procure that the manner of the looseing or rather the
giving up of the Towne to the Enemie may be fullie tried
and Examined, that soe it may appear in whose neglect of
defalt it was that soe much innocent Blood was spilt, when
there was possibillitie of Resistance or anie tearms of
quarter wold have beene granted.

In other words, the accusation was that Moore’s defence fell
between two stools – either his conduct was half-hearted or any
terms of quarter could have been agreed and loss of life and
property avoided.65

But Moore had his supporters. Captain Andrew Ashton,
an eyewitness and member of Moore’s regiment, stated that his
colonel had not slept for eleven days prior to 10 June and still
attempted to rally the defenders in the small hours of 11 June.
When this effort failed, Moore escaped by boat to board one of
the great ships lying offshore. According to Ashton, the blame for
defeat lay with the faintheartedness of some soldiers and sailors
who, having no stomach for the fight after the assault the
previous day, fled. This prompted some of the ships’ captains to
suspect treachery and recommend an evacuation.66 This version is
supported by the royalist suggestion of a failure of nerve by
garrison and ship commanders. It certainly convinced Sir John
Meldrum, the Scots professional and commander-in-chief in
Lancashire. After receiving the surrender of Liverpool garrison by
the royalists in November 1644, Meldrum pushed for the renewal
of Moore’s governorship in Liverpool, despite the opposition of
several of Moore’s colleagues on the Lancashire parliamentarian
committee.67

Conclusion
Between 1642 and 1646 Liverpool was transformed from a
relatively insignificant haven to a bustling port. It had emerged
from the fighting as parliament’s most reliable garrison on the
west coast. Its crucial commercial connections with London were

65 Chandler and Wilson, Liverpool under Charles I, pp. 338-39.
66 Historical Manuscripts Commission, 10th report, Stewart manuscripts, pp.
101-03.
67 Young, Marston Moor, p. 211; Liverpool Record Office, MD 324.
expanding rapidly, while its traditional links with Ireland had assumed even greater importance as the war across the Irish Sea continued into the early 1650s.

The presence of an important garrison had several important implications for Liverpool. At its maximum size, it doubled Liverpool's population; the garrison provided opportunities for the town's merchants and workforce; it underpinned the growth of puritanism; and it increased Liverpool's status as a growing regional port. On the downside, Rupert's attack had been responsible for between 300 and 400 deaths, although how many of these were Liverpool residents is unclear. The town sustained considerable physical damage that had still not been addressed at the end of the 1640s. But as other towns showed, these difficulties were temporary. Liverpool's association with the victorious side in the war and the continuation of its garrison into the 1650s were important factors in laying the foundations for its astonishing expansion in the later decades of the seventeenth century.