

THE POLITICS OF LIVERPOOL, 1660-88

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BETWEEN the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and the fall of James II in 1688 two main issues dominated Liverpool politics, the attempt of the manorial interest to retain control in the town and the attempt of the crown to subordinate the corporate boroughs of England to its authority. The contest between Liverpool and the proprietary manorial element was no new thing. Ever since the reign of Henry VIII the Molineux family had held of the crown the fee farm of Liverpool, a bundle of potentially valuable neo-feudal rights. Other families, too, claimed slices of the fee farm, particularly the Moores and the Stanleys. Ominous tensions had arisen between townsmen and these landlords over the manor rights, particularly in the years leading up to the civil war. Though the civil war temporarily solved this problem in the town's favour, it arose again after the restoration of the monarchy.¹

The town's relations with the monarchy were unfriendly in the seventeenth century, with a widespread refusal to pay Ship Money and a firm sustained commitment to the parliament once war had broken out.² Liverpool's undeviating parliamentarianism was tested in siege and assault. It contrasted sharply with the firm royalism of two out of three of those landed families with whom the townsmen were to run into so much conflict after the Restoration. Yet the militant royalism of the Molineux and the Stanleys was probably the least important factor in making their position difficult in post-Restoration Liverpool. What mattered more was the attempt of an increasingly prosperous mercantile oligarchy to throw off all landlord control, in particular the state of affairs whereby Stanley after Stanley occupied the mayoralty and dominated the parliamentary representation of the borough, and to end the archaic situation in which the Viscounts Molineux, constables of the castle, could

benefit from rising land prices as legatees of the manorial system.³

Certainly there was money to be made out of commercial growth, a growth more noticeable in seventeenth than in eighteenth-century Liverpool, when the town developed from 'a small Fishery of late'. Contemporaries were very impressed with its growth. Celia Fiennes in 1695 thought it 'London in miniature as ever I saw anything'. Daniel Defoe found the town's population doubled at every visit—1680, 1690, 1705. Rising wealth was emphatically reflected in rising population; from around 700 inhabitants in 1565, the population rose to an estimated 1,260 in 1664 and, dramatically, to between 6,000 and 7,000 in 1700. Customs returns provide even more obvious evidence of growth. Between Michaelmas 1676 and Michaelmas 1677 Liverpool paid £3,507 in customs dues, a rather paltry sum compared with payments from Bristol and Hull or even King's Lynn and Lyme; by 1685, however, the port was paying £14,850 and by the end of the century claimed to yield £50,000 p.a.⁴ These are the dry figures that lie behind the bustling expansion: the opening of transatlantic trade, with tobacco starting to come in from the 1640s, the building of quays on the foreshore, and the committing of a bill for the navigation of the Mersey in 1663. And all the while the growing world trade was sustained by the old Irish traffic, by business with northern Europe, and by an unexotic commerce in rock-salt.⁵

Profits were being made out of Liverpool's growth and much of the content of post-Restoration Liverpool politics seems to have been about who made them: landlords sitting on property whose value was rising as a result of mercantile effort, or the businessmen who directly exploited the opportunities. Of course the opposition of interest between land and business must not be overdrawn. Even conservative and catholic landlords like Sir William Blundell shared the English gentry's predilection for a safe commercial flutter while the commercial population of the town included 'many Gentlemen's Sons' who were 'put Apprentices in the Town. . . .' But though the dividing line between gentry and merchants could sometimes be a thin one it was, and was felt to be, a dividing line and on one side of it stood those ancestral families who in the period under review sought to survive or prosper through turning into cash inherited seigneurial and proprietary rights.⁶

Sir Edward Moore, the scion of one of these families, the Moores of Old Hall and Bankhall traditionally clients of the earls of Derby, loomed over post-Restoration Liverpool poli-

tics in his quest for local political power that would enable him to repair his family's fortunes. Though a vehement anglican and royalist, Sir Edward was the son of Colonel John Moore who, on the petition of the burgesses, had been installed as parliamentary governor of Liverpool. Colonel John's governorship was the zenith of Moore power in Liverpool and after the Restoration the family's fortunes went into a decline despite the conformity of Edward Moore. The task that Sir Edward set himself was to revive his family's old political influence; both his father and his grandfather had sat in parliament for the borough and since the middle ages Moores had regularly held the mayoralty of Liverpool. The task was all the more necessary in that local political power, either as mayor or M.P. or both, seemed essential if the Moores were to recover their old prosperity in the new conditions of mercantile capitalism, but it was made more difficult because Colonel John Moore, a regicide, had left the finances and prestige of his family in ruins.⁷

This attempted revival of ancient rights by a man with a shrewd and rapacious attitude to property alarmed the Liverpool townsmen. Sir Edward Moore may have been seen by the local bourgeoisie as a counterweight to the Molineux but he represented the same force as the Viscounts did and was determined to secure political power to advance his schemes. This was constantly refused him by the Liverpool electorate: as parliamentary candidate at the Restoration Moore was passed over when it was put about 'that I was the son of my father'; as candidate for mayor in 1669 Moore lost heavily in a turbulent contest; as candidate for parliament at the key by-election of 1670 Moore was a non-starter. It would be difficult to put political labels on these contests. From one point of view Moore, with his almost impeccable cavalier marriage and his whole-hearted conformity to the 'Reformed Catholic' church of England, was a representative of the royalist-anglican squirearchy; from another point of view, in the post-Restoration politics of antecedence, Moore was the son of a discredited Roundhead.⁸ But these wider ideological considerations were insignificant as long as the contest over manorial power gripped Liverpool. Not until that issue had been resolved could the new politics prevail in the town. This seems to me to be the significance of two major electoral contests that occurred at a time of intense struggle with the landlords, elections that cannot be understood primarily in terms of Court against Country or of Anglicanism against Dissent. The first of these was the mayoral contest of Autumn 1669 which centred around Sir Edward

Moore. His invaluable 'Rental' is largely a record of vituperative animosity towards the townsmen as a whole and towards the most prominent of the mercantile and corporation families in particular. For the business community Moore had feelings of social contempt mixed with outrage and envy; '... riches and pride is so predominant in this town, together with a perfect antipathy they have against all gentlemen ... they are the most perfidious knaves to their landlords in all England; therefore I charge you, in the name of God, never to trust them'. Strong gentry snobbery played its part; no 'truth or honesty' could be expected from 'such mercenary fellows'. Nor were these generalisations aimed only at the town as a body, but at some of the wealthiest and most prominent of the burgesses, the presbyterian and whig Williamsons, for instance: 'Remember you never trust any of that name in this town, for there is a great faction of them and their relations ... They have always been enemies to me and all your predecessors ...'.

Moore was constantly aware, though in the 'Rental' he frequently tried to pretend otherwise, that his economic interests and those of the townsmen were ultimately incompatible. The townsmen were aware of it too for, as Moore told his son, 'they know your interest is always to curb them'. The means of 'curbing' the townsmen was of course to be political power: 'although you be never so great enemies, yet, if you be but a justice, and have power in the country, or once mayor of the town, they will be like spaniels at your feet ...'. It was precisely because Moore intended to use political authority to further his interests as a landlord that the townsmen refused it to him. They refused him election to parliament in 1660 when 'it had saved me five thousand pounds if I had been of that parliament'. Prominent corporators obstructed him, like alderman Gilbert Formby, who 'would not give me his vote ... as much as in him lay he endeavoured to have extirpated me and mine for ever ...'. There were other opponents, 'all tenants that openly appeared against me, at the king's coming in, for being a parliament man', as well they might, for Moore saw his seat in parliament as a means of making his landlordism more onerous.⁹

The squire was even more emphatically refused the mayoralty in 1669 at a time of direct conflict with the town over his property when the deputy mayor and two other aldermen staked out the limits of a piece of Moore property that threatened to encroach on the town land. It was not simply as a landlord that Moore seemed to endanger the town's interests but as the possessor of antediluvian manorial rights such as the

King's Mill which Moore bought from the Molineux in 1668. On the grounds that 'There can be no more mills in the town than what is already' Moore expected to make his Townsend Mill yield the not inconsiderable sum of £5 a week.¹⁰ It seems that the mantle of Molineux unpopularity in the town was falling on the Moores in the late 1660s. The townsmen suspected a deal between Moore and Molineux against them: 'You have hitherto stepped off from us and no wise assisted us against the Lord Molineux, but done otherwise . . .'. In these circumstances Moore put himself forward as candidate for the mayoralty of Liverpool. He was not himself a popular figure and was all the less popular in that he upheld ancient and long controverted Molineux claims. To cap all, Moore represented the traditional and increasingly resented dominance of the Stanleys. He must, he wrote in 1670, serve Lord Derby's interest.¹¹ Lord Derby's son, Lord Strange, was mayor in 1668-9. The Stanley succession to the mayoralty was broken in 1669 by the rejection of Moore as a Stanley client.

In the election of 1669 Moore's rival was 'an honest tradesman', Thomas Bicksteth, a man of a fairly old corporation family who had been closely involved with the corporation of the Interregnum.¹² In 1669 Bicksteth was not so much the Cromwellian or parliamentarian or even, despite his initial difficulties over the anglican tests for office, the nonconformist candidate for mayor but rather a corporation candidate put forward to block Moore and Derby as upholders of manor rights. It is true that much attention is given in the account we have of the election to party-political concerns, in particular the failure of Bicksteth to qualify himself for office through acceptance of the rigorous anglican tests designed by the Corporations Act of 1661 to exclude all nonconformists from corporate office. But this account is Sir Edward Moore's: 'A shorte Narrative of the Proceedings at the Election of the Mayor at Liverpoole upon St Lukes day being the 18th of October 1669', and is not only heavily biased in Moore's favour but lays stress on factors of legal disqualification which were less significant than the struggle for influence between the Stanley-Moore party and the mercantile community represented by Bicksteth. Of course the election of Bicksteth was in technical violation of the Corporation Act and in the following months this was the subject of a petition, probably from Moore, before the privy council. But the charge against Bicksteth was answerable and the corporation showed its support for its new mayor by authorising him to retain solicitors at the town's expense. It is true that Bicksteth had not received the anglican Eucharist

within one year before election to office as the Corporation Act required; it is also true that in September 1669 the English corporations received a reminder from the privy council that the principles of anglican monopoly enshrined in the statute must be minutely observed. But for years Bicksteth had stood up for the interests of the Liverpool corporation and with a hard fight against Molineux and perhaps Derby in the offing Bicksteth's long experience in corporate affairs overruled technical objections against him which could have resulted in the election of Moore, the candidate of the landlord interest. In the circumstances, the freemen 'cared not for an Act of Parliament'.¹³

This was clearly an election in which the vociferous Liverpool freemen, allied with prominent aldermanic and administrative elements in the corporation, played an important role against the aristocratic interest. What the local governing class thought of such popular participation in corporate affairs is largely a matter of speculation. While the prominent merchant and later whig, Thomas Johnson, could complain of 'the Stubbornness of the Common free burgesses of the towne', one of the members of his group, Peter Lurting, would be disenfranchised in 1673 for a popular riotous protest against the election of a loyalist. In 1676 a whiggish quartet, aldermen Thomas Andoe, Thomas Johnson, Peter Lurting and mayor Robert Williamson, were accused of expanding the freeman body in the interests of their party. Finally, with the award in the new 1677 charter of clauses definitely tending towards oligarchy, Lurting and Johnson protested vigorously against a tendency that would cut them off from their popular support. The very least we can say is that the very strong anti-manorial element within the governing body was prepared to use the free populace against the gentry and nobility. Certainly that was the case in autumn 1669, or at least Moore thought so: 'great Shouting there was as is usuall in Popular Assembly'; the recorder, the anglican minister, the town clerk and some aldermen 'leaving the Bench engaged themselves amongst the vulgar...'. He refers to 'the outrage of that Multitude', to 'noyse and clamour', and to the retiring mayor's declaration that, as Bicksteth had not complied with the Corporations Act, even if he 'had ten thousand votes, yett his Election was voyd'.

Bicksteth had the popularity but Moore had in his favour not only the letter of the law but the influence of the Stanleys. The returning officer who at first counted the votes and prematurely declared Moore the new mayor was Lord Strange. His father, Lord Derby, was also present at the contest, so im-

portant to his family's influence in Liverpool, and was roughly handled by the Bicksteth party. Backed by his father, Lord Strange first declared Moore elected; then he insisted on the administration of the oaths to Bicksteth who was vulnerable on that point; next he declared Bicksteth disqualified regardless of the number of votes in his favour; finally he commanded the town clerk to swear in Moore. These actions show the extent to which Moore was a Derby candidate. Ironically, it was his identification with the Derby interest that did most to ensure Moore's defeat in this election. Apparently oblivious to that fact, Moore dresses up the whole contest in anglican-cavalier rhetoric: 'Let all good Christians now judge what a Mayor and what a Minister the Towne of Liverpool doth now enjoy, . . .'.¹¹

In this essentially local election the issue turned largely on the revived claims of the Stanleys.¹⁵ It was the same with the important parliamentary by-election of 1670 in which the corporation won the right to return a member who they considered would represent their interests and not those of Molineux, Derby or Moore. There was no mistaking the anti-aristocratic mood of many of the leading burgesses; time and again Moore draws attention to it in his 'Rental'. In 1669 the landlord grip on the mayoralty had been shaken off; in 1670, with a staunch and wealthy supporter of the corporation interest as mayor in succession to Thomas Bicksteth, the same task confronted Liverpool on the parliamentary front. Tradition made it look difficult, for when the Liverpool representation had been resumed in the sixteenth century the Stanleys had shared it only with the chancellor of the duchy and had used their control to install members of the family into the Liverpool burgessdom in Parliament just as they put themselves into the mayoralty. At the Restoration tradition was re-enforced; the town was represented in parliament by the earl's brother, the Hon. William Stanley, and a loyal servant of the Derby interest, the ex-presbyterian Sir Gilbert Ireland.¹⁶

Yet Stanley predominance was more apparent than real. It had never been based on much real property in the town and, of the Stanleys' foremost agents, Moore never got himself elected to parliament, and Ireland, before his death in 1675, put himself heavily in debt in his attempt to keep up with the pace of Liverpool politics. The Stanleys themselves did not fully recover their pre-war economic position after 1660; their estates were much depleted in the Interregnum and were not fully restored to them. The effect of the war in diminishing Stanley authority in the area was compounded in 1662 by a

disagreement with the King himself over the way Derby controlled the county. Finally Derby influence was weakened through a series of ill-timed deaths, that of the Hon. William Stanley in 1670, which precipitated the electoral crisis, and that of the eighth earl himself in December 1672.

In normal circumstances the maintenance of Stanley electoral control might have been assured through the return of a Moore. But important elements in Liverpool were determined to ensure that circumstances were not normal and Moore's defeat in the mayoral election ruined his chances in the parliamentary, particularly as in some quarters his success as the Stanley standard-bearer had been so confidently predicted as to produce a post-election letter addressed to him as 'the Right Worshipfull Mr Mayor'. Moore, of course, still had to be considered. The only written commitment he could get seems to have been from a very undistinguished group of tenants, dependants and relations. Yet, if he put himself forward, Moore might attract enough support to spoil the carefully laid plans of mayor Thomas Johnson. Writing early in the campaign Johnson begged Moore not to form a party for himself and risk the admission of the hated Molineux. Not that the Molineux were a serious electoral possibility but it is possible that Thomas Johnson dangled their name before Moore to alarm him and dissuade him from standing. The name Molineux could produce in Moore paroxysms of antipathy. Members of the family were to him 'Red-letter men' and he prayed 'good Lord, deliver us from the cruelty of bloodthirsty papists'. Thomas Johnson was not, however, bent on the exclusion of the Molineux to promote the electoral fortunes of the Stanleys. The town was involved in conflict with both families about the same time. Though in writing to Moore Johnson gave the impression of loyalty to Derby—'Lord Molineux does make a strong party; so that my Lord of Derby . . . and wee must be unanimous, or else the Lord Molineux will carry it'—in fact Johnson wanted a corporation candidate, 'a man that will bee faithfull to us, and such a one as wee may increase our interest att courte; it is that wee want'.¹⁷ Thomas Johnson, one of 'the most influential men in Liverpool' and the father of the Sir Thomas Johnson who did so much to advance Liverpool's commercial growth in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, worked hard to achieve a corporation victory in this election. In Moore's view Johnson was 'One of the hardest men in town'; for later commentators he was a 'Protestant Merchant' or 'a staunch whig', the latter a political tag borne out by his appointment as mayor in Liver-

pool's 1695 whig charter and by his exclusion from the corporation in the tory 1680s.¹⁸

Whiggery, however, was still in the future and in 1670 the corporation needed as its member of parliament a man well-connected at court and yet elected by the borough not for his local or national political strength but through the efforts and for the interests of the leading burgesses. As we shall see, the town eschewed Moore who, though able 'as a gentleman, to countenance them before the king, privy council, or in any place or court of England', had interests fundamentally divergent from the town's. The borough chose instead 'a foreign interest', but certainly not one of the great national names that offered themselves who might ignore the wishes of local commercial society. We are fortunate enough to possess a series of letters between various men interested in Liverpool politics and these letters clearly chart the borough's deliberate choice of a virtual nonentity as representative. In the close-fought election of 1670 the result was more difficult to achieve than may appear. It was a by-election for a parliament that had not gone to the country for a decade and came at a time when the government of Charles II had attained a new and superficial security after the heterogeneous Cabal had excluded its Clarendonian rivals, and after the dangerous secret treaty with France had been signed in June. The pressure on Liverpool to return a national politician or the dependant of one of the political bosses reflected the intense competition for seats in this long parliament. Powerful interests were already at work when in October Sir Edward Moore reported that the king's illegitimate son Monmouth had asked him to stand for the vacant seat in what is curiously called the Liverpool interest. The fact that Moore represented another, and incompatible, interest is demonstrated in a letter he wrote to Lord Derby. In it he claims to have told Monmouth that he must serve the Stanley interest, a statement we cannot discount as merely sycophantic. Moore's support for Lord Derby was a factor that reduced his chances of securing the Liverpool representation though in even the very recent past it would have been his best asset. Nonetheless, the election turned largely on the preservation of the Derby interest hitherto guaranteed by the membership in parliament of Stanley and Ireland. Stanley's premature death immediately released a flood of letters on behalf of impressive candidates to the sitting member and Derby protégé Sir Gilbert Ireland. Humphrey Wharton, for instance, recommended his son Robert with points that might appeal to Liverpool, familiarity with the north and with

commercial concerns, and unswerving moral rectitude. Greater names soon appeared: the Duke of York claimed a specious link with Liverpool and drew attention to the ability of his secretary, Mr Ross, to 'serve them in Court or Parliament'; the ex-principal secretary of state for Ireland, Sir George Lane, was a client of a so far anonymous 'greate man', the cavalier hero Ormond, and an impressive anglican loyalist candidate.¹⁹

Some time before these approaches on behalf of magnates had been made to the custodian of the traditional Derby interest the possibility had been broached to the corporation of a different kind of candidate, one who might assist the town in its contest with the landed interest and, through court connections, further its trade. Colonel Birch wrote advising the corporation to select one of its own members. Failing this he warmly recommended Sir William Bucknall, wealthy, well-connected at court and yet not really a courtier, a man—Birch's campaign literature is very adroit—unable to 'come and drinke as some others' but invaluable 'both as to your present Contention with your neighbour Lord, and the whole trade of your Towne'. He was a candidate well known for 'his affection to a true Sober Interest, . . .'.²⁰ Though 'true sober interest' tended to be a code term for opposition sympathies, the term may have reflected Birch's views rather than those of Bucknall whose best points were his parvenu wealth, knowledge of business and court connections. One gets the impression of a social rather than a party-political preoccupation on the part of the Liverpool electorate, so that Bucknall's blatantly bourgeois status—he was a brewer—may have been of more use to him than the support that party candidates like the loyalist Lane received from aristocrats and gentlemen such as the earl of Ancram and Alexander Rigby, or the assistance that the country candidate Wharton could expect from embryonic whigs such as Lords St John and Colchester.²¹

Whether or not the leaders of the corporation had already settled on Bucknall, they were keeping their cards very close to their chests and apparently preserving an agreement which the landed interest could not break and which may have been maintained by the deliberate neglect of Birch's suggestion of an alderman candidate, the popular Thomas Bicksteth for instance. Two things are clear: first that the mayor and aldermen were playing a very secretive game, so much so that in writing even to the main prop of the Derby interest mayor Johnson was respectful, even cordial, and almost entirely non-committal so that some observers, the earl included, were taken in to the point of believing that influence was at Derby's disposal; and

second, that the mayor and aldermen possessed in their own right considerable influence. One commentator, Thomas Marsden, put the general view most succinctly; most of the town was under the influence of the mayor and would vote for whomever he should choose to name; Johnson, in turn, seemed ready to back anyone put forward by the earl. It is the second assumption that seems to have been most at fault. Though prominent aldermen like James Jerome, an ally of Edward Moore, remained faithful to the Derby interest, and other leading corporators such as Percivall and Bushell tried to get a Moore candidature going, the Derby campaign manager had on 1 November to confess his ignorance of the corporation's plans; Ireland was disappointed in his expectation that they would ask him to nominate someone.²²

The impression is constantly confirmed that the mayor and aldermen disposed of the town vote; the question outstanding was who disposed of the mayor and aldermen? The general view seems to have been that these were still controlled by the Stanley interest and it did the corporation no harm to let people go on believing that. A certain element of duplicity was inevitable and accounts for the accusations of serpentine perfidy that were hurled at the corporation during and after the campaign. Sir Roger Bradshaigh wrote of 'infidell Leirpool-tonians' and Sir Gilbert Ireland complained that mayor Johnson had 'most perfidiously complied with Bucknall's advantage', probably in hushing up the arrival of the writ. Sir Geoffrey Shakerley complained of Johnson's 'unhandsome dealings', and Ireland that he had been completely ignored in the corporation's deliberations.²³

What these complaints from neighbouring gentlemen make plain is that the corporation kept its own counsel throughout the campaign and that the mayor dissembled over a decision on behalf of Bucknall long since taken, as when Johnson allowed a Moore-Derby supporter to come away with the impression that he favoured Henry Ashurst, the son of Henry Ashurst of Ashurst, Lancs. The testimony of the gentry makes it clear that the eventual victor was from the beginning the mayor's candidate, that Johnson 'complied with Bucknall's advantage'. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that Bucknall was, or became, the candidate of other interests. He was certainly a court candidate. A London alderman, Marvell's 'Brewer's Clerk', Bucknall had been for some time the leading member of a group of London brewers farming the spirits tax in London and the Home Counties; he had also come to a very lucrative arrangement with the king's mistress,

the duchess of Cleveland, to farm English and Irish revenues and was knighted in 1670. Not surprisingly Bucknall was satirised in the 'Flagellum Parliamentarium' for his dependence on the crown. Nor is it surprising that Bucknall had full official backing for his Liverpool candidature, and this is what made him from the beginning fully acceptable to those who sought 'such a one as may increase our interest at court'. Even the old, prescriptive but now controverted influence of the duchy of Lancaster was put at Bucknall's disposal when the chancellor, Sir Thomas Ingram, wrote recommending him and this was followed by the most impressive recommendation of all, the king's. With such certification, Bucknall had to become Lord Derby's candidate as well; the earl 'must be for the same person, both by duty and inclination . . .'. But the 'inclination' may be discounted. Bucknall was not from the beginning the earl's candidate, and though the Stanley electoral reputation may have been face-saved by backing the certain victor, the candidate of the court and the corporation, it was certainly a reversal of an earlier state of affairs, when other interests rode a Derby bandwagon. It was the combination of local and court support, each perhaps prompted and reinforced by the other, that made Bucknall a certain winner by converting him into the candidate of some of the most powerful influences in and around Liverpool. Lord Derby, it was said by 4 November, 'useth much means for Sir Bucknall' even publishing a letter on his behalf from the lord keeper. Colonel Birch, who was a long-standing Bucknall supporter, had apparently first brought his name to the corporation's attention and was at one point seen as the puppeteer above the brewer. It was even claimed, in a confused report by alderman Percivall, that the Molineux came out late in the day for the front-runner.

It went against Bucknall that he was not even a Lancashire man, but then London money worked for him, as did his unexceptionable protestantism (he was later to run into the fierce temper of the secretly but vehemently catholic Lord Treasurer Clifford) when contrasted with the dissenting sympathies of the 'presbyter', Henry Ashurst. Not that religion was that much of an issue, though there may have been an element of cavalier-country dissatisfaction in the rejection of Bucknall by the stalwart royalist squires of the shire. Bucknall represented a court that was suspected by many cavaliers of departing from the cherished anglican, conservative and constitutionalist principles of the earl of Clarendon, principles still austere upheld by the great duke of Ormond and his candidate Sir George Lane, supported at first by the old-fashioned loyalist

Molineux connection, Sir Roger Bradshaigh and the king's brother York. They formed an opposition group against Bucknall cemented not so much by the catholicism of Molineux and York but by a traditional 'honest' royalism, disenchanting with the court and loyal to the crown, expressing a set of views prevalent amongst the future tory gentry with 'country' opinions that found Bucknall's shady dealings with over-pensioned mistresses so abhorrent. More explicit 'country' views, including definite opinions on foreign policy and the preference for an open diplomacy aimed against France, were represented by the ambassador in Holland, Sir William Temple, whose candidature his brother Sir Richard announced on 7 November. He stressed the ambassador's 'Interest and reputation... acquired in his public employment', the popular, protestant and recently concluded anti-French Triple Alliance and England's 'public' foreign policy, opinions in direct opposition to the clandestine, even sinister, pro-French policy of the court. Temple's letter mentions the possibility of Molineux support and, though this seems to have been an unknown quantity, it was more likely to go against Bucknall than, as it was at one point improbably claimed, for him. Not only did the Molineux fall into the conservative royalist camp but Bucknall was offered as a candidate who would assist the corporation in its contention with its 'neighbour lord', Molineux. And it was for this reason above all that the Molineux were lined up with those elements on behalf of Lane, or even perhaps of Temple, who sought to 'engage the Country to come in and balance the Town, a resolution which the Duke of Ormond said he hopes for'.²⁴

Ultimately, perhaps, the election had the character of a clash between the urban and the rural interests. It was rivals of Bucknall like Edward Dobson who relied on the support of the out-burgesses, non-resident honorary freemen; it was gentlemen like Bradshaigh who raised the issue of their franchise; and it was the borough's electoral autonomy that offended squires like Sir Gilbert Ireland, complaining of 'the insolent impositions of your burgesses'. Towards the end of the campaign, however, the shire's resistance started to collapse. It is true that Bucknall's very close court connections gave the opposition some encouragement. Bucknall, in town and spending freely at the beginning of December, had had his electoral conduct questioned by several members of parliament and Sir Gilbert gave out that he would switch support from Ashurst, whom Derby, Johnson and others had urged to stand down, to Sir George Lane at whose disposal Sir Gilbert

announced to Molineux he would place his 'small interest'. Piqued that, as the sitting member, he had not been allowed to choose his colleague he schemed furiously to prevent Bucknall's return. But Ireland's optimistic determination was not widely shared. Ashurst's support had already substantially gone over to Bucknall, the duke of York's letter on behalf of Lane had no success, and Molineux despaired of Lane's chances, outwitted as the Lane party was by the manoeuvres of the court-corporation group whose advantage lay in expediting the contest. Defections followed; while Sir Geoffrey Shakerley remained firm for Lane, Sir Roger Bradshaigh confessed on 6 December that his 'small interest'—there was as much truth as modesty in these recurring admissions of diminished influence—had been 'long since bound up from being against Bucknall', and now that Lane had no chance he put his electoral weight at the disposal of the corporation. Finally, Sir Gilbert threw in the towel, though he continued to scheme for some kind of contest so that he could obtain his revenge by later controverting a result that had been achieved by 'Golden nets'.²⁵

Golden nets or not, by election day 9 December, the varied resistance to Bucknall had collapsed and the brewer was returned for Liverpool, a victory largely due to the 'unhandsome dealings' of the mayor who had had his term of office continued through the campaign. Derby's influence was not an active factor in the election, but this is because his prestige had already been weakened, not only as a result of land disputes with the corporation but because of an earlier failure to advance the corporation's interests by soliciting a new charter. The *quid pro quo* politics of the eighteenth century had been formed long before, a complicated patronage system whereby the political capital of a politician at the centre depended on his strength in the localities, which in turn depended partly on his ability to obtain favours at the centre. In the case of the Stanleys this latter ability was in some doubt after the Restoration. Though the Hon. William Stanley had been counted amongst the 'Parliament men as are servants, or have dependence by office or commands under his Majestie', and though the family had an outstanding royalist record, inadequate compensation from the crown gave them a sense of grievance against the court and led to an alienation that was less than useful to a town that needed spokesmen at Westminster and Whitehall to obtain various concessions — navy contracts, a new pier, a new customs house, a new church, preference over the rival port of Chester.

Above all a new charter was a major desideratum in the 1660s though the corporation did not take the initiative in seeking it but responded to a supposed government intention. In July 1663 'Upon reading a letter from Mr John Case certifying that writts of *Quo Warranto* are to be issued forth to all Corporations, it is ordered that a letter be forthwith sent to the said Mr Case for his further advice, and touching the renewing of the Town's Charter'. But clearly the corporation readily acceded to what it imagined to be the crown's policy and spontaneous resolutions in favour of a new charter passed the council in May 1664 and in June, October and November 1667. In these resolutions there seems to be no party-political issue but rather a preoccupation with jurisdictional and fiscal changes, a re-crossing of rights in the context of quarrels with the landlord interest. Thus the important letter of application of 1668 from John Sturzacker, mayoral deputy, and others to the corporation's agent in London, James Jerome, is concerned largely with corporate real estate and with the functioning of the corporation under a succession of aristocratic supervisory officials—mayors and recorders. It was a period when the corporation was particularly sensitive about its property rights, and thus the insistence on 'our claim of the Common . . . we have had by prescription all manner of heridaments and privileges, as Common, Common of Pasture . . .'. At the same time the corporation was in the middle of a run of mayors from the Stanley family and it was only with difficulty that a Stanley candidate was rejected in the following year. For this reason there was concern with the status of the chief magistrate's deputy during his absences. Concern was also shown at the widely broached possibility of introducing loyalist noblemen into corporations as recorders. Liverpool seems to have been determined to restrict the activity of the legal official, and perhaps to ensure that he be a professional; the recorder must be 'only assistant and to direct or advise in point of law'.²⁶

The kind of charter the governing body of Liverpool wanted was a definitive, confirmatory one that would clarify in its favour the position as to common land and the status of the corporation. This explains why the earl of Derby took no action to obtain a charter that would threaten his interests. His inaction illustrates why the corporation was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with landlord mayors. The year of application was the year of a Stanley mayoralty and the corporation obviously, though perhaps ingenuously, expected Derby to serve its advantage: 'Application shall be made to his

Lordship by the aldermen of this town, to acquaint his Honor of the freedom of this assembly to have their Charter renewed.' Either through lack of pull at the centre, or through disinclination to promote the interests of the governing body, Derby failed to do anything about getting a new charter in 1668. The reduction of the Stanley influence in Liverpool elections, parliamentary or corporate, was linked with this failure to earn political support by obtaining tangible advantages for the town.²⁷

When Liverpool's first post-Restoration charter was eventually granted in 1677 the Stanleys had little to do with it. Nor were the preoccupations of that later date, though they were familiar and related, those of 1668. In the later 1670s the main issues were the restriction of the corporate electorate and the role of the county in town affairs. The question of the size of borough electorates was a familiar one throughout the seventeenth century and after the Restoration there was a definite trend towards oligarchy, though this may have been exaggerated by latter-day whig propagandists of the nineteenth-century Municipal Reform Act. The most learned of these, Serjeant Merewether, discovered an oligarchic conspiracy amongst loyalist corporators at Liverpool: 'The Common Council thus purified by the Commissioners [under the Corporations Act] seemed to have formed a plan for vesting in themselves and their associates all the powers of the corporate body, independently of the burgesses, which they accomplished by obtaining from Charles II . . . the charter . . .'. Undoubtedly such a purpose existed, though its realisation was partly thwarted by the inclusion in the confirmatory charter of 1677 of individuals like Thomas Johnson and Peter Lurting who seem throughout the 1670s to have relied on support from popular elements in the borough. On the other hand, the clause specifying that the major and bailiff should no longer be elected by the assembly of freemen but by the sixty of the council was brutally oligarchic and the popular group clearly recognised this. They refused to have anything to do with the new incorporation which had been obtained, as they saw it, conspiratorially by 'a few of the Burgesses of the aforesaid town, by a combination among themselves, without the consent of the greater part of the Burgesses . . .'. It was a loyalist combination and, though small, it built itself up by the inclusion of town Tories like Silvester Richmond and Robert Seacombe, and above all by a clause providing for fifteen non-resident country gentlemen—Tories, it goes without saying, even if the name had yet to be adopted in English politics.

Liverpool was entering the age of whig and tory party politics in the later 1670s and important re-alignments had taken place since 1670. Above all, the anglican and 'cavalier' gentry, which at the turn of the decade had been deeply suspicious of an administration that included the presbyterian Lauderdale, the libertine Buckingham, the catholic Clifford and the former Cromwellian Ashley Cooper, was now to some extent won over to the court by the earl of Danby's attempted rejection of the Cabal's leanings towards toleration and France. The era of better feeling between the anglican landed interest and the court, the apparent collaboration between the crown and the squires to swamp the municipalities, may have been responsible for the alienation from the court of those elements in Liverpool which had earlier been prepared to support crown candidates. Without a doubt the crown's maturing 'borough policy' included an intention to reduce the independence of corporate towns by inserting into the membership of their common councils politically reliable members of the gentry. But in towns like Liverpool the independence of the corporation from the landed interest had for long been the primary issue in politics and it is my belief that the origins of Liverpool's staunch whiggery lay less in nonconformity than in an assertion of municipal self-sufficiency against the predominantly tory gentry backed by the crown. Toryism seemed to promise the reversal of the gains that the borough had made since the Restoration in freeing itself from control by the county. The 1677 charter, with its provision that 'a fourth part of the said sixty [of the common council] be of the out-burgesses', was followed by other measures which tended to blur the cherished distinction between town and county, the resolution of November 1677, for instance, that anyone excluded from sitting as a justice in the county should likewise be excluded from office in the corporation.

These provisions were only the preliminaries to a much more intense subjection of the borough to the county in the tory 1680s, which achieved a climax in the surrender of the charter in 1685. On 19 August 1684 'At a Common Council then held, it was declared by Mr Mayor, that he had lately been with Sir George Jefferies, . . . who demanded from him the Charter of this Corporation by special direction from his Majesty, and expects to have the said Charter to be delivered to him at Bewsey tomorrow, . . .; or for default thereof, a *Quo Warranto* to be sent for it; . . .'. This made nonsense of any claim that might be made of corporate independence and it was followed by a charter that handed the borough over to

the county. The terms of the charter clearly worked in this direction (Lord Derby was appointed an alderman) but more than that the new grant was arranged in such a way as to make it clear to all that the town depended on the shire. On 8 April 1685 the deputy mayor 'attended with many freemen inhabitants of this borough' treked out to Bewsey Hall, now home of a staunch rural tory Sir Richard Atherton, under the charter the new mayor of Liverpool, to receive the charter. There was no doubt that toryism meant municipal subordination and oligarchy, just as whiggery offered the possibility of municipal self-government and a more extensive franchise, as was shown by the restoration of freemen and burgess electoral rights in the widely popular charter of 1695. Predictably, the 1685 charter was not well-received outside the knot of tories who had solicited it. Alderman James Jerome had to be dismissed for his opposition to it and the reception of the charter had occasioned what Lord Sunderland, the chief agent of the crown's borough policy, described as 'some disorderly riotous proceedings'. The charter was, I think, unpopular on two related counts: it called in the county to dominate the town, and it gave power to a tory minority in a whiggish town. The town's new tory government was endowed with the machinery to preserve itself. Backed by the crown's reserved right of removing any members of the corporation, the most senior members were also equipped with the power 'to give and administer the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance to every person . . . living within the aforesaid borough, whom from any reasonable cause they may suspect of being evilly disposed to the obligation of their allegiance, or towards the government of this realm . . . as it is now established in Church and Civil State'.²⁸

In Liverpool there may have been a considerable number of individuals amongst the freemen and, in the early 1680s, in the corporate body who might be open to such suspicion. The whig interest remained strong and was reflected in the return to parliament in 1678 of Sir Ralph Assheton who was considered by Secretary of State Williamson as one of the 'members who were expected to be present on behalf of the Court and failed to attend'. He had, however, received the surrender of Liverpool as a parliamentary colonel in 1643 and was mourned in high whig fashion by the dissenting ministry: 'a worthy member of the long Parliament . . . a great loss to the country . . . Here lies his Country's friend and popery's foe . . .'. And if this election was controverted, as it was by the indefatigable Sir Edward Moore in the last year of his life, the decision on

Liverpool by the house of commons was thoroughly whig: the sitting members were declared to be the oppositionist duo, Richard Wentworth and John Dubois.²⁹

In the period of party formation between the late 1670s and early '80s Liverpool's stance seems to have been broadly whiggish. So was the attitude of the corporation to the loyal—and not so loyal—address mania of those years. Liverpool's 'loyal' address of August 1681 clearly reflects the preoccupation of the whig party, protestantism, law, property and liberties, and echoed the views of the Liverpool corporation's whig majority, the 'far greatest part of the Council'. Tory dissent is not difficult to understand given the guarded tone of an address which looked, when the conventional deferential rhetoric was stripped away, like an opposition manifesto. The borough's offering to King Charles recalls his unflinching adherence to protestantism, despite temptation during his exile, his clemency at the Restoration, his maintenance of property, religion and liberties, and finally his recent reassurance that he would 'make the excellent laws of the land the rule of your government both in Church and State, and endeavour the extirpation of Popery'. In gratitude the corporation promised to maintain the king's person and heirs 'against all Popish contrivances and other devices whatsoever'. All this seems to be thoroughly whiggish: the repetitive insistence on the danger from catholicism, the religion of the king's brother James, heir to the throne; the dwelling on the crown's post-Restoration policy, unpopular with tories, of oblivion for past political misdeeds; an insistence that the king place himself under the laws, even as a condition of his subjects' loyalty.³⁰

Little in this document suggests even moderate toryism, much less the high-flying non-resisting variety. Yet this address may well have been the last significant moment before 1689 when the whigs carried a majority of the Liverpool corporation. The process was already under way by which the tories captured the corporation, a process which their exploitation of the 1677 charter assisted and which the 1685 charter clinched. In 1682 it was the turn of the tories to notch up a symbolic victory after Bishop William Morton of Kildare, given the freedom of the town without the usual fees, took the necessary anglican oaths, rather flamboyantly, on his knees. The same year provided the best opportunity to test the real strength of hard-core whiggery in the town, where it was still dominant, and in the corporation, where it was becoming less so. Admittedly only diehard whigs would expose themselves to the now very considerable danger of standing up to be counted on

behalf of the king's illegitimate son Monmouth who, in his pseudo-royal progresses and his quite open challenge to the succession of the catholic duke of York, violated every principle of tory legitimacy. And yet some corporators came out in support of the whigs' duke in an attempt to swing the whole corporation into an official endorsement of Monmouth. We have several accounts of Monmouth's visit to Liverpool, all written in response to the enquiries of a suspicious central government. Their general tenor is to play up the role of the populace in welcoming the duke. Peter Shakerley, for instance: 'Some few little guns (muskets, some think) from some ships and some shouts from the rabble, which was great, welcomed his arrival . . . The rabble had got some muskets and gave him some volleys.' Clearly Monmouth had a reception at Liverpool but the 'rabble' never has a surname and the conspiracy of anonymity in the reports to the government was maintained by crediting to the populace the acclamation of Monmouth. Thus the tory alderman Silvester Richmond: 'The second day he came over again but made no stay in the town and was followed out of it by some acclamations of the vulgar sort of people.'

Such reports suggest a desire to shelter neighbours and perhaps protect the corporation from some drastic intervention by the central government that might have completely ruined the prestige of Liverpool tories. In their reports Shakerley and Richmond attempt to shelter individuals, the former the earl of Derby and the latter the whig alderman John Chorley who entertained Monmouth at his new house on the night of Tuesday 12 September. The event was well known but as far as alderman Richmond was concerned the duke stayed 'at a private house', while, according to the Rev. Matthew Fowler, the exclusionist hero put up 'at an alderman's house in Liverpool whose name is not remembered'.

These were odd lapses of memory and they are only the most obvious instances of a deliberate attempt to give the government a false impression. Take Shakerley's report: Monmouth 'yielded to be made free of the town and then the bells rang'. Well, the bells did not ring themselves; they were rung officially; 'Paid for ale to the ringers when the Duke was in town, 1s.' The small matter of the bells conceals a more salient fact. Monmouth was invited by mayor Richard Windall and five aldermen to receive the freedom, a clear sign of corporate political approval. Yet our reports insist upon the minority position of the Monmouth whigs: the 'invitation was not consented to by the whole body' [Shakerley]; '. . . the Mayor . . .

to vote him free, could scarce get a Council, being forced to make use of one of the Council, who acted, as I am informed, though he has not taken the requisite oaths'. [Richmond]; finally in October came a report that it had proved virtually impossible to make up the thirty of the Council required to confer the freedom and that two whig hardliners, Peter Atherton and John Molineux, had been sent for. This is convincing evidence of diffidence. Contradicting it Matthew Fowler's impressions, though displaying a certain bias against the corporation, depict the conferment of the freedom not as a boycotted shambles but as a successful attempt to set the seal of corporate endorsement on Monmouth's treasonable activities: 'The D. stayed behind to receive the courtesy of the Town, viz. the Freedom of it and a banquet, and then was conducted with great ceremony by the Mayor and his brethren to the waterside.'³¹

However impressive the ceremony was the fact remains, and all the accounts testify to it, that Monmouth was awarded the freedom, a notable achievement considering that the duke was on the verge of being arrested, that support for him in 1682 was evidence of very committed whiggery, and that such prominent whigs as aldermen Clayton and Thomas Johnson deliberately dissociated themselves from the conferment. Monmouth whiggery was extreme but it was probably the logical conclusion of the party's programme. The attempt to obtain recognition for the duke in 1682 or '83 was the whigs' last hope, though many whigs drew back from it. Monmouth's arrest set the scene for the rout of the whigs in 1683, the tory show trials, the death in exile of the party's genius, Lord Shaftesbury, the failure of the Rye House Plot and the round-up of Shaftesbury's lieutenants. At Liverpool the shrewder whigs lay low in 1682; the 'progress' was the party's last throw for six years. Following a failure to which the reservations of 'moderate' whigs had contributed, even those who had come out openly for Monmouth had to conform or face the consequences. Support for Monmouth was a desperate gamble and its failure discredited respectable local whiggery so that the whigs in the borough were as far from success after 1682 as the popular adulation of Monmouth made it appear they were close to it in the autumn of that year. Not only were leading local whigs discredited but so also was the principle of popular participation in local government because of the involvement of the 'rabble' on whom the whigs' leaders depended. The events of September 1682 provide the best evidence for the strength of the whigs in Liverpool town and corporation, but also

explain the eclipse of the party. After 1682 nothing is heard of the strident whig tone of 1681. A new address was composed expressing shocked disapproval of the botched assassination bid of whig zealots in September 1683 and denouncing 'those traitorous and unparalleled designs' directed against the king and the duke of York 'by a factious and restless sort of men who cannot endure prerogative, because it secures the property of your Majesty's good subjects, over whom they would tyrannise as formerly they have done'. The king was 'reserved to be the scourge of rebels and traitors'. The tory reaction was echoed in a letter from mayor Edward Tarleton and his colleagues asking for directions from the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster about the treatment of the many quakers who embarked at Liverpool for America. Such emigration, it was claimed, offered to whig conspirators the possibilities of disguise and escape.³²

How had this tory mood come to dominate the Liverpool corporation? Liverpool shared in the prevailing national swing towards the king and the church but the local tories achieved an ascendancy in the corporation largely through the manipulation of personnel. Thomas Johnson, an anglican, was easily edged out because of his rejection of the oligarchically orientated charter of 1677: 'It was ordered that the said Mr. Johnson should not be admitted into the said Council for that he had publicly declared he would not act by virtue of the new charter.' John Molineux, a prominent whig dissenter, was excluded by the imposition of the anglican oaths required by the statute regulating corporations.³³ Despite his exclusion Molineux collaborated in the conferment of the freedom on Monmouth in 1682. This action more than anything else defeated the Liverpool whigs. Thomas Baines was quite right in seeing the 1683 tory address as a frightened reaction to the Monmouth episode: 'the corporation of Liverpool endeavoured to clear itself from suspicion of sympathy in the designs of Monmouth and Shaftesbury by a most loyal address to the king'. The fifteen 'out-burgesses' brought into the town government in 1677 further helped the conversion of the town to toryism. Tory control was precarious, however, partly because individuals such as Richard Windall, who by 1686 seems to have conformed completely to the establishment, had only four years previously shown quite other political colours. As late as 1686 an obvious whig, bailiff John Poole, was still in office and had to be removed. Although the county tories had been called in to counteract the whiggery of the townsmen, their presence did not solve the basic problem in town politics, the tension be-

tween a whig borough and a tory hinterland. Above all, after the tories put themselves in the saddle and were confirmed in their ascendancy by the charter of 1685 they had to face the consequences of a royal policy that attacked the institution that tories held most dear, the church of England.

Although an atmosphere of honeymoon prevailed between James II and the tories on his accession in 1685 estrangement quickly came about. For the king had another love, his catholic faith, and his desire to advance it by obtaining toleration for his co-religionists soon came into conflict with the prejudices of those whose toryism was largely the political reflection of their anglicanism. At Liverpool the corporation was distinguished for its adherence to the established church, an adherence strengthened in some individuals by a close involvement with the emoluments of that church. Silvester Richmond, Liverpool's leading corporation tory, was a highly paid surgeon licensed by the dean and chapter of York, a position which gave him a strong vested interest in the preservation of the anglican monopoly over his own profession, while the placing of his sons in various Lancashire benefices must have confirmed his attachment to the church. It is not surprising that when the king's order that proceedings against a catholic surgeon in Liverpool be stopped was disobeyed by the authorities, Silvester Richmond, senior alderman, was dismissed from the corporation. Perhaps tory-anglican views were still closely allied to professional interests. Oliver Lyme, the deputy-mayor, was dismissed with Richmond in August 1687. An intransigent tory, Lyme owed his considerable wealth to the reservation of such lucrative offices as the customs controllership to tory-anglicans.³⁴

Lyme and Richmond stood out from their fellow councillors in summer 1687 and it was the rest of the corporation, 'a full Council', that voted their dismissal. The corporation was still co-operating with the king's policy. Richmond himself was present at a courteous reception in September for the catholic Bishop Leyburn, while the corporation entertained the high Laudian Bishop Cartwright, a determined advocate of the royal policies and one of King James' notorious Commissioners in Causes Ecclesiastical.³⁵ Within a month, however, the whole corporation followed Lyme and Richmond into an attitude of resistance to the king's catholicising policy. In October came an order from the corporation for a recall of the charters that had been too casually surrendered to London in 1685. Then in November the corporation gave its unco-operative answers to the king's request for a firm commitment to the policy of toleration which was to be put before parliament: 'When it shall

please the King to call a Parliament, he [the mayor] proposed to vote for such persons as he hoped would serve the just interests both of his Majesty and the nation.'

By September tory intractability had ensured the failure of the royal toleration policy. At Liverpool the corporation had moved into open resistance. In defiance of the crown's attempt at securing compliance through the removal of personnel the council was determined to keep its mayor James Prescott. The corporation stated its 'due submission and humble deference to the power of removing any officer in the corporation' but repudiated this power in action. The right of removal was conceded when its exercise coincided with the interests of the tory oligarchy but was challenged when used against the governing group. Thus the mayor was to keep all the attributes of office in the corporation, 'for the defence of its rights wherewith he was entrusted, until a successor should be legally chosen and sworn according to the charter and the ancient custom of the corporation'.³⁶

The mention of ancient rights, of a piece with an earlier demand for a recall of ancient charters, has a whiggish sound. And it was appropriate for towns so solicitous for their chartered rights as Liverpool to have whig governments. Nonetheless, the fall of James II resulted in an interim period of local tory rule; the 'whig revolution' resulted at Liverpool in the restoration of a tory oligarchy. In the interests of its prosperity the town took steps to accommodate itself to the new regime, a process which involved a contest between tory 'old' and whig 'new' charter men, and occupied the years up to 1695. But Liverpool tories had nothing to do after 1688 with the monarch who had offended their anglicanism and Liverpool stood aside when Jacobite Lancashire rose for its king in 1694. The borough displayed its old concern for accommodation with the central government and was rewarded with the whig charter of 1695 which afforded the opportunity to relax the party-political tension between the town and its government, the prerequisite of prosperity.

NOTES

- 1 T. Algernon Earle and R. D. Radcliffe, 'The child-marriage of Richard, second Viscount Molineux; with some notices of his life, from contemporary documents', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire* (hereafter *THSLC*) 44 (1893), pp. 254-61.
- 2 A. M. Robinson, 'Cheshire in the great Civil War', *THSLC* 48 (1896), p. 153; E. M. Platt, 'Liverpool during the Civil War', *THSLC* 61 (1910), pp. 183-202.

- 3 George Chandler, *Liverpool* (1957), pp. 51, 74, 82-94; James Croston, ed., *Baines' History of Lancashire* (hereafter *Baines' Lancashire*) V (1888), p. 129; E. M. Platt, 'Extracts from the Liverpool corporation records, 1541-1701', *THSLC* 55, 56 (1905), pp. 102-3; Thomas Baines, *History of the town and commerce of Liverpool, and of the rise of manufacturing in the adjoining counties* (hereafter *Baines, Liverpool*) (1852), pp. 330-4.
- 4 Chandler, *Liverpool*, pp. 97, 295; Stanley A. Harris, '*Deus nobis haec otia fecit*. Some notes on Liverpool's motto', *THSLC* 116 (1965), p. 5; F. Walker, 'Historical geography of southwest Lancashire before the Industrial Revolution', *Chetham Society* N.S. 103 (1939), p. 45; William Fergusson Irvine, 'Lancashire hearth taxes', *THSLC* 52 (1902), pp. 128-129; *Baines' Lancashire* V, pp. 128-9; *Cal. State Papers Dom.* (hereafter *CSPD*) 1677-8, pp. 384-5; Arthur C. Wardle, 'Liverpool's early customs collectors', *THSLC* 95 (1944), p. 45.
- 5 Chandler, *Liverpool*, pp. 285, 289, 291; *Commons Journals*, VIII, p. 447; T. C. Barker, 'Lancashire coal, Cheshire salt and the rise of Liverpool', *THSLC* 103 (1952), pp. 84-6.
- 6 T. E. Gibson, 'Lancashire mortuary letters, 1660-1672, from the Crosby records', *THSLC* 36 (1887), p. 40; Chandler, *Liverpool*, p. 97.
- 7 T. N. Morton, 'The family of Moore in Liverpool', *THSLC* 38 (1889), pp. 149-58; Thomas Heywood, 'The Moore Rental', *Chetham Society* 12 (1847), introd. (hereafter *Moore Rental*).
- 8 *Moore Rental*, pp. 1, 37; *Baines, Liverpool*, pp. 329-30.
- 9 *Moore Rental*, pp. 11, 46-7, 37.
- 10 *Ibid.* p. 79; Richard Bennett, 'The king's mills of ancient Liverpool', *THSLC* 48 (1897), pp. 47-51.
- 11 *Moore Rental*, p. 10; Liverpool Record Office, MS. Cal. of Moore Deeds, 1749, Edward Moore to the Earl of Derby, 25 Oct. 1670.
- 12 Sir James A. Picton, *City of Liverpool. Selections from the municipal archives and records from the 13th century* (hereafter *Picton, Liverpool*) (1883), p. 66; Chandler, *Liverpool*, p. 192; *Moore Rental*, introd., p. viii.
- 13 L'pool RO. Moore Deeds and Papers, 391; *Picton, Liverpool*, p. 245.
- 14 'A Short Narrative...'; L'pool RO. Moore Deeds and Papers, 391, *passim*; Moore Deeds and Papers, 393, Thomas Johnson to Edward Moore, 1 Nov. 1670; *Picton, Liverpool*, pp. 245, 248.
- 15 'A Short Narrative...'; Ronald Stewart-Brown, 'The tower of Liverpool With some notes of the Clayton Family of Crooke, Fulwood, Adlington and Liverpool', *THSLC* 61 (1910), pp. 51-2.
- 16 *Moore Rental, passim*; Chandler, *Liverpool*, pp. 89-92; *Baines' Lancashire* V, pp. 156-7; T. W. King, ed., 'Lancashire funeral certificates', *Chetham Society* 75 (1869), p. 83.
- 17 Thomas Heywood, ed., 'The Norris Papers', *Chetham Society* 9 (1846), p. 18; T. W. King, ed., 'Lancashire Funeral Certificates', *op. cit.* pp. 85-7; *Moore Rental*, app., pp. 135-9, p. 16; F. Walker, 'Historical Geography', *op. cit.* pp. 117-18; A. J. Hawkes, 'Sir Roger Bradshaigh of Haigh', *Chetham Society*. (*Chetham Misc.* N.S. 3) (1945), p. 23; *DNB* James Stanley, seventh earl of Derby; L'pool RO. Moore Deeds and Papers, 391, 'Considering the necessity of a person of interest...', n.d., but probably 1660 or 1661; 393, Thomas Johnson to Edward Moore, 1 Nov. 1670; L'pool RO. MS. Cal of Moore Deeds and Papers, 1736, Arthur Squibb to Edward Moore, 25 Oct. 1669; *Ibid.* 1752, Thomas Johnson to Edward Moore, 4 Nov. 1670.
- 18 Alexander Goss, 'The narrative of Richard Abbot, servant of Caryl Lord Molineux', *Chetham Society* 61 (1864), pp. 12-13; T. Heywood, 'Norris Papers', *op. cit.* introd., p. iv; Chandler, *Liverpool*, pp. 55, 195; 'The navigation of the river Weaver'. *The Palatine Notebook* (1884), pp. 33-4; *Moore Rental* p. 47; E. M. Platt, 'Sir Thomas Johnson', *THSLC* 52 (1902), p. 148; *Picton, Liverpool*, p. 252.
- 19 *Moore Rental*, p. 88; Rev. A. Hume, 'Some account of the Liverpool election of 1670;...', *Proceedings and Papers of the Historic Society of Lancs. and Ches.* 6 (1854) app., pp. 1-26, especially pp. 1-4; L'pool RO.

- MS. Cal. of Moore Deeds and Papers, 1749, Edward Moore to the earl of Derby, 25 Oct. 1670.
- 20 Rev. A. Hume, 'Some account of the Liverpool election of 1670', *op. cit.* app., p. 4, n.d. (but before 19 Oct. 1670).
- 21 *Ibid.* pp. 5-7.
- 22 *Ibid.* pp. 15, 5, 7, 8, 15-16, 20, 24, 23; L'pool RO, MS. Cal. of Moore Deeds, 1751, 1753, 1750.
- 23 Rev. A. Hume, *op. cit.* app., pp. 9, 11, 16, 15, 10-11; F. R. Raines, ed., 'Dugdale's Visitation of Lancashire, 1664-5', *Chetham Society* 84 (1872), p. 9; Andrew Marvell, 'Further Advice to a Painter', H. M. Margoliouth, ed., *The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell* (1927), I, p. 169 and app. p. 291; *The Palatine Notebook*, I, (1881), pp. 144-5; E. M. Platt, 'Extracts from the Liverpool Records', *op. cit.* pp. 102-3; C. H. Hartmann, *Clifford of the Cabal* (1937), pp. 309-10.
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