

THE EARL OF DERBY'S CATHOLIC ARMY

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The role played by Roman Catholics in the English Civil War has long been the subject of debate and controversy. In one recent foray into this field Dr. Keith Lindley opined that during the war Catholic neutrality was widespread, a neutrality which led to a peculiar degree of toleration for Catholics during the Commonwealth period. By way of riposte Dr. Peter Newman, in a series of articles on Roman Catholic activists and officers, reaffirmed the important contribution to militant Royalism made by Catholics especially in the Northern Counties.¹ The nub of Newman's criticism was that in relying overmuch on the records of the Committees for Compounding and for Advance of Money Lindley, because of the very nature of the sources themselves, underestimated the active military contribution of Roman Catholics to the party of Charles I. By including such sources as 'A List of Officers Claiming to the Sixty Thousand Pounds etc. granted by his Sacred Majesty for the Relief of His Truly Loyal and Indigent Party' 1663, and seventeenth century lists like 'Royal Martyrs' 1663 and a 'Catalogue of the Lords, Knights and Gentlemen (of the Catholicke Religion) that were Slain in the late Warr in Defence of their King and Country' 1660, Newman was able to show that at least among field officers, that is those ranks from major upwards, Catholics accounted for large percentages of Royalist officers.² Particularly marked was the number of Roman Catholic officers in the army of the Earl of Newcastle which was labelled by Parliamentary tract writers 'the Catholique Army'.³ This study seeks to examine both contemporary and recent claims that part of the Northern army, or indeed an army within an army, that of the Earl of Derby in Lancashire, was likewise largely composed of Catholic officers and men.⁴

To define what exactly constituted the Earl of Derby's army is not altogether straightforward. The army had a short life. Its first elements were being raised as early as July 1642, by the end of May 1643 it had been totally destroyed, yet despite such a curtailed existence Derby's forces were subject to, in a remarkable degree, a continual process of recruitment, withdrawal, borrowing etc. Thus while the Lancashire Royalists, even in the first year of the war, contributed substantial numbers of soldiers to the main field army, supported the neighbouring counties of Cheshire and Yorkshire with troops and companies, and allowed outsiders to recruit within the county, yet in turn the Lancashire Royalists themselves were reinforced by several units raised elsewhere. A few examples can illustrate the fluid and heterogeneous nature of Derby's army. The regiments of Charles Gerard, Sir Gilbert Gerard and Lord Molyneux, all substantially Lancastrian in content, were sent by Derby to join the King prior to the Edgehill campaign. Thomas Prestwich joined the Cheshire regiment of Sir Thomas Aston after the siege of Manchester, while John Cansfield, John Girlington and George Middleton, amongst others, eventually left Lancashire to serve the Earl of Newcastle across the Pennines, while several Lancashire officers flocked to serve Queen Henrietta Maria once she had landed at Bridlington on February 22, 1643. When Lancashire regiments did return north as they did under Byron in December 1643 and under Rupert in May and June 1644 the Royalist cause in the county, at least militarily speaking, was a broken reed. On the other hand Derby, as Lord Lieutenant of North Wales, was helped by Welsh troops, mainly on garrison duty; Cheshire Royalists aided Derby from time to time especially in September 1642; individual volunteers and units originating in many parts of the country assisted Derby at the siege of Manchester and well into February and March of 1643. For the purposes of this article I shall take anyone fighting for the Royalists in Lancashire between July 1, 1642 and May 31, 1643 as belonging to the Earl of Derby's army.⁵

The revival of interest in the military history of the English Civil Wars displayed in the work of such scholars as Dore, Hutton, Newman, Roy, Wanklyn and Young is closely associated with the utilisation of a wider range of sources than was employed by the older generation of analysts and commentators such as Broxap and Willis-Bund. The sources on which the present study is based include the List, the

Lancashire Quarter Sessions Petitions of maimed soldiers 1660–1680, the records of the Committee of Compounding and of Advance of Money, Royal Martyrs, Catalogue, the 1658 List of Roger Whitley, together with the two standard Lancashire sources, Civil War Tracts and the Discourse, as well as family papers, parish registers, recusancy lists and Worsley's 1655 list of suspected Royalists.⁶ The employment of such a combination of sources serves to identify a greater number of Royalist officers occupying lesser positions in the military hierarchy as well as some volunteers and common soldiers. Only with a preliminary data collection on this scale can an exhaustive analysis of individual Royalist military involvement begin to proceed. Of course the investigation of ranks below major is not clear cut. There are problems of identification and even when these have been resolved there is no guarantee that an individual's social status and/or geographical origin can be found. Bearing in mind Dr. Newman's caveat over the simple counting of names, the exercise is worth attempting and analysis below the rank of major is worthwhile.⁷

Using the sources outlined above, along with many stray references found in a wide range of supporting works, some 413 Lancashire Royalist officers have been identified who were active at some time between 1642 and 1660. In addition I have also identified to date, in a continuing study, some 1866 individuals who fought for, or in some other way supported, the Royalists during the same period.⁸ Of the 413 officers 88 can be said to have been part of Derby's army from July 1642 to the end of May 1643. In the case of volunteers the timing of their military activity is difficult to discover. In the records of the Committee of Compounding and Advance of Money precise information on the nature of military involvement is rare and phrases such as 'adhered in the first war' or 'assisted in the wars' give no hard facts on which to base a reasoned judgment of the exact nature of an individual's participation. Thus in this context only when a person is said to have acted 'from the beginning of the wars' or some like phrase can he be included in the Earl of Derby's army. In the final analysis then 88 officers and 114 others are included either as having fought or in some other way aided Derby's army up to the end of May 1643.

Contemporary opponents of the Lancashire Royalists were in no doubt of the religious affiliation of many of the King's supporters. The frequently hysterical outpourings

against Roman Catholics and their role in the Civil Wars can be explained partly by the religious complexion of Lancashire in the mid-seventeenth century. Writing with hindsight to the London Committee in 1650 the Lancashire Committee commented, 'In the beginning of the war this county was looked upon by Parliament as one of the most dangerous, in respect of the interest which some great men had in it that went with the King's party, and of the many Papists that abound in parts of it.' Along with Monmouthshire, Lancashire was reckoned to have the largest concentration of Roman Catholics in the whole country. Contemporary estimates of the size of the Roman Catholic population in Lancashire were open to exaggeration. Such estimates as do exist were usually based on numbers of recusants, but there is one assessment of the numbers of Roman Catholics given by Captain Richard Winch on a journey made to the north of England in 1648. He wrote that there were, 'above 12,000 families of papists in the said Duchy upon Recorde.' At a conservative estimate of four persons per family this would give a Catholic community of around 50,000. The modern scholar Bossy calculates that the proportion of Roman Catholics per 1,000 was 94 in Monmouthshire and 90 in Lancashire. As Blackwood gives the county's population in 1642 as around 150,000 Bossy's figure would give a Roman Catholic community in Lancashire of *c.* 13,500 against a national total of 60,000. Hibbard estimates that even in Lancashire the proportion of Roman Catholics in the adult population as a whole was well under 10%.⁹

Catholics accounted for 221 out of 774 gentry families (28%). Of the 221 most were to be found in the lowland, arable hundreds of Amounderness (47.7% of all gentry families in this hundred were Roman Catholic), Leyland (39.4%), West Derby (36.9%) and Lonsdale (32.6%). Taking in all social ranks Blackwood was able to show that West Derby, with just over and Amounderness with just under 35%, had most Roman Catholics in 1641 while next came Leyland (13.7%), Blackburn (10%), Lonsdale (4.4%) and Salford (1.8%).¹⁰

Given the contemporary view of the pervasive character of Roman Catholicism in the county and its proximity to, and links with, Ireland, it was no surprise that when the anti-Catholic feeling of the years 1640–1642 broke, Lancashire Puritans experienced much of the fear and trepidation that had struck in the Armada year of 1588. To

them plotting Papists were everywhere awaiting the opportunity to overthrow the 'true Protestant religion'. In 1639, as the Scottish crisis intensified and rumours ran rife of Catholics flocking to join Charles I's army in the north, suspicion of the activities of Lancashire Catholics was compounded. In August 1639 a Catholic petition to Charles I called for restraint over the enforcement of the penal laws particularly in the north.¹¹ In October 1, 1639 a meeting of the collectors of the Catholic contribution referred to the 'business of daily informing against us'. Hard on an investigation of the Scottish war the House of Commons concluded that 1500 papists in arms were present in Lancashire while it was rumoured that Lancashire priests were implicated in the Army Plot. In December 1640 the House directed that especial care be taken for indicting all the Popish recusants in Lancashire not already indicted and convicted. Rumours that early in 1641 Strafford was building up a Catholic army in Lancashire and North Wales were apparently substantiated by reports that Catholics had been buying up large stocks of corn.

The response of Parliament to what appeared to be a fast deteriorating situation was to send commissioners on August 18, 1641 into six counties, Lancashire being one, to ensure that all convicted recusants were disarmed as the royal proclamation of November 11, 1640 had directed. During October while the commissioners went about their business news reached the mainland of the outbreak of the Irish rebellion. While the Protestants in Lancashire steeled themselves for sudden attacks from across the Irish Sea rumours intensified throughout the country. Parliament was alarmed to hear of the arrival of armed Lancashire Catholics in London.¹² On November 17, 1641 Pym told of six Catholics 'this night come out of Lancashire armed with swords and pistols' and Strange's letter regarding insecurity in the county convinced sceptics of the truth of the rumours. As the 'Catholic fear' of the winter of 1641-2 raged on, nowhere in the land was Catholic involvement considered more dangerous than in the North and Lancashire in particular. The horrific tale that MPs heard on February 21, 1642 concerned a gentleman who had discussed plans with a Roman Catholic priest to make 'fireballs and grenados' so that on the Irish landing 'all the towns of Lancashire should upon one day be burned and then the papists to rise' merely confirmed fears and suspicions held. The subsequent investigation of the 'fireball plot' which found that the

recusants concerned were 'of good ability, of seeming civil behaviour and quiet neighbours' did nothing to dispel the anxieties.¹³ No-one felt the anxieties as strongly as Lord Strange. The growing uncertainties during the winter of 1641-42 persuaded him to stay in the county when perhaps he might have wished to leave. Part of Strange's quandry was no doubt due to the fact, that despite measures introduced to arrest strangers, wandering Roman Catholics and night riders, he himself was reported to have claimed that he was 'inforced to keep a guard about his house for fear of the Papists'.¹⁴

In these circumstances it can be understood why the 1641-42 recusant roll was the most comprehensive for a decade. Roger Kirkby reported that 15,000 Catholics had been indicted in Amounderness, Alexander Rigby reported the same figure, although the actual number was 6,000 lower, and the House of Commons was 'much startled'. Nor could the response of some Lancashire areas to the Oath of Protestation of early 1642 have brought much comfort to those fearful of Catholic mood. In Garstang, for example, 230 persons signed the document but 288 openly refused.¹⁵ The humour of Lancashire Protestants in the months before the outbreak of war is illustrated by the County Petition of March 12 1642. Seeing themselves 'seated in the mouthe of danger', the petitioners demanded naval protection in the Irish Sea lest 'the Irish cruelties' and 'great barbarism' be 'transported wither from the opposite shore . . .'.¹⁶ When the external threat was married to the 'enemy within' it is easy to understand the rising tide of anti-Catholic feeling. Whether in early 1642 this was or was not justified, matters little; that it existed was sufficient. Yet the tendency to hammer Catholicism at any and every opportunity led Protestants to habitually refer to the Royal party as 'Papist' with no attempt to distinguish other denominations or groups, such as Anglicans which supported Charles.¹⁷

In the atmosphere described above the use of Roman Catholic soldiers, either native Lancastrians or outside Catholics, to support the King in the county was bound to provoke an adverse reaction and prove a sensitive issue and could do irreparable harm to the King's party. Crucial were the attitudes of Charles himself and James Lord Strange later the 7th Earl of Derby.

As Barry Coward makes clear, Strange was a Protestant who patronised Protestant preachers, who disliked the Arminian character of the Caroline court in the 1630s and

who had an intense dislike of popery. Yet Strange did not seek confrontation with the Lancashire Catholic gentry. Such a stance was tenable in the years prior to 1639 but when the Scots Wars broke out the resultant polarisation of opinion in Lancashire destroyed the *via media* sought by Strange, a path which alone could preserve the integrity of the county community. The fact that Strange was fearful of Roman Catholic violence in 1641 and may have felt personally threatened made no impression on his detractors such as Alexander Rigby who interpreted Strange's apparent reluctance to move against Roman Catholics as evidence that he positively favoured them.¹⁸ The presence of leading Roman Catholics in positions of authority in the county cannot be seen as proof of discrimination in favour of Catholics. That Roman Catholics held office as Justices of the Peace, although at times recusancy led to removal, simply reflected the sizeable proportion of Roman Catholics among the county's gentry.¹⁹ In Puritan eyes Strange may well have been guilty of seeking an accommodation, however tenuous, with Roman Catholics, yet given the weight of the Catholic presence in the country, the facts that his house at Lathom was in a strong Roman Catholic area of south-west Lancashire and that many of his tenants were Roman Catholics, Strange had no choice but to live side by side with the Catholics despite his personal distaste. Whether in 1642 this accommodation went so far as actively seeking the military assistance of Roman Catholics is not clear and on this matter the attitude of the King himself was all important.²⁰

Charles I's public pronouncements were certainly calculated to allay Protestant fears of any Roman Catholic involvement in the Royal army. His military manual (1642) stated, 'no papists of what degree or quality so ever shall be admitted to serve in our Army', and again on August 25, 1642 the King swore 'to Our Knowledge noe Papist is neere us and wee have by severall Proclamations forbidden any such resorte.' It is also worth remembering that the Commission of Array included instructions to disarm 'all Popish Recusants'. Yet despite these outpourings it was commonly known that Roman Catholic officers dismissed in 1640 were serving the King in 1642, many of them high rankers – John Belaysse, Thomas Tyldesley, John Winter, Thomas Leveson etc.²¹

The Yorkshire musters of August 4, 1642 made plain Charles' dependence on Roman Catholics for it was noted

that 'many recusants, to make themselves capable to commands do resort to Church.' Charles sanctioned such practice by writing to the Earl of Newcastle on September 23, 1642. '... I do not only permit but command you to make use of all my loving subject's services, without examining their consciences. ...' And his positive reply to the celebrated request of September 1642 for permission to arm sent him by six leading Roman Catholics was confirmation that such developments were fast being officially sanctioned. In Lancashire such official pronouncements were bound to encourage the emergence of Catholics hitherto reluctant to show open support for Charles. Strange may have privately jibbed at such developments, yet having lost soldiers to the Edgehill campaign he was in no position to refuse military assistance from whatever the source.²²

Contemporary Protestant opinion was certain that Royalists were making a good deal of use of Roman Catholics both at the start of hostilities and as the war increased momentum. As early as May 25, 1642 some 300 Papists were said to be gathering near Lancaster while at the famous meeting on Preston Moor on June 20, it was claimed that the majority of those who rode up and down the moor, supporting the King were 'popish Recusants'.²³ Throughout late June and July Protestant fears of the machinations of Lancashire Roman Catholics increased. On July 8, 1642 a Parliamentarian from Preston wrote to a friend in London, 'the soldiers are all moved out of the town to the number of 4,000 ... we are beset with papists. I dare not go to the moor'. On July 27 Henry Oxinden was informed, 'The papists are upon Lancashire and threaten some heavy doom to befall the Protestants in these Parts.' Three prominent leaders of the Parliamentary cause, Ralph Ashton, John Moore and Alexander Rigby, reported that, 'we dayly expect and fear great Insurrections of popish, Protestant professors, Papists and other malignant persons ...' Indeed it would seem that religion was the main issue separating the two sides for Rigby, while meeting Thomas Tyldesley and others at Sir Gilbert Houghton's house on July 3, stated that 'he could like them well, if they were not so familiar with Papists.'²⁴

For the Parliamentarians the siege of Manchester provided ample confirmation that the rumours of Catholic involvement were true. The tract writers referred to the presence of Papists in his army while Parliament's thanks to Manchester claimed that Strange had, 'procured divers

papists and other ill-affected persons in a hostile and rebellious manner . . .'²⁵ Intelligence reports in the period following the Royalist reverse at Manchester continually referred to the issuing of commissions to Roman Catholics and the recruitment and arming of Catholic companies and the activities of priests. Richard Shuttleworth's letter of October 21, 1642 is typical, ' . . . There is now at present great preparation among the papists, for [raising] of companies my lo: haveinge some companies already in a bodie at Wigan, and about Lathom and Ormskirk, as is related to us, w^{ch} are feared were daylie increased in strength and armes both of horse and foote, and besides that, some papists have commission to rayse volunteers . . . this contrie and espially this hundreth . . . was never in greater feare nor more danger than nowe it is'.²⁶

The petition of the six Roman Catholic Lancashire gentlemen and the King's favourable reply of September 27 must have given encouragement to those Catholics who were waiting to receive Charles' blessing before taking up arms on his behalf. The King's response further heightened tension; fears that Roman Catholics were redoubling their recruitment intensified during the hectic period of reorganisation started by Derby in December 1642. Tyldesley, Dalton and Cansfield were all reported to be recruiting hard with Tyldesley being especially active in the Fylde. It was also pointedly remarked that among Derby's administrative henchmen who met at Preston on December 10, 1642 were several Catholics e.g. Adam Mort, Mayor of Preston, William Smith and Hugh Anderton.²⁷

Once the fighting began in earnest, in February 1643, references to Roman Catholics in the Royalist ranks increased. Preston was reckoned to be the rendezvous for the Papists of Amounderness Hundred and when it was taken on February 9, 1643 the lists of Royalist dead, wounded and prisoners were annotated to show those who were 'of the Popish party', while the blowing up of Houghton Tower shortly afterwards on February 14 was not unnaturally attributed to 'those perfidious creatures whose religion will allow them to make no conscience of dealing treacherously with Protestants . . .'²⁸ Predictably the presence of the Roman Catholics was highlighted and emphasised in all reporting of the fighting that followed. The chief managers of the Royalist attack on Bolton, February 16, 1643, were all noted recusants. Papists were expressly blamed for the cruelties at Derby's assault on Lancaster,

March 18, 1643. At the disaster at Whalley, Derby was accompanied by 'all the . . . great Papists in this County', while the Parliamentary capture of Wigan and Warrington dealt a blow to the 'goods and treasure of papists' and to their 'last hold'.²⁹

Even allowing for pardonable exaggeration and partiality the case set out by the Protestant and Parliamentary writers seems clear enough. The extent of Catholicism in Lancashire created a tense atmosphere before the war began. Increasing polarity between Roman Catholics and Puritans was caused by mutual suspicion and antagonism fuelled by events in Ireland and ample rumour. Despite a public stance against the use of Catholics in the royal armies Charles and his supporters repeatedly made use of Catholics, a development which, if the tract-writers are to be believed, gathered pace in Lancashire under the auspices of such prominent military personalities as the Andertons, Cansfield, Dalton, Middleton, Molyneux and Tyldesley *inter alia*. The *prima facie* case for the Catholicism of Derby's army seems overwhelming, but how does it stand up to a more dispassionate analysis? Was Derby's use of Lancashire Catholics that intense and indeed what was the Lancashire Catholic community's military response?

THE EARL OF DERBY'S ARMY – IT'S STRENGTH AND ORGANISATION

Using descriptive sources, other tracts and standard accounts can help to give an impressionistic survey of the strength of Derby's army as it developed and the numbers at his disposal at each stage in its brief existence. The birth of Derby's army may be said to have taken place on July 15, 1642 when the Royalists, in number estimated at anything between 30 and 40, along with a troop of horse brought from York, skirmished at Manchester. The protagonists are actually named as being present and of those only two – Lord Molyneux and Thomas Tyldesley were Roman Catholic.³⁰ After this Lord Strange (not Derby until the death of the sixth Earl during the siege of Manchester) began recruiting in earnest in South Lancashire and his warrant to the high constables of Amounderness hundred referred to the proclamation of August 12 about the King's plans to raise his standard. Lord Strange announced that he was to raise volunteers from the militia companies relying on the

pull of his name and leadership. According to a report on August 26, 1642, following his first muster at Preston, as many as 100 musketeers, 60 pikemen and 16 cavalry had agreed to enlist from a single hundred.³¹

From such meagre beginnings Derby's army soon grew to the extent that by September three foot regiments numbering about two thousand men had been raised under Charles and Gilbert Gerard and Viscount Molyneux. After the siege of Manchester these three marched to join the main Royalist field army, probably at Meriden Heath east of Birmingham. Among the force which marched to Edgehill was Thomas Tyldesley who commanded the freeholders band and had brought them to Warrington prior to the attack on Manchester.³² Such evidence as exists is too scanty to quantify the Catholic presence but a closer examination of the army which attacked Manchester reveals a little more.

There are eleven separate estimates of the size of Derby's army at the siege of Manchester. The smallest figure is 2,000, the highest 4,500. Broxap shies away with 2,000 to 4,000 but more specific accounts give 2,000 foot and anything up to 600 horse. On balance it seems unlikely that the army exceeded 3,000 men. Strange's articles of impeachment refer to 'in persuance of his Trayterous Actions procured divers Papists and other ill affected persons in a hostile and rebellious manner.' That Catholics were among the Royalist army is indisputable. Thomas Tyldesley is specifically noted as having assembled Roman Catholic soldiers at Wigan prior to the rendezvous at Warrington. No comprehensive lists of soldiers and officers present at the siege exist but a combination of sources yields the line-up to be found in Appendix 1. Of the 36 names only 5 can be with any certainty identified as Roman Catholic but this is of course hardly a reliable indication of Catholic participation.

Derby lost some 200 men at the siege with nearly 100 taken prisoner. Given the size of Derby's army as 3,000 this would leave 2,700 men, a figure immediately reduced by the march southwards of the three foot regiments to join the main field army. The strength of these regiments was approximately 1,600 men which means that Derby was left with about 1,000 troops.³³ Another reduction through desertions must have been made up by fresh recruitment, for a Parliamentarian spy claimed that on October 26, 1642 the Royalists totalled 1,400 and this estimate excluded the

garrison at Liverpool.³⁴ Some of Derby's soldiers may have been demoralised on account of their experiences at Manchester and this made further utilisation of all possible resources vital in order to increase Royalist strength. It must be safe to assume that a proportion of the fresh recruits after October (and the King's reply to the Catholic gentlemen of September 27) were Roman Catholic. The absence of Molyneux and Tyldesley during the Edgehill campaign did not prevent Catholic recruitment. At the beginning of December in the north of the county John Cansfield and Thomas Dalton were busy raising troops while Catholics were involved in the administrative reorganisation of the Royalist war machine in mid-December 1642 (Appendix 2).³⁵

On December 10, Derby and his main supporters met at Preston to rationalise the financing of their forces, an agreed 2,000 foot and 400 horse. The initiative for this meeting probably came from Molyneux and Tyldesley who must have returned from the south by then. Their presence may also explain the energetic way in which the Royalists began to reorganise their forces in preparation for action.³⁶ It is possible to deduce the composition of Derby's army at this stage from two main sources which together can be used to arrive at a virtual army list. The royal army at the siege of Manchester has been estimated as 3,000 men. From this must be deducted losses sustained in killed, prisoners and desertions. After the various regiments departed for Edgehill and subsequent recruiting to replace them, Derby, as indicated above, had about 1,400 men at his disposal. Losses were incurred in various small skirmishes, notably at Chowbent on November 27 and Leigh on December 24, where losses can hardly have exceeded 200. All this implies that Derby's army was something over 1,300 in late December 1642.³⁷

Examination of both sources reveals, however, a different story. In the billeting list of December 22 are 13 companies (assuming Captain Halsall and Lord Molyneux to have a company each) which at a conservative estimate of 80 each equals about 1,000 (this includes the loss of 58 at Leigh on Christmas Eve). When the dispositions ordered on December 30 are added the figure rises to 1,900. To this can be added companies of Captains Pilkington and Wood and the horse troops at Lathom. The total could well approach 2,200. This estimate may err on the high side but even if it drops to 2,000 it shows evidence of considerable recruiting

by Derby's officers and also shows that the drain of troops to the south was not crippling, at least in numerical terms.³⁸

The Lancashire Lieutenantcy Papers throw further light on the scale of recruiting between October and December. The sources examined above take no account of recruitment in the north of the county where both Cansfield and Dalton were raising troops of horse. While another horse troop under Captain Cunnie remained at Lathom strong assistance 'lately arrived at Liverpool' was expected to swell the Royalist numbers.³⁹ The composition of this assistance is not known, certainly the parliamentary scout who reported their arrival was unable to ascertain their identity though he did write of 'two or three greate shippes'. Further recruiting is reported at Chorley and Wigan by Farrington, Rigby and Fleetwood.⁴⁰ While the Royalists were engaged in reorganisation in the south of the county, one key figure was absent - Thomas Tyldesley. The explanation lies in the fact that he was busily recruiting in Amounderness where he succeeded in raising seven companies all substantially Roman Catholic in composition, so too was Captain Bayard's company recruited in Leyland Hundred.⁴¹ When we include the northern recruits and the company of Lloyd at Liverpool, he had been made a freeman of the port on November 26, 1642, the number of Royalist soldiers in the whole county must have approached 3,000 by the end of the year. That such an increase in numbers was at least partly due to the additions of Roman Catholic units seems clear. Apart from the substantial numbers recruited in the north the army in the south also had its share of Roman Catholics as shown in Appendix 3.⁴²

Derby's reorganised army got off to a poor start. When the Earl himself was in Chester planning a possible joint venture with Earl Rivers, news came of the fall of Preston on February 9, 1643. An examination of the list of prisoners and garrison reveals the presence of several prominent Roman Catholics (Appendix 4).⁴³ This major setback roused Derby to action. A fierce though eventually abortive attack was unleashed on Bolton (February 16), two rendezvous were arranged at Ormskirk (February 27 and March 14) and following the strengthening of Liverpool garrison with Welsh companies Derby marched north from Wigan with 600 foot and 400 horse. Once in the Fylde clubmen to the number of 3,000 joined the army and when Girdlington and Tyldesley brought further recruits, on paper at least, Derby had a fine fighting force. Consequently the capture of

Lancaster town (March 18), Preston two days later, the defeat of Shuttleworth by Molyneux (March 20) together with Brewer's success (March 22) mark the high tide of Royalist success in 1643 although a further attack on Bolton failed (March 28).⁴⁴ Despite the fact that Derby's army had by now further swollen in numbers, the fatal encounter at Whalley (April 20) ended the Royalists' dream of dominating the county. Derby's defeat revealed the faulty over-reliance on the ill-disciplined rabble that were clubmen. Captains had been appointed over some irregulars but insufficient training in some measure contributed to the panic during which the clubmen fled at Whalley, a major factor in Derby's defeat.⁴⁵ The units which had been led down to Edgehill were sorely missed in the aftermath of Whalley. Royalist morale was shattered and the Parliamentarians resumed the offensive and began to mop up enemy garrisons. By June 1643 all the major towns of the county were in Parliamentarian hands and with only Lathom House and Greenhalgh Castle in the King's hands, Derby's army had ceased to exist as a fighting force only eleven months after its genesis.⁴⁶

THE EARL OF DERBY'S ARMY - AN ANALYSIS

In all 88 Lancashire officers fought in their native county between July 1, 1642 and May 31, 1643, 71 fought exclusively within the county during this period while the other 17, including such luminaries as Gilbert and Ratcliffe Gerard, John Cansfield, Thomas Prestwich, Lord Molyneux, Thomas Tyldesley and Derby himself, fought both in and outside the county. Of the 88 officers, 39 (44%) were Roman Catholic. 114 'sub-officers', common soldiers, adherents and assisters etc, again all Lancashire natives, can be considered to have been either part of Derby's army or to have played a substantial role in its support and maintenance. Of these only 18 (16%) were Roman Catholic (Table 1). Problems of identification are certainly present here as it is more difficult to identify Roman Catholics once they fall below gentry level. The substantial numbers of Catholics present in the Royalist Composition Papers and the 1655 lists make it hard to believe that problems of source material alone account for the large discrepancy of 28% between the two categories. It may well be that, for reasons we shall return to, Roman Catholics in the sub-

TABLE 1: *The Earl of Derby's Army. July 1642 – May 1643*

	N	R.C.	% R.C.
Lancashire officers fighting in county	88	39	44
Lancashire sub-officers, 'adherents', 'assistors' etc.	114	18	16
Outside officers, volunteers etc.	24	5	21
Total	226	62	27

gentry classes preferred not to become embroiled in the conflict to the same extent as their fellow co-religionists from the higher social strata. This appears to tally with Lindley's findings that in Monmouthshire, Yorkshire and Lancashire, 'Catholic royalism . . . becomes more pronounced as one moves up the social scale.'⁴⁷ Of course it is not safe to assume that Derby's contingent was composed exclusively of Lancastrians. I have identified some 24 outsiders, officers and gentlemen volunteers who fought for or supported Derby at the siege of Manchester and after of whom 5 were Roman Catholic.

The resulting level of Roman Catholic involvement only assumes significance when the numbers of active Royalist participants of that faith are related to total size of the population in the county for it is a claim of Newman that Catholics played a role in supporting and sustaining the Royalist war effort out of all proportion to their numbers. Above it has been estimated that the percentage of Roman Catholics in Lancashire in the mid-seventeenth century was about 10% while among gentry families the percentage rose to 28%. As Table 1 reveals the proportion of Catholics in Derby's army was certainly greater than their proportion in the county as a whole. Taking the whole sample of 413 officers (Table 2) it is shown that the percentage of Catholics among the field officers, the military pacesetters as it were, is superior to the proportion of Catholics in the lower ranks. Could it have been that this discrepancy was due simply to lack of manpower? While their contribution was undeniably over the expected norm when population figures are taken into account, the fact that Roman Catholics accounted only for around 10% of Lancashire's population must eventually have had an adverse effect on their participation. This shortfall shows up among the lower military

TABLE 2: *All Lancashire Royalist Officers 1642-1660. By Military Rank*

<i>Military Rank</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R.C.</i>	<i>% R.C.</i>	
Above colonel	4	1	25	
Colonel	33	18	54.5	
Lt.-Colonel	16	9	56	Field officers 73. R.C. 37 (51% R.C.)
Major	20	9	45	
Captain	165	65	39	Captain-ensign 306. R.C.115 (37.5% R.C.)
Lieutenant	64	21	33	
Quartermaster	30	13	43	
Cornet	29	11	38	
Ensign	18	5	29	
Other	34	11	32	
Total	413	163	39.5	

ranks but not apparently in social rank (Table 3). Here social status could only be identified among 227 of the 413 officers. Of the 227, 129 were Catholics (57%). Officers drawn from below gentry are rare, therefore the substantial military contribution of the Lancashire Catholic gentry shows up graphically – almost 58% of gentry officers, including knights and esquires, were Catholic, all the more impressive as amongst the Lancashire Catholic community only 7% were gentry.⁴⁸

TABLE 3: *All Lancashire Royalist Officers 1642-1660. By Social Rank*

	<i>N</i>	<i>R.C.</i>	<i>% R.C.</i>	
Viscounts, Barts, & Knights	15	10	66.6	Barts-Esq, 72. R.C. 36 (50% R.C.)
Esquires	57	26	45.6	
Gentlemen	142	88	62	Gentlemen 155. R.C. 93 – others (60% R.C.)
Yeomen	5	2	40	
Others	8	3	37.5	
Total	227	129	56.8%	

When the tables (Tables 4 and 5) for the Earl of Derby's army are compared with the whole sample of 413 officers we find that the percentages of Catholic involvement are almost identical but when social rank is examined there is a marked discrepancy with Catholic representation in the class of gentry and below much more marked in the total sample (60%) than in Derby's army (36%). This would seem to indicate that early in the war it was the mere Catholic gentry and below who were reluctant to support the King militarily but later in the war Catholic participation became more overt, not among those of high social standing whose support of Charles was fairly constant throughout the war, but among Catholic gentlemen in the county. In this regard the arrival of Rupert in June 1644 and the subsequent Marston Moor campaign encouraged the enlisting of several Catholic gentlemen who had not felt moved to support the King in the first two years of hostilities. Such gentlemen included *inter alia* Colonel Cuthbert Clifton, Captains Richard Butler, Robert Knipe and John Lance, Lieutenant Thomas Mossock and Cornet Hamlet Massey.

It is widely regarded that the main recruiting area for Derby's army was the Fylde in Amounderness Hundred.⁴⁹ Tables 6, 7 and 8 show that at least among identifiable individuals Amounderness was not the main provider of officers and other Royalists, although it must be pointed out that the figures are distorted for Lonsdale and Salford Hundreds by the utilisation of two fortuitous sources.⁵⁰ Contemporary references to the Fylde Clubmen, up to the number of 3,000, even allowing for exaggeration, seem to emphasise the important role of this area in providing men for the King's army and yet the theory that the Fylde produced huge amounts of Royalist infantry rests largely with the Parliamentary author of the 'Discourse' who had special knowledge of the region and understandably concentrates on the men in his narrative to the exclusion of other regions of widespread Royalist support. Close examination of Blackwood's work on Catholic gentry and plebians in Lancashire shows that although Amounderness and West Derby had the biggest concentrations of Catholics in the county, the social composition of Catholics in each of the two hundreds was different – whereas in West Derby 7% of Catholics were gentry only 4.2% in Amounderness originated among the gentry. As it was from the gentry that the chief thrust of Catholic military involvement came it follows that Amounderness was not necessarily the most important

TABLE 4: *Earl of Derby's Officers July 1642 – May 1643. By Military Rank*

<i>Military Rank</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R.C.</i>	<i>% R.C.</i>	
Above colonel	3	1	33.3	
Colonel	10	6	60	
Lt.-Colonel	7	4	57	Field officers 26. R.C. 13
Major	6	2	33.3	(50% R.C.)
Captain	46	18	39	
Lieutenant	6	2	33.3	
Quarter-master	1	1	50	Captain-ensign 57.
Cornet	2	1	50	R.C. 23
Ensign	2	1	50	(40.3% R.C.)
Other	5	3	60	
Total	88	39	44.3	

TABLE 5: *Earl of Derby's Officers July 1642 – May 1643. By Social Rank*

	<i>N</i>	<i>R.C.</i>	<i>% R.C.</i>	
Barts, Viscounts, Knights	7	4	57	Barts-Esq 29. R.C. 17
Esquires	22	13	59	(58% R.C.)
Gentlemen	31	12	38	
Yeomen	3	1	33	Gentlemen 39. R.C. 14
Others	5	1	20	others (35.8% R.C.)
Total	68	31	45.5	
Social rank unknown	20	8	40	

recruiting area of Derby's army; nevertheless impressionistic evidence, such as the geographical origin of Royalist colonels points to a substantial contribution to the King's cause from the Fylde if not on quite the same scale as that in West Derby Hundred.

TABLE 6: *Earl of Derby's Officers. July 1642 – May 1643. Geographical Origin*

<i>N</i>	<i>Hundred</i>	<i>%</i>
13	Amounderness	16
2	Blackburn	2
15	Leyland	17
9	Lonsdale	10
4	Salford	3
27	West Derby	31
18	Unknown	20
88		100

TABLE 7: *Earl of Derby's Army. July 1642 – May 1643. Sub-officers, Adherents etc. Geographical Origin*

<i>N</i>	<i>Hundred</i>	<i>%</i>
2	Amounderness	2
1	Blackburn	1
3	Leyland	3
35	Lonsdale	31
34	Salford	30
12	West Derby	11
27	Unknown	22
114		100

TABLE 8: *Earl of Derby's Army July 1642–May 1643. (Lancastrians only). Geographical origin*

<i>N</i>	<i>Hundred</i>	<i>%</i>
15	Amounderness	7
3	Blackburn	1.4
18	Leyland	9
44	Lonsdale	21
38	Salford	18
39	West Derby	19
45	Unknown	23
202		100

THE EARL OF DERBY'S ARMY – CONCLUSION

Among officers the contribution of Catholics to Derby's army was impressive. With exactly half the field officers Catholic it is clear that Lancashire Catholic gentry represented a pool of support for the King out of all proportion to their numbers both within the county as a whole and within their own community. If the original composition of the army relied less on Catholic support this changed after the siege of Manchester, when the move south of regiments on the Edgehill campaign left Derby for a time seriously under-resourced. Catholics arrived to fill the vacuum encouraged by the reply of Charles I to the letter of the recusant gentlemen. If it could be assumed that Catholic officers had Catholic companies, then the case for strong Catholic support down the social scale would be clear but this cannot be taken for granted and evidence is scanty.

Overall plebian Catholics were more reluctant than their socially superior co-religionists to fight for the King. Lindley cites various motives for Catholic neutrality – Catholics who owned former monastic property did not want the Church to recover it, those who lived near Parliamentary garrisons were intimidated into inactivity, while others were alienated from the Crown during the 1630s – but these reasons could apply equally to Catholic gentry as to plebians.⁵¹ The main factor for the lack of support for Charles among plebian Catholics was poverty. Poorer Catholics did not possess the financial resources necessary to sustain lengthy military activity; as Mosler discovered in Warwickshire, most Catholics could not afford either to compound for their estates or to fight.⁵² In 1641 some 24% of Lancashire Catholics were husbandmen, poor farmers, unable to fight or provide large scale assistance. Moreover in Lancashire the existence of independent plebian Catholic communities free from gentry control could certainly cut down the recruiting potential of various areas.⁵³ One must also remember that whereas it is possible that up to one quarter of the male population fought in the war, at any one time perhaps only one tenth was engaged. In such circumstances it is doubtful whether Roman Catholics, even in Lancashire, had sufficient manpower to sustain lengthy military support for the King.⁵⁴

It was the Roman Catholic gentry of West Lancashire, especially in West Derby Hundred, who spearheaded Catholicism. Newman has written that, '... the real muscle

of the Royalist army lay with minor gentry and their social inferiors.' In Lancashire the muscle came from the minor gentry's social superiors who played a substantial role in the first year of conflict and were to fight for Charles all over the country up to 1646 and beyond.⁵⁵

What were the consequences of the substantial Catholic presence among Derby's officer cadre? Did the inclusion of Catholics put off potential Protestant supporters and thus inhibit the growth of what might have been a fruitful area of recruitment? Again did the Royalist Catholics encourage some to declare for Parliament when in other circumstances they might have chosen neutrality? Three petitions of 1642, one from Lancashire to Parliament (March 12) and two to the King (May 2 and June 6) abound in requests to take measures against Catholics – 'That the Recusants of this Countie may be disarmed'; 'We . . . acknowledge . . . Your late Proclamation, for the putting in due execution the Laws against Papists'; and warnings about the march of Catholicism – ' . . . the Popish and malignant party'; ' . . . Popish Impieties and Idolatries . . .'⁵⁶ Those who signed these petitions must have been dismayed by the sight of increasing numbers of Catholics flocking to join Derby in the autumn of 1642. This further exacerbated the fears of those still anxious after the alarms of 1641 and uncertainties of early 1642. Thus at the defence of Manchester, Bolton and Lancaster, the successful attacks on Preston and Wigan, and the decisive battle of Whalley, Parliamentarians identified Catholics as the prime movers and chief culprits on the Royalist side. Whether this was a misguided or exaggerated view is of no importance, that this suspicion existed was sufficient. Did the use of Catholic troops place a millstone round the Royalists' necks that sank their cause in Lancashire and eventually in the whole war? Or was the Royalist defeat in the county due to poor organisation, lack of manpower and crippling demands for additional support both of men and money from the main Royalist field army?⁵⁷ Of the substance of Catholic royalism in high command both national and local there can be little doubt, but whether this involvement was of long-term benefit to the King is open to question.

NOTES

- 1 K.J. Lindley, 'The Part Played by the Catholics', in B. Manning, ed. *Politics, Religion and the Civil War* (1973), pp. 126-176; P.R. Newman, 'Catholic Royalist Activists in the North, 1642-46', *Recusant History*, 14, (1977), pp. 26-38; 'Catholic Royalists of Northern England 1642-45', *Northern History*, 15 (1979), pp. 89-95; 'Roman Catholic Royalists: Papist Commanders under Charles I and Charles II, 1642-60'. *Recusant History*, 15 (1981), pp. 396-405.
 - 2 Newman, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 26-27; for a discussion of 'A List', 'Royal Martyrs' and 'Catalogue' see Newman's *Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642-1660. A Biographical Dictionary* [hereafter Newman R.O.] (1981) pp. ix-x. Newman, *art. cit.* (1981), p. 404 quotes the following percentages. In Staffordshire 30.3% of all field officers were Catholic, Northumberland 39.5%, Durham 47.8% and Lancashire 59.7%. For the country as a whole Newman gives 259 Catholic officers out of 1072 whose religious affiliation can be deduced (just over 24%); see P.R. Newman, 'The Royalist Officer Corps 1642-1660: Army Command as a Reflexion of the Social Structure'; *The Historical Journal*, 26, (1983) p. 953.
 - 3 Newman, *op. cit.* (1977), p. 28; J.L. Malcolm *Caesar's Due. Loyalty and King Charles 1642-1646*; Royal Historical Society, *Studies in History Series*, No. 38 (1982), p. 65.
 - 4 Newman, *op. cit.* (1977), p. 28 writes, 'West of the Pennines, though for a remarkably brief spell, the Earl of Derby's army operated, drawing heavily on the Catholics of the Fylde, and technically under Newcastle's command'. Contemporary allusions to the Catholic content of Derby's army are legion. The two main sources dealing with Lancashire and the war in general are G. Ormerod, ed., *Lancashire Civil War Tracts*, [hereafter *C.W.T.L.*] Chet. Soc. 2 (1844), and W. Beaumont, ed., *A Discourse of the War in Lancashire* [hereafter *Discourse*] Chet. Soc. 62, (1864).
 - 5 The chief work dealing with the war in Lancashire remains E. Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire* (1910), 2nd edition 1973, with introduction by R.N. Dore; see also R. Hutton, 'The Failure of the Lancashire Cavaliers', *THSLC*, 129 (1980), pp. 47-62.
 - 6 Examples of this work include R.N. Dore, ed., *The Letter Books of Sir William Brereton*, I, LCRS, 123, (1983-4). R. Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642-1646* (1982). I. Roy, 'The English Civil War and English Society', in *War and Society. A Yearbook of Military History*, ed., B. Bond and I. Roy (1975), pp. 24-43. M. Wanklyn, 'Royalist Strategy in the South of England, 1642-1644', *Southern History*, 3, (1981) pp. 55-79. P. Young, *Edgehill* (1967). J. Willis Bund's *The Civil War in Worcestershire, 1642-1646* was published in 1905.
- The Quarter Sessions Petitions are in Lancashire Record Office (Q.S.P.); the records of the Committees of Compounding for Lancashire will be found in J.H. Stanning, ed., *Royalist Composition Papers* [hereafter *RCP*] vols. 1-6, LCRS, 24 (1891); 26 (1894), 36 (1898), 72 (1916), 95 (1941), 96 (1942) and in M.A.E. Green ed., *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding etc, 1643-1660*, 5 vols. (1889-92); also useful is Green, ed., *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1642-1656*, 3 vols. (1888). Worsley's 1655 List of Royalist suspects is in B.L. Additional MS. 34,013, ff. 2.55. Roger Whitley's Notebook 1658 is in the Bodleian Library Oxford: Bodl. Ms. Eng. hist. e 309. I am grateful to Dr. Peter

- Newman for sending me extracts from the Notebook. The sources used to identify Catholics include *R.C.P.* vol. 6, recusant lists and poll tax lists printed in *THSLC*, vols. 50, 60 and 64, and recusancy lists for 1666–7, 1667–8 in *Catholic Record Soc.* vol. 6.
- 7 P.R. Newman, 'Aspects of the Civil War in Lancashire', *Lancs. Chesh. Antiq. Soc.* 82 (1983), pp. 115–116.
 - 8 Full documentation for each officer is to be found in my *Biographical Dictionary of Lancashire Royalist Officers, 1642–1660*: forthcoming.
 - 9 *RCP* vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 14. *ibid.*, pp. 23–25. J. Bossy, *The English Catholic Community 1570–1850*, (1975), pp. 404–405. B.G. Blackwood, 'The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion, 1640–1660', *Chet. Soc.* 3rd series, 25 (1978), pp. 3, 7, 18: For a discussion of why Catholicism was so strong in these areas see Bossy, *op. cit.* pp. 92–95, and C. Hibbard, 'The contribution of 1639. Court and Country Catholicism', *Recusant History*, 16 (1982), p. 53.
 - 10 Blackwood, *op. cit.* (1978) p. 28. B.G. Blackwood, 'Plebian Catholics in the 1640s and 1650s', *Recusant History*, 18 (1986), p. 52; I have extrapolated the percentages from Table 3, p. 52.
 - 11 B.W. Quintrell, 'The Practice and Problems of Recusant Disarming 1585–1641', *Recusant History*, 17 (1985), pp. 208–222. A. Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (1981), pp. 211–212. M.J. Havran, *The Catholics in Caroline England* (1962), p. 156.
 - 12 *Kenyon MSS*, HMC 14th Rept. IV p. 59. Fletcher, *op. cit.* pp. 139–40.
 - 13 Fletcher, *op. cit.* pp. 202–203.
 - 14 Hibbard, *op. cit.* pp. 50–54. R. Clifton, 'The Popular Fear of Catholics during the English Revolution', *Past and Present*, 52 (1971), pp. 28, 31, 40, 44–45, 50.
 - 15 Hibbard, *op. cit.* p. 55; Clifton, *op. cit.* p. 47; Fletcher, *op. cit.* p. 5.
 - 16 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 2–5; also quoted in Fletcher, *op. cit.* p. 215 as B.L.E. 148 (12).
 - 17 Malcolm, *op. cit.* p. 159.
 - 18 *Victoria County History of Lancaster*, II (1908), p. 234; G.F.T. Jones, *Saw-Pit Wharton* (1967), pp. 42–45. Hibbard, *op. cit.* p. 56.
 - 19 D.J. Wilkinson, 'The Commission of the Peace in Lancashire, 1603–1642', *THSLC*, 132 (1982), pp. 41–66.
 - 20 B. Coward, *The Stanleys, Lords Stanley and Earls of Derby, 1385–1672*, *Chet. Soc.* 3rd series, 30 (1983).
 - 21 Malcolm, *op. cit.* pp. 49, 171. See Young, *Edgehill* pp. 168–9 where he lists 71 Roman Catholic officers dismissed in 1640, including 26 serving the King in 1642.
 - 22 Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 329, 332–333. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 38–40.
 - 23 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 14, 324, 329, 330.
 - 24 Fletcher, *op. cit.* p. 361; B.L. Additional MSS 28,000, fol. 206, quoted in Fletcher, *op. cit.*, 410 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 18, 21.
 - 25 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 49–50, 54, 58. *Discourse*, p. 6.
 - 26 J. Harland, *The Lancashire Lieutenantcy*, *Chet. Soc.* 50, (1859), pp. 278–280, 293, 294, 296, 298 (the extract from this page). As well as South-West Lancashire the Fylde was specifically referred to as an area of Catholic recruitment and organisation, *ibid.* p. 304.
 - 27 *Discourse*, p. 19; *C.W.T.L.* pp. 65, 68; Harland, *op. cit.* p. 313.
 - 28 *Discourse*, p. 24; *C.W.T.L.* pp. 72, 74–5, 81.
 - 29 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 83, 86–88, 93, 96, 101, 103–4, 131.
 - 30 *Discourse*, p. 6; J. Hall, ed., *The Civil War in Cheshire*, *LCRS*, 19, p. 27. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 24–37, 331.
 - 31 Fletcher, *op. cit.* pp. 329–331.

- 32 *Discourse*, pp. 19–20; Hutton, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 51; M.D.G. Wanklyn and P. Young, 'A King in Search of Soldiers: Charles I in 1642. A Rejoinder', *Historical Journal*, 24 (1981), p. 151.
- 33 Harland, *op. cit.* II, p. 281 gives a figure of 8–900 (regiments of Gerard and Molyneux only) for the departing soldiers; Young estimates the recruits for the main field army as 1,610, *Edgehill*, pp. 89–90 while Wanklyn and Young, *op. cit.* p. 151 give 2000 Foot, including at least two companies from Staffordshire and Cheshire picked up en route. For estimates of the size of Derby's army at Manchester see J.M. Gratton, 'The Lancashire Royalist Regiment in the First Civil War', unpublished Dissertation for the Diploma in Local History, University of Liverpool, 1975, pp. 12–14.
- 34 Harland, *op. cit.* II, p. 313; *C.W.T.L.* pp. 66–68; Gratton, *op. cit.* p. 12.
- 35 Appendix 2 gives the names of 19 persons present at the meeting, 6 were Roman Catholic.
- 36 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 66–68; *Discourse*, p. 17.
- 37 Memorandum of Billeting, December 22, 1642, Anderton Deeds and Papers 16/3 and 16/A, Wigan Public Library; Orders issued by the Earl of Derby, Houghton Deeds and Papers 352, Lancashire Record Office. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 55–56; A.J. Hawkes, 'Wigan's part in the Civil War', *Lancs. Chesh. Antiq. Soc.* 47 (1930–31), pp. 103–104.
- 38 Regarding the size of companies – that of William Pilkington varied between 60 and 120. *RCP*, vol. V, p. 56 et seq. The drain southwards of Lancashire Royalist troops is often advanced as the main cause of their local defeat – the figures quoted here indicate that it was a drain of quality troops that was important not the numbers themselves.
- 39 Harland, *op. cit.* II, pp. 279, 313.
- 40 *Ibid.* p. 294. The mysterious visitors could have been either soldiers from North Wales perhaps under Captain David Lloyd, later governor of Liverpool, or a contingent from Ireland possibly including sergeant-major Purvey who was to assist at the defence at Preston.
- 41 *Discourse*, p. 19.
- 42 G. Chandler, *Liverpool under Charles I* (1965), p. 313.
- 43 *HMC*. 13th Report, pp. 95–96; R.H. Morris and P.H. Lawson, *The Siege of Chester* (1924), p. 38. W. Phillips, ed., *Sir Francis Otley's Papers*, Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society, 2nd Series, 6 (1894), p. 66. See Appendix 4.
- 44 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 84–88; *Discourse*, pp. 30–31; Broxap, *op. cit.* pp. 69–78.
- 45 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 95–98; *Discourse*, pp. 31–35; Broxap, *op. cit.* pp. 78–83.
- 46 Broxap, *op. cit.* pp. 84–88.
- 47 Lindley, *op. cit.* p. 140.
- 48 Blackwood, *op. cit.* (1986) pp. 51–52.
- 49 Newman, *op. cit.* (1977) p. 28; *Discourse*, pp. 19, 29, 52–53.
- 50 The two sources are (i) a list of 29 royalist supporters in Yelland Conyers in Lonsdale, *Calendar for the Advance of Money*, p. 1275 and (ii) the signatures of 29 Manchester townsmen protesting against the affray in the town on July 15 1642 in *C.W.T.L.* pp. 34–35. In a paper on popular royalism, which I read to a Civil War conference at Liverpool University on January 17 1987 and awaits publication, the analysis of over 1600 plebian royalists revealed a geographical distribution of 24% of royalist supporters originating in West Derby Hundred as opposed to in 18% in Amounderness.
- 51 Lindley, *op. cit.* pp. 163–169.
- 52 D.F. Mosler, 'Warwickshire Catholics in the Civil War', *Recusant History*, 15 (1980), p. 262.

- 53 Blackwood, *op. cit.* (1986), pp. 45–46.
- 54 The mention of proportions fighting in the war arises from a discussion with Dr John Morrill at Liverpool on January 17 1987. See also Morrill's comments in *Reactions to the English Civil War 1642–1649*, ed., J.S. Morrill (1982), p. 17.
- 55 Newman, *op. cit.* (1983), p. 95. Ninety-eight Lancashire officers (23.7%) never fought inside their native county – of those, 44 (44.8%) were Catholics. Only 18 fought outside Lancashire during the lifetime of Derby's army, 4 were Catholic. Officers may have fought outside Lancashire for various reasons – early collapse of the Royalist war effort, family connections, financial gain, personal reasons etc.
- 56 *C.W.T.L.* pp. 2–11.
- 57 Newman refers to Derby as being used by the King as a 'glorified recruiting officer in 1643' – P.R. Newman, 'The Royalist Party in Arms: the Peerage and Army Command, 1642', pp. 81–84, in *Politics and People in Revolutionary England. Essays in Honour of Ivan Roots*, ed. C. Jones, M. Newitt and S. Roberts (1986), p. 84.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF ROYALISTS PRESENT AT THE SIEGE OF MANCHESTER SEPTEMBER 24–30 1642

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Ashton of Penketh | |
| 2. Barton (second son to Earl . . .) | |
| 3. Bishop Richard | |
| 4. Byrom | |
| 5. Charnock | R.C.? |
| 6. Danvers | |
| 7. Downes | R.C. |
| 8. Farrington | |
| 9. Gerard Gilbert | |
| 10. Girlington | |
| 11. Grandison | |
| 12. Heblethwaite | |
| 13. Holt | |
| 14. Homerston | |
| 15. Houghton | |
| 16. Marsh | |
| 17. Molyneux | R.C. |
| 18. Monson | |
| 19. Mountagne | |
| 20. Mountain | |
| 21. Nowell | |
| 22. Ogle | |
| 23. Prestwich | R.C. |
| 24. Radcliffe | |
| 25. Rawsthorne | |
| 26. Rivers | |
| 27. St John | |
| 28. Saunders | |
| 29. Skirton | |

- | | | |
|-----|------------|------|
| 30. | Snell | |
| 31. | Standish | |
| 32. | Stowell | |
| 33. | Tarbock | |
| 34. | Townley | R.C. |
| 35. | Tyldesley | R.C. |
| 36. | Windebanke | |

NOTES TO APPENDIX 1

- 1 John Ashton of Penketh was a captain at the siege, he was killed at Bolton on February 16, 1643. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 47, 51, 83; *Discourse*, p. xiv.
- 2 Presumably the son of Robert Bertie, Lord Willoughby of Eresby, from 1627 the Earl of Lindsay – he was part of a small Lincolnshire contingent sent to help Strange. It is possible it may have been Captain Francis Bertie of Grandison's regiment. P. Young, *Edgehill* p. 211.
- 3 A native of Berkshire and a prominent officer in Colonel Gilbert Gerard's regiment. Newman, *Biographical Dictionary*, No. 123.
- 4 Henry Byron was Molyneux's major. He was killed at Edgehill. Newman, No. 227; *C.W.T.L.* pp. 44, 51.
- 5 If this was Robert Charnock of Astley then he was not a Catholic, on the other hand it might be Thomas Charnock of Charnock who was.
- 6 A sergeant-major of uncertain origin. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 7 John Downes of Wardley. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 51, 342; *V.C.H. Lancs.* IV, p. 385, n. 87.
- 8 William Farrington senior of Werden was a key organiser for the Lancashire royalists. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 9 Later Sir Gilbert, Gerard played a leading role both in Lancashire and the south and west Midlands ending his war as governor of Worcester. *C.W.T.L. passim.* Newman, No. 593.
- 10 One of the most active and respected of Lancashire royalists. *C.W.T.L.* pp. 45, 51.
- 11 Quartermaster at the siege *RCP*, IV, p. 82. William Villiers, Lord Grandison, raised his regiment on August 5, 1642. Young, *Edgehill*, pp. 210–211.
- 12 'Mr Thomas Heblethwaites was buried at Didsburie the xxviiijth of September, this gentleman came Anno Dni 1642 against Manchester and was slaine at the siege there . . .' H.T. Crofton & E.A. Tindall, eds., *Registers of St James Didsbury*, Lancashire Parish Register Society, 8 (1900), 1642 September.
- 13 Richard Holt of Ashworth. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51; *RCP*, III pp. 255, 257.
- 14 'Andrew Homerston, heretofore in action against Manchester and there drowned.' *C.C.A.M.* p. 49.
- 15 Sir Gilbert Houghton. *C.W.T.L. passim.*
- 16 Dr Marsh 'taken prisoner before Manchester'. *C.W.T.L.* p. 60.
- 17 Lord Molyneux. *C.W.T.L. passim.*
- 18 Sir John Monson, a prominent Lincolnshire gentleman who commanded a troop in the Lincolnshire royalist regiment raised by

- Lord Willoughby of Eresby probably in late July 1642. A. Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War*, pp. 312, 325 and C. Holmes, *Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire* (1978), pp. 127-28.
- 19 This and the following may be the same person. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 20 Colonel of horse. H.M.C. 5th Rept. *Sutherland MSS*, p. 142.
- 21 Roger Nowell of Read, *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 22 *C.W.T.L.* p. 51. Could be any one of three Lancashire gentlemen.
- 23 Later Sir Thomas Prestwich. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 24 Sir Alexander Radcliffe of Ordshall. *C.W.T.L.* p. 62.
- 25 Captain (later Colonel) Edward Rawsthorne *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 26 John Savage, 2nd Earl Rivers, T. Baines. *History of Lancashire 1870*, p. 321.
- 27 Possible relative of Lord Grandison. Notes as No. 20.
- 28 Major Francis Saunders *C.W.T.L.* p. 51. *Newman*, No. 1273.
- 29 Captain - note as No. 20.
- 30 Captain of horse. Drowned at siege of Manchester - had two rings on his hands worth £20. Broxap, *op. cit.* p. 47n.
- 31 Thomas Standish, junior of Duxbury. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 32 A captain slain at the siege; Hawkins' Tract; T. Baines, *History of Lancashire* (1870), p. 321.
- 33 Edward Tarbock of Tarbock. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 34 Charles Townley. *C.W.T.L.* p. 51.
- 35 Thomas Tyldesley. *C.W.T.L. passim.*
- 36 Francis Windebanke. *Newman*, No. 1591.

APPENDIX 2

THE REORGANISATION OF THE EARL OF DERBY'S ARMY (1) PRESTON
DECEMBER 10 1642

Earl of Derby	
Sir John Girlington	
Alex. Rigby of Burgh	
Robert Holt	
Roger Kirby	
William Farrington	
Adam Morte	R.C.
John Fleetwood	
Henry Ogle	
John Bretherton	
Robert Mercer	R.C.
Francis Sherrington	
Sir John Talbot	R.C.
Ratcliffe Ashton	
James Anderton	R.C.
Sir Gilbert Houghton	
Thomas Clifton	R.C.
William Smith	R.C.
Hugh Anderton	R.C.

[Source: *C.W.T.L.* pp. 67-68].

APPENDIX 3

THE REORGANISATION OF THE EARL OF DERBY'S ARMY (2) DECEMBER 22 1642

Captain Chisnall	
Captain Ogle	
Captain Tarbock	
Captain Slater	
Sir Will. Gerard	R.C.
Mr Eccleston	R.C.
Captain Stevenson	
Captain Marshall	
Captain Halsall	
Thomas Lathom	R.C.
Lord Molyneux	R.C.
Captain Salwin	
Captain Barrow	
Captain Penketh	R.C.
Lieutenant Rannekers	
Captain Ashton	
Edward Norris	R.C.
Peter Veele	
Captain Chernock	
Captain Houghton	
Captain Farrington	
Denny Purvey	R.C.
Captain Somner	
Adjutant Orchard	
Henry Ogle	
Lieutenant Wood	
William Forth	
Mr Lloyd	
Mr Anderton of Lostock	R.C.
Mr Ashton of Chadderton	
Mr Sherrington	

[Source:Anderton Deeds and Papers 16/3 and 16/3A Wigan Public Library].

APPENDIX 4

ROYALISTS AT THE FALL OF PRESTON FEBRUARY 9 1643

Sir Gilbert Houghton's brother	
Westby	R.C.
Purvey	R.C.
Captain Farrington	
Son of Sir John Talbot	R.C.
Richard Fleetwood	R.C.?
Anderton of Clayton	R.C.
Morte	R.C.
Radcliffe Houghton	
Sir Gilbert Houghton	
Mr Blundell	R.C.

Mr Abbot	R.C.
Mr Mawdsley	
2 Thomas Houghtons	
Captain Houghton	
Ralph Shorroock	
John Hilton	
Mr Townley	R.C.

[Source: *C.W.T.L.* p. 75].

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